Artists' Rights And Lady And The Tramp Questions In Your Rep

Artists Rights And Lady And The Tramp Questionsin Your Report Toent

In your report to Entertainment Weekly, your team has been asked to analyze a legal case involving Disney and Peggy Lee regarding her rights related to the 1955 film "Lady and the Tramp." The case examines whether Lee was entitled to a share of profits from videocassette sales and whether Disney's distribution practices and use of her voice and likeness breached contractual and privacy rights. Your report should assess these issues from both Disney's and Ms. Lee's viewpoints, focusing on contractual interpretation, the scope of rights, customary practices, damages, and legal principles concerning breach of contract and invasion of privacy.

Paper For Above instruction

The case of Peggy Lee versus Disney concerning the rights associated with the 1955 animated film "Lady and the Tramp" raises intricate questions about contractual obligations, customary industry practices, and privacy rights. Analyzing this case involves understanding the contractual language, the nature of Lee’s rights, Disney’s business practices, and relevant legal principles to arrive at an informed conclusion regarding entitlement, breach, and damages.

Entitlement to Videocassette Royalties and Contractual Interpretation

Initially, the core issue is whether Peggy Lee was entitled to a percentage of the profits from videocassette sales. The 1952 contract explicitly stipulated that Disney retained the rights to distribute "Lady and the Tramp" through theatrical and television channels, while Lee retained residual rights for phonographic recordings at 12.5%. Crucially, clause 12(b) clarified that Disney was not granted rights to produce phonograph recordings or transcriptions for sale to the public, which indicates a scope of rights assigned to Disney but also limitations.

From Disney's perspective, the contract, particularly its language and the explicit exclusion in clause 12(b), suggests that the distribution of videocassettes was outside their rights granted in 1952. Conversely, Ms. Lee contended that the broader language of the contract, coupled with the phrase "including the rights to 'any other technology yet to be invented,'" implied that future distribution modalities, such as videocassettes, might be encompassed within the rights transferred or at least under the scope of the original agreement. However, given the explicit exclusion concerning phonograph recordings, and the absence of the term "videocassettes," the contract's language supports Disney's stance that the sale of videocassettes was unauthorized unless a new agreement was made.

From a contract law perspective, courts emphasize the objective intent of the parties at the time of entering into the agreement, guided by the language of the contract and the surrounding circumstances. The explicit language and the well-documented industry practices—where Disney customarily did not provide profit participation to voice performers—favor Disney’s position. Furthermore, the principle of expressed contractual terms taking precedence over industry practice aligns with the law's preference to enforce written agreements as they stand.

Based on this analysis, it seems that Lee was not entitled by the 1952 contractual language to proceeds from videocassette sales unless a subsequent agreement or amendment specifically granted such rights. Hence, Disney's denial of the payment under the original contract appears legally justified.

Analysis of the Two Grounds of Lee’s Suit

a. Breach of Contract

Lee’s claim for breach of contract hinges on whether Disney’s distribution of videocassettes was authorized under the 1952 agreement. The contract's language—particularly clause 12(b)—indicates that Disney did not acquire rights to produce phonograph recordings or other media for sale, which could extend by analogy to videocassettes. Since videocassettes are a new technology developed well after 1952, their inclusion depends on whether the contract intended to encompass such future inventions.

Legal interpretation suggests that ambiguous or broad language in contracts must be construed against the drafter—here, Disney—and in favor of the non-drafting party—Lee. Nonetheless, the explicit exclusion about phonograph recordings implies technological expansion was not intended to include videocassettes unless explicitly covered. Courts also look at the parties' conduct and industry standards; Disney’s longstanding practice of not giving profit participation to voice performers further supports the argument that Lee was not intended to participate in profits from videocassette revenues.

Therefore, from an objective contractual interpretation, Disney did not breach the original agreement by distributing videocassettes, given that such rights were not granted or implied. Lee's attempt to claim profits from videocassettes would likely fail unless an agreement or amendment granting such rights exists.

b. Invasion of Privacy

Lee alleged that Disney's use of her voice and likeness without her consent constituted an invasion of privacy, specifically a violation of her right to control her publicity. California Civil Code § 3344 protects against unauthorized commercial use of a person’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness for profit.

In this case, Lee claimed that Disney's use of her voice in the film and subsequent videocassettes, without her explicit consent for the new medium, infringed her rights. Disney, on the other hand, argued that her participation in the original contract and her reduced payment of $3,500 included rights to her voice performance, which they believed were sufficiently licensed at the time.

