CHE 320 Safety Engineering Ethics And Professionalism Fall 2

Che 320 Safety Engineering Ethics And Professionalismfall 2017che 320

Review the details of the Deepwater Horizon disaster on the Wikipedia article titled “Deepwater Horizon explosion”. a) Many warning signs and incidents occurred before the explosion, but engineers and management chose to ignore them. List three of these near-misses, and explain why each should have been viewed as a warning of the impending disaster (i.e. what specifically did they suggest might go badly wrong?) b) Why were operational problems and concerns about safety not reported to (or acted on) by the upper management who were ultimately responsible for the Deepwater Horizon?

Read the article titled “Blowup” by Malcolm Gladwell. a) Explain what is meant by the term “normal accident”. b) Why does our ever-growing reliance on complex safety systems in many aspects of our lives (e.g. antilock braking systems, network firewalls, smoke detectors, etc.) actually encourage people to take more risks than they would have otherwise?

Read the article titled “No One Knew He Was There” on the EHS Today website: a) How was Garcia killed? What was the official cause of death? Who was ultimately responsible for Garcia’s death? b) List at least four general behaviors or actions that Garcia took, which violated accepted industry safe practices for work in confined spaces. (do not simply list four missing items of PPE, etc.) c) Explain what was meant by “near-miss confined space fatality” in the article. d) What is the main subject of the legal dispute between Garcia’s family and Reynolds?

Consider the process flowsheet above. In this process, hot gasoline containing methane gas is pumped by a positive-displacement pump (P-1) into a separator drum (D-1). The methane gas and the liquid gasoline are separated in the drum, D-1. A heat exchanger (E-1) cools the hot liquid gasoline stream, to limit the loss of gasoline by evaporation in the drum. Valves V-4 and V-6 automatically maintain the liquid level in the drum, between set high and low limits. See the Crowl text for details of the symbols on the flowsheet diagram. (You are encouraged to discuss this problem in “what-if” teams). Signals (dashed lines) to and from the other valves and the pump allow remote manual control by an operator in the main control room. There are no people working near the equipment (good plant design). During a startup, the pump P-1 suddenly exploded in a large ball of fire. Although the pump and the connected piping are destroyed, the drum itself was only slightly damaged by the fire. a) What is the most likely sequence of events that led to the destruction of the pump? List them in order of their occurrence. Hint: Use a “What-If?” analysis to consider what would happen if each of the labeled pieces of equipment did not operate as expected (either singly or together). What would cause that to happen? Safe assumptions: Pipes carrying hot gasoline would be made from metal (conductive), so static electricity is not a concern. There is no oxygen/air in the gasoline/CH4 mixture, so it cannot burn/explode unless released to the atmosphere. The pump is rated for continuous operation at the maximum temperature of the hot gasoline feed. No open flames are present. b) Draw appropriate reliefs on the diagram, wherever they are required to prevent catastrophic failure. Err on the side of safety in your final design, but please do not simply put a relief on every pipe or piece of equipment. Copy and paste this symbol where required on the figure: Relief symbol: c) Describe a simple change that could be made to the piping or signal/control lines, which would completely and automatically eliminate the main cause of this explosion. Hint: Signals can be made to control equipment other than valves. Just adding a relief or two is not sufficient.

The photographs below show a typical underground pump vault in a petroleum refinery. The pump is used to feed a liquid hydrocarbon stream (e.g. gasoline) to a nearby distillation tower. a) Is the pump vault a permit-required confined space? Explain in terms of the formal definitions of confined spaces. What signage would be required for this area? b) Using the Hazard Identification Tool which was distributed in class, identify at least three potential life-threatening hazards which might exist in the pump vault. c) List the specific items of safety equipment that are required before anyone enters the vault to perform maintenance on the pump head. d) List and describe the role of each person who is required to be involved in the maintenance operation.

Refer to the process flow diagram above: Propane vapor is compressed in the turbine compressor C-1 to a final pressure of 7 atm. The boiling point of propane at 7 atm is 12 °C. The compressed vapor is then cooled with 4 °C water in the heat exchanger E-1. The cold propane vapor condenses into liquid propane, which is held in the large refrigerated tank T-1 until it is fed to a reactor. The process is controlled from a remote control room, and an overfill sensor sends an alarm signal to the operators if the liquid rises above a set level. The tank can be inerted by closing all valves except V-5 and V-7; the N₂/propane vapor goes to a flare, where it is safely burnt. Valves V-7 and V-8 are normally closed. (You are encouraged to discuss this problem in “what-if” teams). Mark on the diagram where pressure/vacuum reliefs are necessary using the specified relief symbol. Please ensure arrows indicate the location and type of relief (pressure or vacuum).

Extra Credit (20 points): Read the article “Learning from UCLA” by J. N. Kemsley. Then answer: a) In 2008, a graduate student died during a “routine” organic synthesis step using a very hazardous chemical. What was this chemical and what was the primary hazard? b) Summarize the suspected sequence of events that led to the incident and death of Sheharbano “Sheri” Sangji, the 23-year-old graduate student. c) Describe the “proper” technique to transfer the dangerous chemical and whether it was followed. Include the proper PPE and if it was worn. d) Did regulators (Cal/OSHA) cite violations to UCLA? Why? e) What systemic problem did this incident reveal, particularly related to safety culture? Be sure to answer in complete, grammatically correct sentences, with in-depth analysis.

