Being Sane In Insane Places D. L. Rosenhan

Being Sane In Insane Places D L Rosenhanif Sanity And Insanity Exist

Being Sane in Insane Places D. L. ROSENHAN If sanity and insanity exist, how shall we know them? The question is neither capricious nor itself insane. However much we may be personally convinced that we can tell the normal from the abnormal, the evidence is simply not compelling.

It is commonplace, for example, to read about murder trials wherein eminent psychiatrists for the defense are contradicted by equally eminent psychiatrists for the prosecution on the matter of the defendant's sanity. More generally, there are a great deal of conflicting data on the reliability, utility, and meaning of such terms as "sanity," "insanity," "mental illness," and "schizophrenia." Finally, as early as 1934, Benedict suggested that normality and abnormality are not universal. What is viewed as normal in one culture may be seen as quite aberrant in another. Thus, notions of normality and abnormality may not be quite as accurate as people believe they are. To raise questions regarding normality and abnormality is in no way to question the fact that some behaviors are deviant or odd.

Murder is deviant. So, too, are hallucinations. Nor does raising such questions deny the existence of the personal anguish that is often associated with "mental illness." Anxiety and depression exist. Psychological suffering exists. But normality and abnormality, sanity and insanity, and the diagnoses that flow from them may be less substantive than many believe them to be.

At its heart, the question of whether the sane can be distinguished from the insane (and whether degrees of insanity can be distinguished from each other) is a simple matter: do the salient characteristics that lead to diagnoses reside in the patients themselves or in the environments and contexts in which observers find them? . . . [T]he belief has been strong that patients present symptoms, that those symptoms can be categorized, and, that the sane are distinguishable from the insane. More recently, however, this belief has been questioned. . . . [T]he view has grown that psychological categorization of mental illness is useless at best and downright harmful, misleading, and pejorative at worst.

Psychiatric diagnoses, in this view, are in the minds of the observers and are not valid summaries of characteristics displayed by the observed. Gains can be made in deciding which of these is more nearly accurate by getting normal people (that people who do not and have never suffered symptoms of serious psychiatric disorders) admitted to psychiatric hospitals and then determining whether they were discovered to be sane and, if so, how. If the sanity of such pseudopatients was always detected, there would be prima facie evidence that a sane individual can be distinguished from the insane in the hospital context. If, on the other hand, the sanity of the pseudopatients was never discovered, serious difficulties would arise for those who support traditional modes of psychiatric diagnosis.

Given that the hospital staff was not incompetent, that the pseudopatient had been behaving as sanely as he had been outside of the hospital, and that it had never been previously suggested that he belonged in a psychiatric hospital, such an unlikely outcome would support the view that psychiatric diagnosis betrays little about the patient but much about the environment in which an observer finds him. This article describes such an experiment. Eight sane people gained secret admission to 12 hospitals. Their diagnostic experiences constitute the data of the first part of this article; the remainder is devoted to a description of their experiences in psychiatric institutions.

The eight pseudopatients were a varied group. One was a psychology graduate student in his 20’s. The remaining seven were older and "established." Among them were three psychologists, a pediatrician, a psychiatrist, a painter, and a housewife. Three pseudopatients were women, five were men. All of them employed pseudonyms, lest their alleged diagnoses embarrass them later. Those who were in mental health professions alleged another occupation in order to avoid the special attentions that might be accorded by staff as a matter of courtesy or caution, to ailing colleagues.

With the exception of myself (I was the first pseudopatient and my presence was known to the hospital administrator and chief psychologist and, so far as I can tell, them alone), the presence of pseudopatients and the nature of the research program was not known to the hospital staffs. The settings were similarly varied. In order to generalize the findings, admission into a variety of hospitals was sought. The 12 hospitals in the sample were located in five different states on the East and West coasts. Some were old and shabby, some were quite new.

Some were research-oriented, others not. Some had good staff-patient ratios, others were quite understaffed. Only one was a strictly private hospital. All of the others were supported by state or federal funds or, in one instance, by university funds. After calling the hospital for an appointment, the pseudopatient arrived at the admissions office complaining that he had been hearing voices. Asked what the voices said, he replied that they were often unclear, but as far as he could tell they said “empty," “hollow" and "thud." The voices were unfamiliar and of the same sex as the pseudopatient. . . . Beyond alleging the symptoms and falsifying vocation, and employment, no further alterations of person, history, or circumstances were made. The significant events of the pseudopatient's life history were presented as they had actually occurred. Relationships with parents and with spouse and children, with people at work and in school, were described as they were or had been. Frustrations and upsets were described along with joys and satisfactions.

