Answer Them In Essay Format — Each Answer Must Be 300 Words

Answer Them In Essay Format Each Answer Must be 300 Words Minimum Yo

Answer them in essay format. Each answer must be 300 words MINIMUM. You MAY answer ONE extra question for extra credit. You may use outside sources, but if you do you must include separate works cited page. Plagiarism will not be tolerated.

1. In Plato's Ring of Gyges how is the concept of good/justice explained? Do you think this is the way good/justice actually is, or do you think it's something more?

In Plato’s “Ring of Gyges,” the concept of good and justice is examined through a thought experiment involving a shepherd who discovers a magical ring that grants invisibility. Gyges, the shepherd, uses the ring to indulge in immoral acts, ultimately overthrowing the king and seizing power. Plato presents this scenario to explore whether individuals act justly because it is inherently right or due to fear of punishment. The implication is that, when given the chance to act secretly without repercussions, individuals will prioritize their self-interest over justice or morality. Plato argues that justice is intrinsically linked to the soul’s harmony and the highest good, which is achieved through rationality and virtue. The ring’s power tempts individuals to abandon justice, suggesting that many people prioritize personal gain and pleasure over moral integrity when unchecked by societal constraints. However, this thought experiment has led many to question whether true goodness and justice are merely social constructs or whether they have an objective, inherent nature. Some interpret the story as indicating that humans are naturally selfish and that justice is sustained only by societal rules. Others believe that genuine justice is rooted in the rational pursuit of the good, regardless of external circumstances. Personally, I think it is more than just a social contract or fear of punishment. Deeply rooted in human nature, justice involves a genuine concern for the well-being of others and the pursuit of moral excellence. While external influences and societal pressures can sway individuals, an authentically just person acts morally from within because they recognize the intrinsic value of justice itself. Therefore, justice transcends mere self-interest and societal enforcement, embodying the moral ideal of harmony and virtue within the individual and society alike.

2. According to Max Stirner, the concepts of good, bad and the State are phantasms and are simply determined by power. In detail, what does he mean by this? Do you agree with him? Why or why not?

Max Stirner, a prominent figure in individualist anarchism, posits that the concepts of good, bad, and the State are mere “phantasms,” products of human imagination that serve the interests of those in power rather than representing objective truths. By calling them phantasms, Stirner emphasizes that moral categories and political structures are constructed narratives used to manipulate individuals and maintain authority. He argues that societal morals and laws are not grounded in any inherent moral order but are instead creations designed by those wielding power to control others. For Stirner, these constructs obscure the reality of individual freedom and self-interest, which should be paramount. His critique departs from traditional moral and political philosophies that treat good and evil as universal truths, instead asserting that these are social illusions. Similarly, he claims the State is not a real entity with moral authority but a collective imposition that enforces the interests of those who hold power. This perspective underlines a radical individualism that dismisses external moral standards, advocating instead for the sovereignty of the individual, unconstrained by societal or political narratives. I find Stirner’s argument compelling in that it highlights how societal constructs can serve vested interests rather than universal moral principles. However, I also see limitations in fully dismissing moral concepts, as some fundamental ethics—like compassion or justice—may have objective grounding rooted in human experience and social necessity. Nonetheless, Stirner’s emphasis on the fluid, power-driven nature of moral and political concepts reminds us to critically analyze accepted truths and question authority, which is essential for genuine individual autonomy.

3. What does Arendt mean by the "banality of evil"? How did this concept apply to Eichmann and his deeds? Has there been anyone else in history, past or present, that this concept can apply to?

Hannah Arendt’s concept of the “banality of evil” refers to the shocking realization that ordinary individuals can commit heinous acts not necessarily out of malicious intent but through thoughtlessness, conformity, and a lack of moral reflection. In her investigation of Adolf Eichmann’s trial, Arendt observed that Eichmann was not a fanatic or a deeply evil person but rather an ordinary bureaucrat who blindly followed orders and prioritized obedience over moral judgment. This insight challenged traditional views of evil as rooted in exceptional malevolence, instead highlighting how mundane conformity and uncritical adherence to authority can facilitate horrific deeds. Eichmann’s case exemplified that evil can manifest in the everyday actions of seemingly average people who abdicate personal responsibility, simply executing orders without contemplating the moral implications. The “banality of evil” suggests that such individuals are not inherently evil but fall into destructive patterns through thoughtlessness and a failure to engage in moral reflection. This concept has broader implications, as it can be applied to numerous historical atrocities where ordinary persons contributed to systemic evil—such as those involved in genocides, oppressive regimes, or unethical corporate practices. Examples include the complicity of ordinary citizens in the Holocaust, the participation of individuals in apartheid-era South Africa, or contemporary instances of state violence. Arendt's analysis underscores the importance of moral vigilance and critical thinking in preventing evil from becoming banal or ordinary, emphasizing that moral responsibility rests with individuals to resist unquestioning obedience and conformity.

