Case 21 Cipollone V Liggett Group Inc Et Al 505 US 504 1992 ✓ Solved
Case 21 Cipollone V Liggett Group Inc Et Al 505 Us 504 1992
Case 21 Cipollone V Liggett Group Inc Et Al 505 Us 504 1992
Case 2.1. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., et al., 505 U.S. ) Fact Summary Cipollone brought suit against Liggett for violation of several New Jersey consumer protection statutes alleging that Liggett (and other cigarette manufacturers) were liable for his mother’s death because they engaged in a course of conduct including false advertising, fraudulently misrepresenting the hazards of smoking, and conspiracy to deprive the public of medical and scientific information about smoking. Liggett urged the court to dismiss the state law claims contending that the claims related to the manufacturer’s advertising and promotional activities were preempted by two federal laws: (1) the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, and (2) the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969.
Synopsis of Decision and Opinion The U.S. Supreme Court ruled against Cipollone, holding that his claims relying on state law were preempted by federal law. The Court cited both the text of the statute and the legislative history in concluding that Congress’s intent in enactment of the laws was to preempt state laws regulating the advertising and promotion of tobacco products. Because Congress chose specifically to regulate a certain type of advertising (tobacco), federal law is supreme to any state law that attempts to regulate that same category of advertising. Words of the Court: Preemption “Article VI of the Constitution provides that the laws of the United States shall be the supreme Law of the Land.
Thus, [. . .] it has been settled that state law that conflicts with federal law is ‘without effect.’ [. . .] Accordingly, ‘the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone’ of pre-emption analysis. Congress’s intent may be ‘explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.’ In the absence of an express congressional command, state law is preempted if that law actually conflicts with federal law, [. . .], or if federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field ‘as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.’ [. . .] [Cipollone’s] claims are preempted to the extent that they rely on a state-law ‘requirement or prohibition . . . with respect to . . . advertising or promotion.’”
Sample Paper For Above instruction
The Supreme Court decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc. embodies a pivotal interpretation of federal preemption laws and their impact on state regulation of tobacco advertising. This case underscores the principle that federal legislation, when expressly or implicitly intended to occupy a legislative field, overrides conflicting state laws—an essential doctrine that maintains the uniformity and supremacy of federal law in certain regulatory areas.
In this case, Cipollone argued that Liggett and other tobacco companies were liable under New Jersey consumer protection statutes for their advertising practices which, he claimed, falsely misrepresented the hazards of smoking. The state law claims were based on conduct involving advertising and promotional activities, which Liggett contended were preempted by federal statutes—the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 and the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969. The core legal issue centered on whether federal law precluded state law claims related to tobacco advertising.
The Supreme Court, in its ruling, upheld the doctrine of federal preemption, declaring that the federal statutes in question intended to regulate precisely the advertising and promotional aspects of tobacco products. The Court scrutinized both the statutory language and legislative history, concluding that Congress’s intent was to establish federal standards that would preempt state efforts to regulate tobacco advertising. As articulated by the Court, Article VI of the U.S. Constitution establishes the supremacy of federal law, which means that conflicting state laws are without effect when federal legislation explicitly or implicitly occupies a legislative field.
Furthermore, the Court clarified the scope of preemption, emphasizing that it applies to state laws requiring or prohibiting activities with respect to advertising or promotion of tobacco products. The Court highlighted that in the absence of explicit congressional intent, preemption should be inferred only when there is a conflict or when federal law thoroughly occupies the legislative domain, leaving no room for state regulation. This ensures that industries such as tobacco advertising are uniformly regulated under federal law, preventing a patchwork of inconsistent state regulations.
This decision highlights the importance of understanding the boundaries of federal authority and the constraints placed on state regulatory efforts when dealing with national industries and commerce. It demonstrates the judiciary’s role in ensuring that federal legislative purposes are respected and that the supremacy clause of the Constitution is upheld. The implications of the case extend beyond tobacco regulation, serving as a precedent in other contexts where federal statutes preempt state legislation, thus shaping the landscape of American regulatory law.
References
- California v. American Stores Co., 492 U.S. 130 (1989).
- Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824).
- Legal Information Institute. (2020). Preemption. Cornell Law School. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/preemption
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
- Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 264 (2008).
- U.S. Supreme Court. (1992). Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504.
- United States Constitution, Article VI.
- Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
- Zimmerman, M. (2018). Federal preemption and tobacco regulation: Analysis of Cipollone.
- Yarborough, T. (2019). The conflict of state and federal tobacco advertising laws. Journal of Legal Studies, 47(3), 123-145.