These facts are important to remember. If anything, they strongly biased the subsequent results in favor of detecting sanity, since none of their histories or current behaviors were seriously pathological in any way. Immediately upon admission to the psychiatric ward, the pseudopatient ceased simulating any symptoms of abnormality. In some cases, there was a brief period of mild nervousness and anxiety, as none of the pseudopatients really believed that they would be admitted so easily. Indeed, their shared fear was that they would be immediately exposed as frauds and greatly embarrassed.

Moreover, many of them had never visited a psychiatric ward; even those who had, nevertheless had some genuine fears about what might happen to them. Their nervousness, then, was quite appropriate to the novelty of the hospital setting, and it abated rapidly. Apart from that short-lived nervousness, the pseudopatient behaved on the ward as he/she "normally" behaved. The pseudopatient spoke to patients and staff as he/she might ordinarily. Because there is uncommonly little to do on a psychiatric ward, he/she attempted to engage others in conversation. When asked by staff how he/she was feeling, he/s/he indicated that he/she was fine, that he/she no longer experienced symptoms. He/She responded to instructions from attendants, to calls for medication (which was not swallowed), and to dining-hall instructions. Beyond such activities as were available to him on the admissions ward, he spent his time writing down his observations about the ward, its patients, and the staff. Initially these notes were written "secretly," but as it soon became clear that no one much cared, they were subsequently written on standard tablets of paper in such public places as the dayroom. No secret was made of these activities.

The pseudopatient, very much as a true psychiatric patient, entered a hospital with no foreknowledge of when he would be discharged. Each was told that he would have to get out by his own devices, essentially by convincing the staff that he was sane. The psychological stresses associated with hospitalization were considerable, and all but one of the pseudopatients desired to be discharged almost immediately after being admitted. They were, therefore, motivated not only to behave sanely, but to be paragons of cooperation. That their behavior was in no way disruptive is confirmed by nursing reports, which have been obtained on most of the patients. These reports uniformly indicate that the patients were "friendly," "cooperative," and "exhibited no abnormal indications."

The failed detection of the pseudopatients despite their apparent normal behavior highlights critical issues about psychiatric diagnosis and the perception of sanity. All pseudopatients were discharged with diagnoses of schizophrenia "in remission," despite never exhibiting any genuine symptoms during their hospital stay. This suggests that once labeled, the diagnostic label persisted regardless of behavior, emphasizing the power of institutional biases and diagnostic assumptions. The fact that their actual behavior aligned with mental health norms but they were still misdiagnosed underscores how much diagnoses are influenced by the environment and expectations of the observers rather than accurate representations of individual pathology.

Paper For Above instruction

Rosenhan's seminal experiment, "Being Sane in Insane Places," critically examines the validity of psychiatric diagnoses and the concept of sanity versus insanity. The core argument posits that mental health labels are often not rooted solely in individual behavior but are significantly influenced by environmental factors, institutional biases, and societal expectations. The experiment's design highlights the pervasive influence of context in defining what is deemed normal or abnormal, illuminating the limitations of psychiatric classification systems.

The study involved eight pseudopatients who feigned auditory hallucinations to gain admission into various psychiatric hospitals. These individuals were thoroughly examined and behaved as normally as possible after admission until their discharge. Despite their consistent demeanor and absence of symptoms, all pseudopatients were diagnosed with schizophrenia—most labeled as "in remission"—and remained institutionalized for an average of 19 days. Notably, their behaviors did not deviate from their typical conduct outside the hospitals, yet the staff failed to recognize their sanity, illustrating a profound bias rooted in the diagnostic process itself.

This experiment exposes the fallibility and subjectivity inherent in psychiatric diagnoses, emphasizing that such labels often reflect institutional expectations rather than genuine pathology. The notion that diagnoses are in the minds of observers and not solely about observable characteristics questions the objectivity of psychiatric classifications. Rosenhan’s findings challenge clinicians and researchers to reconsider the criteria and methodologies used in diagnosing mental illness, advocating for a more nuanced and environment-aware approach.

The implications extend to societal perceptions of mental health, where labels can stigmatize and distort individual identities. Rosenhan’s work underscores the importance of contextual understanding and criticizes the over-reliance on diagnostic labels that may serve institutional purposes rather than accurately representing patient realities. It calls for reforms in psychiatric practice, emphasizing humanity, contextual awareness, and skepticism of diagnostic authority.

In conclusion, Rosenhan’s study compellingly demonstrates that the boundary between sanity and insanity is often blurred by environmental influences and diagnostic biases. It reveals that psychiatric labels are not always objective truths but constructs heavily shaped by institutional contexts. This insight urges mental health practitioners to critically evaluate diagnostic practices and prioritize comprehensive understanding over simplistic categorizations, fostering a more empathetic and accurate approach to mental health.

References

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