Paper For Above instruction

The Deepwater Horizon disaster exemplifies how ignored warning signs and a culture of disregard for safety can culminate in catastrophic events. Three notable near-misses before the explosion include: (1) The increased frequency of drilling disturbances, which suggested unstable well conditions; these indicated risks of a blowout due to pressure build-up. (2) The failure of cement barriers, which should have been a red flag for potential blowouts or gas leaks, warning of inadequate well integrity. (3) Reports of abnormal pressure readings not properly addressed could have indicated an impending pressure release or gas influx. Each of these signaled escalating risks that, if properly responded to, might have prevented the disaster. The failure to escalate safety concerns was rooted in management’s pressure to proceed with operations, ignoring operational problems and safety concerns, thus reducing safety to a lower priority and fostering a culture that dismissed warning signs. The overall corporate culture prioritized cost and production over safety, leading to the suppression or neglect of crucial safety information.

Malcolm Gladwell’s concept of a “normal accident” refers to accidents that are inevitable in highly complex, tightly coupled systems, where small failures can cascade into catastrophic failures despite safeguards. Our reliance on complex safety systems, such as anti-lock brakes, network firewalls, or smoke detectors, inadvertently encourages complacency and risk-taking because users might trust these systems to prevent accidents, leading to neglect of manual safety precautions. This misplaced confidence reduces vigilance and shifts the perceived safety responsibility from operators to technology, increasing the likelihood of incidents when these systems fail or are bypassed.

Garcia was killed due to unsafe entry procedures in a confined space, with the official cause being asphyxiation due to insufficient ventilation. The primary responsibility lies with the employer, Reynolds, for negligence in safety oversight. Garcia engaged in unsafe behaviors by entering the confined space without proper testing or continuous monitoring, failing to follow permit-required confined space procedures, and neglecting to use proper communication or emergency measures. A “near-miss confined space fatality” refers to an incident where a worker almost dies due to hazards in a confined space, highlighting potential risks that could have led to fatalities if circumstances were slightly different. The legal dispute revolves around whether Reynolds had adequately implemented safety protocols and whether Garcia’s death was preventable, with his family arguing that Reynolds failed in duty of care.

The process flowsheet involves a pump (P-1) that transports hot gasoline containing methane into a separator drum (D-1). The most likely sequence leading to the pump’s explosion begins with a failure in maintaining proper temperature or pressure, possibly due to blocked valves or sensor malfunction. If the safety valves V-4 and V-6 failed to relieve excess pressure, or if control signals malfunctioned, pressure could build up unnoticed, eventually causing the pump to rupture. A “What-If” analysis reveals that a failure in the level sensors or cooling system could lead to overheating, further escalating pressure and temperature inside the pump. To prevent such failures, relief valves should be installed at the pump outlet and in the piping network where pressure could reach unsafe levels, indicated on the diagram by the relief symbols. A simple change to eliminate the explosion main cause involves installing automated control logic that shuts down or isolates the pump if abnormal temperature or pressure patterns are detected, thus avoiding buildup and preventing catastrophic failure automatically.

The underground pump vault in a refinery is classified as a permit-required confined space because it involves limited entry, potential for hazardous atmospheres, and difficulty in immediate rescue. Signage indicating the space’s permit-required status is necessary. Potential hazards include: (1) a risk of explosive vapor accumulation; (2) oxygen deficiency due to vapors displacing air; (3) chemical exposure from residues or leaks. Safety equipment required for entry includes an atmospheric tester, personal protective equipment such as respirators, gloves, and protective clothing, and a specialized rescue harness. Maintenance personnel involved must include a trained entrant with a confined space permit, an attendant monitoring the situation outside, and an entry supervisor overseeing procedures to ensure safety protocols are followed.

The process involving propane vapor compression includes pressures up to 7 atm, with condensing occurring at 12°C. Reliefs are necessary at the tank’s vapor space and the compressor inlet and outlet lines to prevent overpressure or vacuum collapse. Relief symbols should be placed at the compressor discharge, tank vapor inlet, and any piping where pressure could exceed or fall below safe limits. Proper placement ensures rapid pressure relief during abnormal conditions, safeguarding equipment and personnel. This proactive safety measure minimizes the risk of tank rupture or pipeline failure due to unanticipated pressure surges or losses.

The incident involving Sheharbano "Sheri" Sangji revealed critical systemic issues in laboratory safety culture. The primary chemical involved was tert-butyllithium, known for its extreme reactivity and hazard. The sequence of events included her handling the chemical without adequate PPE, overriding safety protocols, and lacking proper training, leading to a chemical fire that resulted in her death. The proper transfer technique involved using a syringe pump and proper PPE such as gloves, goggles, and a lab coat, which Sangji did not follow. Regulations cited by Cal/OSHA highlighted UCLA’s failure to enforce adequate safety procedures, including proper training, supervision, and hazard communication. The broader systemic problem illuminated by this tragedy was a culture that prioritized research productivity over safety, leading to unsafe work practices. This incident underscores the importance of fostering a robust safety culture where safety compliance is integral to research activities, with management committed to hazard mitigation and continuous safety training.

References

• Det Norske Veritas. (2010). Deepwater Horizon Incident Review. DNV, Norway.
• Gladwell, M. (2004). Blowup: The Myth of Safety in Complex Systems. The New Yorker.
• NRC. (2012). Safety Culture in Nuclear and Industrial Settings. National Research Council.
• US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board. (2012). Investigation Report on the Sheharbano Sangji Incident.
• OSHA. (2010). Confined Spaces in Construction. OSHA Publication 3117-02N.
• Crowl, M. A., & Louvar, J. F. (2017). Chemical Process Safety: Fundamentals with Applications. Pearson.
• Kempsley, J. N. (2008). Learning from UCLA: An Analysis of Laboratory Safety Failures. Journal of Chemical Health and Safety.
• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. (2019). Hazardous Chemical Handling and Storage.
• American Society of Safety Professionals. (2021). Best Practices in Safety Culture Development.
• National Safety Council. (2018). Risk Management and Safety Systems Reliability. NSC Publications.