4. In Martin Luther King's Letter from Birmingham Jail , he talks about how the "white moderate" is a bigger stumbling block to the freedom of black people than even the Ku Klux Klan. Explain what he means by this statement. Taking into consideration Arendt's concept of the "banality of evil", do you think this concept is applicable to King's view of the "white moderate"? Why or why not?

Martin Luther King Jr. in his “Letter from Birmingham Jail” criticizes the “white moderate” for their passive stance and preference for order over justice. He describes the white moderate as more committed to “being well-adjusted” and “avoiding controversy” than actively supporting civil rights. King contends that this attitude impedes genuine progress because it perpetuates the status quo, delaying necessary moral action. Unlike outright segregationists or violent oppressors, the white moderate’s indifference and inaction are insidious; they uphold unjust structures through complacency. King sees them as a more formidable obstacle because their seemingly benign attitude masks a failure to confront injustice, thereby sustaining systemic racism. This reflects the danger of moral apathy and the refusal to take courageous stands, which perpetuate injustice just as much as overt hostility. When considering Arendt’s “banality of evil,” this concept can indeed be applied to King’s critique of the white moderate. Like Eichmann’s bureaucratic obedience, the white moderate’s complacency exhibits thoughtlessness and failure in moral reflection. Both examples demonstrate that ordinary individuals can sustain evil or injustice through passive conformity and a lack of moral engagement. Just as Eichmann’s banality made him complicit in evil, the white moderate’s passive complicity allows unjust systems to persist. Therefore, Arendt's insight helps us understand how moral blindness or indifference in ordinary people can perpetuate injustice, emphasizing the necessity for active moral engagement and resistance against complacency in addressing social evils.

5. According to Zizek, what is subjective violence and the two kinds of objective violence? What are some examples he provides? Do you think his definition of violence is too narrow, too broad, or just right? Why do you think this?

Slavoj Žižek distinguishes between subjective violence and two types of objective violence—symbolic and systemic. Subjective violence refers to direct, visible acts of violence committed by individuals or groups, such as physical assault, war, or terrorism. It is concrete and easily identifiable. Žižek argues that subjective violence often distracts us from the more profound, structural forms of violence embedded within social systems. The first type of objective violence he describes is systemic violence, which is embedded within social, economic, and political structures that create inequalities or oppression, often invisible to casual observation but perpetually harming vulnerable populations. Examples include income inequality, institutional racism, or colonial exploitation. The second is symbolic violence, a term introduced by Pierre Bourdieu, referring to the subtle ways in which social norms, language, and cultural practices reinforce power disparities. For instance, the normalization of poverty or the marginalization of minority voices through cultural narratives exemplify symbolic violence. Žižek’s definition broadens the conventional understanding of violence by including these less visible but equally destructive forms, emphasizing that systemic and symbolic violences sustain and legitimize physical violence. I believe this broader definition is valuable because it reveals the roots of violence within societal structures and cultural representations, encouraging us to confront issues beyond immediate physical harm. However, some might view this scope as too expansive, potentially diluting the urgency of addressing physical violence directly. Nonetheless, Žižek’s approach underscores that addressing violence comprehensively demands recognizing and challenging the underlying systemic and symbolic forces that perpetuate suffering, making his conception both insightful and necessary for understanding contemporary conflicts.

References

• Plato. (c. 380 BCE). The Republic.
• Stirner, M. (1844). The Ego and Its Own.
• Arendt, H. (1963). Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil.
• King, M. L. Jr. (1963). Letter from Birmingham Jail.
• Žižek, S. (2008). Violence: Six Sideways Reflections.
• Gaus, G. (2010). The Routledge Guidebook to Hannah Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem.
• Berlin, I. (2002). The Power of Ideas: The Selected Essays of Isaiah Berlin.
• Foucault, M. (1975). Discipline and Punish.
• Bourdieu, P. (1990). The Logic of Practice.
• Rancière, J. (2004). The Politics of Aesthetics.