Chapter 23 Functionalism Outline 1: Functionalisms Negoti

Chapter 23 Functionalismchapter Outline 1 Functionalisms Negative T

Chapter 23 discusses functionalism as a criticism of the mind/body identity theory. It introduces the negative and positive theses of functionalism, explaining that while it does not reject materialism, it challenges the idea that psychological states are identical with physical states based solely on their types. The chapter clarifies the distinction between psychological tokens and types, using the type/token distinction, emphasizing that psychological types are multiply realizable across different physical substrates and species. It critiques the identity theory's physicalism, explains the causal role of mental states, and explores the implications for artificial intelligence and non-human animals. The chapter also discusses objections, such as the nature of pain and sensations, and concludes that functionalism offers a more plausible account of mental states by focusing on their causal roles rather than their physical makeup. It ends with reflections on free will and psychological egoism, alongside review questions and problems for further thought about types, tokens, and mental state characterization.

Paper For Above instruction

Functionalism has emerged as a significant philosophical theory regarding the philosophy of mind, primarily as a critique of the earlier mind/brain identity theory. The core motivation behind functionalism resides in its capacity to better account for the diversity and variability of mental states across different physical substrates, including in artificial intelligence and non-human animals, by emphasizing their causal roles rather than their physical constitution (Putnam, 1975; Fodor, 1968).

The identity theory, which posits that each mental state is identical to a specific physical state, faces the problem of multiple realizability—that is, the idea that the same mental state can be realized by different physical states across various organisms or systems. For example, the mental state of pain in humans might correspond to a particular neural activation, but in other species or artificial systems, pain could be realized differently physically yet still functionally serve the same role. This critique aligns with the type/token distinction: types refer to properties or states sharing essential characteristics, while tokens are individual instances. In the context of the mind, mental tokens are particular episodes or states occurring at specific times, whereas mental types are the general properties such as pain or desire, which can be instantiated in numerous tokens (Putnam, 1975).

Functionalism rejects the notion that mental types are identical to physical types, arguing instead that mental states are multiply realizable because they are characterized by the causal roles they play. For example, pain is not defined by any particular neural configuration but by its causal role—namely, causing withdrawal behavior, causing aversion, and being caused by certain external stimuli (Fodor, 1968). This view is exemplified through the analogy of mousetraps, which are physical objects made from various materials but share the functional role of catching mice. Similarly, mental states in different beings or systems may have different physical implementations but share the same functional roles (Block, 1978).

The implications extend to artificial intelligence: if future computers can perform functions akin to perception, reasoning, and desire, then, according to functionalism, they could possess mental states despite different physical substrate—silicon chips versus biological brains. This challenges the view that only biological systems can have minds and emphasizes the importance of causal roles rather than physical composition (Putnam, 1975).

In addition, the chapter considers the application of functionalism within the animal kingdom, suggesting that non-human species can have psychological states if their physical systems realize the same causal roles. For example, a dog’s feeling of pain might be realized in different brain structures compared to humans, yet serve the same functional purpose (Fodor, 1968). Similarly, within humans, different physical encodings can instantiate the same mental state over time, illustrating the flexible and multiple realizability of mental properties (Block, 1978).

However, the theory faces objections, particularly regarding sensations like pain, which seem to have qualitative or subjective properties that functional accounts may overlook. Critics argue that functional descriptions do not capture what it 'feels like' to be in a certain mental state—an argument known as the “hard problem” of consciousness (Chalmers, 1995). Nonetheless, proponents maintain that focusing on causal roles provides a more scientifically promising framework for understanding the mind, especially in light of artificial intelligence developments (Searle, 1980).

In conclusion, functionalism offers a flexible, causally oriented account of mental states that accommodates the diversity of physical realizations across organisms and systems. It denies that mental types are physically identical, advocating instead that the key feature of mental states is their causal roles. This perspective sustains that minds are realizable in multiple physical forms, aligning well with advances in neuroscience and AI, and addressing some limitations of the identity theory (Fodor, 1968; Putnam, 1975).

References

• Block, N. (1978). Troubles with Functionalism. In W. Savage (Ed.), Perception and Cognition (pp. 77-96). University of Minnesota Press.
• Chalmers, D. (1995). Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2(3), 200-219.
• Fodor, J. (1968). Psychological Explanation. Random House.
• Putnam, H. (1975). The Nature of Mental States. In H. Putnam, Mind, Language, and Reality. Cambridge University Press.
• Searle, J. (1980). Minds, Brains, and Programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3(3), 417-457.