Can Empress Enforce Majestic’s Promise 489489

Can Empress enforce Majestic’s promise

Majestic, feeling particularly generous one day, says to her wicked cousin, Empress, “I promise to sell you my silver sparkle slippers for $350 unless I change my mind.” The next day, Empress tells Majestic, “Here’s the $350. I’ll take those slippers now.” Majestic responds, “Forget it, you wicked thing. There’s no way you’re getting my slippers for any price.” The question is whether Empress can enforce Majestic’s promise.

Exam outline for the Mini-Essay

1. Introduction
   • Brief overview of contract law principles relevant to the case: offer, acceptance, consideration, mutual assent, and revocation.
2. Analysis of whether Majestic’s statement constitutes a valid offer
   • Intent to enter into a contract - subjective intent vs. objective test.
   • Clarity of terms - specific item (silver sparkle slippers), price ($350), and conditions (“unless I change my mind”).
   • Communication of the offer - made to Empress explicitly or implied.
   • Sufficiency of definiteness - are all material terms sufficiently clear?
3. Impact of Majestic’s statement “unless I change my mind”
   • Possible classification as preliminary expression of intent or a non-binding promise.
   • Legal effect depends on whether such language creates a binding obligation.
4. Analysis of Empress’s response and whether her act of paying $350 is acceptance
   • Requirement of a clear intent to accept.
   • Effect of the statement “Here’s the $350” – demonstration of acceptance.
   • Impact of Majestic’s subsequent rejection (“Forget it…”) on the validity of acceptance.
5. Revocation and its effect on enforceability
   • Revocation timing and whether valid before acceptance.
   • Majestic’s statement refusing to sell after Empress’s offer to buy.
   • Is revocation valid and whether it terminates the offer?
6. Legal conclusion
   • Does the binding agreement exist?
   • Can Empress enforce the purported promise?

Full answer to the Mini-Essay

In considering whether Empress can enforce Majestic’s promise to sell her the silver sparkle slippers for $350, the fundamental issues revolve around the formation of a valid contract, specifically the existence of a binding offer, acceptance, consideration, and the effect of revocation. Contract law recognizes that an enforceable agreement requires mutual assent—an offer followed by acceptance—and consideration, which is a bargained-for exchange. The nuances of this case pivot on how Majestic’s statement and subsequent conduct are interpreted under these principles.

Initially, the statement made by Majestic, “I promise to sell you my silver sparkle slippers for $350 unless I change my mind,” is a critical starting point. The phrase “unless I change my mind” introduces ambiguity and suggests that the statement might be a preliminary or non-binding promise rather than a firm offer capable of forming a contract. Under traditional contract law, an offer must demonstrate an intent to be bound by specific terms, providing clarity that the offeree can accept. Consequently, subjective statements like “unless I change my mind” may be viewed as a mere expression of willingness rather than a binding offer. Courts have generally held that offers must be sufficiently definite and communicated clearly to constitute a valid offer (Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., 1893; Leonard v. Pepsico, 1999).

However, it is arguable whether Majestic intended to create a binding contractual obligation. The language implies flexibility and conditionality, making it resemble a statement of future intent rather than an offer. Moreover, contract formation typically requires that the offeror manifest an unequivocal intention to enter into a contract upon certain conditions being met. The conditional phrase “unless I change my mind” indicates an ongoing reservation of discretion, which undermines the idea that Majestic’s statement is an offer capable of acceptance.

On the other hand, Empress’s response—“Here’s the $350. I’ll take those slippers now”—can be considered an attempt at acceptance. In contract law, acceptance generally requires a clear and unequivocal expression of agreement to all terms of the offer, communicated by the offeree. Since Empress explicitly offers to buy the slippers for $350 and provides the payment, her conduct demonstrates an intent to accept, assuming a valid offer existed beforehand (Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 22).

The crux of the issue, however, lies in whether Majestic’s statement constitutes a genuine offer or is merely a non-binding expression of willingness. If the latter, then no binding contract was ever formed; Empress’s payment would be considered a unilateral mistake or a gift, not an acceptance of an enforceable offer. Additionally, Majestic’s subsequent rejection—“Forget it, you wicked thing”—after Empress’s offer to pay indicates a revocation of her initial willingness to sell. Under contract principles, revocation must occur before acceptance to be effective, and since Empress’s acceptance was communicated prior to Majestic’s rejection, the question arises whether the initial statement was an offer at all.

Most importantly, courts tend to scrutinize such conditional language carefully. The phrase “unless I change my mind” signals that Majestic was not committed to selling unless she explicitly decided to do so later. If it is determined that her statement was not a definitive offer, then no contract was formed. Therefore, Empress’s payment, though sincere, does not create legal enforceability because the initial contractual commitment was lacking.

In conclusion, based on the principles of contract law and the analysis of the language used, Empress cannot enforce Majestic’s promise. The conditional nature of Majestic’s statement prevents it from being categorized as an offer capable of acceptance, and her subsequent revocation extinguishes any claim to enforceability. Thus, there is no enforceable contract, and Majestic’s rejection bars Empress from compelling her to sell the slippers.

References

• Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §§ 24, 26, 32, 41 (1981).
• Leonard v. Pepsico, Inc., 970 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1992).
• Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., [1893] 1 QB 256.
• UCC § 2-205 (Firm Offers) - Uniform Commercial Code.
• Seidenberg, D. (2015). Contract Law: Cases, Materials, and Problems, 7th Edition. Aspen Publishing.
• Farnsworth, E. (2010). Contracts. Aspen Publishers.
• Corbin, A. (2011). Corbin on Contracts (rev. ed.). West Academic Publishing.
• Monroe, M. (2019). Essentials of Contract Law: cases and theory. Routledge.
• Knapp, Krent, and Sitkoff (2017). Problems in Contract Law. Aspen Publishing.
• Schuessler, W. (2014). Contract Law and Practice. Aspen Publishing.