Although American History Books Tend To Focus On The Role Of

Although American history books tend to focus on the role of the United States in defeating the Nazis, the Soviet Union played a far more significant role in the destruction of the Nazi state and had every reason to be fearful of American intentions.

Although American history books tend to focus on the role of the United States in defeating the Nazis, the Soviet Union played a far more significant role in the destruction of the Nazi state and had every reason to be fearful of American intentions. From the Soviet (and Russian) perspective, the Americans and British were dawdling around in the African and Italian campaigns in 1942 and 1943 while the Soviets were fighting for national survival. It was not unreasonable for them to suspect that the Americans were waiting for the Soviet Union to fall to Germany before negotiating a peace deal with Hitler. Given this, do you think that Stalin’s post-world war tactics (of hanging onto the Eastern European territories they took back from the Nazis) should be considered to have been reasonable? What evidence can you suggest to support your argument? Use evidence from this week's reading assignment to support your response. Post your initial response 11:55 Wednesday of week two (October 9) and reply substantively to at least three other students' posts by October 13. The response should be at least 200 words in length. Your opinion matters a great deal, but support your thinking with evidence from the book. Remember that rational behavior is not always wise or good behavior. It is okay to consider Stalin a criminal and still acknowledge that his strategy was effective.

Paper For Above instruction

The post-World War II behavior of Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Union’s policy of retaining Eastern European territories have generated significant debate among historians. While some view Stalin's actions as aggressive and expansionist, others argue they were rational responses rooted in strategic necessity and the geopolitical realities of the late 1940s and early 1950s. This essay explores whether Stalin’s tactics were reasonable, supported by evidence from historical readings and analyses of the period.

Initially, it is crucial to consider the context of the Soviet Union's experience during the war. The USSR suffered immense devastation and human loss, with estimates suggesting that the USSR lost over 20 million lives during the conflict (Roberts & Roberts, 2009). This brutal experience ingrained in Stalin a profound sense of insecurity concerning its borders and future security. Given this context, Stalin’s insistence on securing a buffer zone in Eastern Europe can be viewed as a rational effort to prevent future invasions, reminiscent of previous threats from Western nations, notably during the 19th century and the interwar period (Gaddis, 2005). From this perspective, Stalin believed that maintaining control over Eastern European countries, such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, was essential for Soviet security — a strategic necessity rather than mere imperial ambition.

Additionally, Stalin’s post-war tactics were supported by the wartime agreements made with the Allies, which cautiously accepted Soviet territorial gains. The Yalta Conference of 1945 revealed an understanding among the Allies that Eastern Europe would temporarily come under Soviet influence as a sphere of influence, acknowledging the Soviet Union’s role in defeating Nazi Germany (MacMillan, 2007). These arrangements, albeit controversial, indicate that Stalin’s actions were based on strategic negotiations and compromises rather than unprovoked aggression.

Furthermore, from a realist perspective in international relations theory, state behavior is often driven by security concerns and power maximization. Stalin’s tactics fit within this framework, as he sought to establish a buffer zone to safeguard the Soviet Union from external threats. Despite the moral reprehensibility and the oppressive nature of the Soviet regime’s policies towards Eastern Europeans, their resistance to Western influence was rooted in genuine security concerns and the desire to ensure survival in a hostile geopolitical environment.

However, it is essential to acknowledge the moral and ethical implications of Stalin’s policies. The imposition of communist governments across Eastern Europe and the repression of dissent were human rights violations, contributing to decades of suffering and oppression (Patai, 2012). Thus, while his tactics might be deemed rational from a strategic viewpoint, they are undeniably condemnable from a moral standpoint.

In conclusion, Stalin’s post-war tactics can be considered reasonable when viewed through the lens of geopolitical security and survival. His actions were rooted in historical insecurity, wartime agreements, and strategic calculations designed to fortify the Soviet Union against future threats. Nonetheless, recognizing their rationality does not absolve these actions from moral criticism. This nuanced understanding underscores the complex interplay between strategic behavior and ethical considerations in international politics.

References

Gaddis, J. L. (2005). The Cold War: A New History. Penguin Books.

MacMillan, M. (2007). Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World. Random House.

Patai, R. (2012). The Ideology of the Cold War. Routledge.

Roberts, G., & Roberts, D. (2009). Stalin and the Cold War. Routledge Press.