Evaluating whether Disney invaded Lee’s privacy hinges on whether her voice or likeness was used without her consent or outside the scope of the original agreement. Since Lee provided her voice and performed according to contractual terms, the scope of her consent—either explicit or implied—becomes key. If her voice was used in new media not contemplated by the 1952 contract, and without her express consent, then she might have a valid privacy claim. Conversely, if the initial agreement included rights to her voice, then the use falls within her scope of consent, negating privacy invasion claims.

Legal precedent underscores that the unauthorized commercial use of an individual’s voice or likeness, especially for profit, constitutes a privacy violation. Still, consent—whether explicit or implied—can serve as a defense. In this case, the core issue revolves around whether Lee’s original contractual consent extended to the use of her voice in new distribution formats and whether Disney’s actions exceeded or stayed within that scope.

Relevance of Industry Practices and Customs

Disney’s longstanding practice of declining profit participation deals for voice performers plays a significant role in interpreting the contract and the parties' intent. Expert testimony from industry professionals suggests that such practices stem from historical experiences and industry standards, reflecting a policy rooted in the idea of "absolute ownership" of rights, a concept prevalent in early Disney practices.

This customary practice indicates that Disney viewed voice performers' rights to profit participation as limited, especially in animated features. The testimony from voice actors like Jodi Benson and Cheech Marin supports the notion that profit-sharing was not customary for voice work, which reinforces Disney's position and helps interpret the original contract as not providing for profit participation from videocassette revenues.

Moreover, including industry custom and usage as evidence of contractual intent aligns with contract law principles that courts consider such evidence to interpret ambiguous terms or establish parties' expectations. Since Disney’s practice had been consistent over decades, it suggests that the parties did not intend to extend profit-sharing rights to voice performers for new media, including videocassettes.

Potential Damages and Calculations

If Disney prevails, Lee would only be entitled to residuals—specifically, the 12.5% of profits she was originally granted for phonographic recordings, capped at $381,000 under union rules. Conversely, if she prevails and receives damages based on profit participation, her claim for $9 million could be justified. The calculation of damages involves determining the profits attributable to videocassettes.

Using the provided fictitious income statement, the profit before tax for "Lady and the Tramp" in 1987 was $27,239,744. Assuming that portion of profit attributable to videocassette sales is proportional to the sales revenue ($72,236,000), her share based on 12.5% of profits would be calculated accordingly.

Furthermore, if Lee's claim is upheld, her damages before interest would be 12.5% of the profits, supporting her claim of substantial monetary relief. The estimated damages facilitate quantification, aligning with standard calculations of profit-sharing claims.

Interest, Damages, and Final Award

If Lee prevails, court-allowed prejudgment interest at 8% from February 28, 1988, to March 1, 1991, could significantly increase her damages. The interest calculation would involve applying the annual interest rate to her awarded damages for each year following the demand date. The total interest and damages combine to produce the final monetary award.

For example, assuming damages of roughly $3 million (based on 12.5% of the profits), the interest accrued over three years at 8% compound annually would amount to approximately $720,000, leading to a total award of about $3.72 million.

Such calculations underscore the importance of contractual clarity and the potential financial repercussions for companies infringing on rights or deviating from standard practices.

Conclusion

This analysis indicates that, based on contractual language and industry practices, Disney likely did not breach the contract by distributing videocassettes without explicit permission from Lee. Furthermore, her privacy claims hinge on whether her consent extended to new media formats, which appears questionable given the scope of her original agreement and industry norms. Ultimately, a court's interpretation emphasizing the parties’ intent, the explicit contractual terms, and customary practices supports Disney’s position, although Lee's residual rights and damages remain significant points of contention.

References

• Cal. Civ. Code § 3344. (2004). California Civil Code concerning unauthorized commercial use of name, likeness, or voice.
• Levi Strauss & Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 24 Cal.App.3d 372 (1972).
• Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
• Morey v. Vannucci, Cal.App.4th 904 (1997).
• Rivers v. Beadle, Cal. App. 2d 691 (1968).
• Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, Contracts (9th ed. 1987), §§ 684, 685.
• The Entertainment Litigation Reporter, "Breach of Contract: Lee v. Walt Disney Productions," April 8, 1991.
• U.S. Copyright Office. (2020). Copyright Law and Industry Practices.
• Smith, J. (2019). Contract Interpretation in Entertainment Law. Journal of Business Law, 25(4), 567-589.
• Walker, L. (2021). Privacy Rights of Performers: Legal Principles and Industry Standards. Entertainment Law Review, 33(2), 112-130.