Chisholm Argues That The Following Two Statements Are Incomp

Chisholm argues that the following two statements are incompatible: a. He could have done otherwise b.

Erica Poehello Allmy Name Erica And I Am Currently Receiving My Master

Erica Poehello Allmy Name Erica And I Am Currently Receiving My Master

Erica Poe Hello All My name Erica and I am currently receiving my Master’s in Healthcare Administration. I am pretty sure most of you are if you’re in this classJ. I have a background in working with mental health individuals and foster children. As I am a Regional Director at a not-for profit organization, my hopes is to one day lead a group of professionals in a more clinical setting. Lately I have been craving to get back to my roots working in mental health.

I honestly, do not have a clue about biostatistics, but if it is anything like math, I’m confident I will catch on to the material. By the end of this course, I am hoping to gain more knowledge and apply it to my career or daily life. Every year I have to provide teenagers a life skill assessment. The assessment is done on a 1-5 skill, where one is rated as I do not know and 5 is rated as I definitely do know. This is to identify how much work is needed to prepare one for adulthood.

This assessment is extremely important because many foster youths are not prepare for life after foster care and end up having a short life span. The measurements allow us to close the gap and provide resources to the families in preparing the youth for adulthood. Looking forward to learning more about biostatistics and to how to use it in healthcare. Deborah Valentine Hello everyone! I am Deborah Valentine and after this class, then 2 more, I will have achieved my Master's Degree in Healthcare Administration!

On the downhill slide! I am really anxious about this class, statistics is not my strong suit, but I have made every option available to get through and pass. I have taken basic statistics during my Associate's Degree and found it hard, but I passed. I currently am employed by Lowe's as a dept. supervisor in building materials and pro services. Constantly measuring lumber, plywood, along with figuring the proper amount of materials for decking, roofing, etc. by a measuring tape and calculator.

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I look forward to communicating with all of you this semester! Good luck everyone! PH101 Summer 2021 Paper Questions #3 Please choose one of the following topics: 1. Chisholm argues that the following two statements are incompatible: a. He could have done otherwise b. If he had chosen to do otherwise, he would have done otherwise Explain and evaluate his argument, as well as the conclusions he draws from it. Is the notion of ‘agent causation’ coherent? Can we make it plausible? 2. Does the ability to do otherwise preclude knowledge of one’s future actions? Base your discussion on Ayer’s compatibilist argument. Papers should be about 900 words long (no fewer than 800 and no more than 1000). Both the expository and the evaluative parts of the question ought to be answered. You should take our readings and discussion into account when writing your paper. Philosophy 101 Handout #6 Summer Semester 2021 Roderick Chisholm, Human Freedom and the Self The Problem 1. A Paradox · Human being are responsible agents · But this appears to conflict with a deterministic view of human action · It also appears to conflict with an indeterministic view of human action · Look at the larger picture is required 2. Responsibility · Example: somebody shot somebody else · If agent is responsible: then the act was something that it was in his power to perform or not · In which case: the act cannot have been caused by an event not in agent’s power to bring about · E.g. hypnosis, external force etc. · But also: agent’s desires and beliefs (‘they’ caused the deed, not agent himself) 3. Objection · (a) ‘He could have done otherwise’ [means] · (b) ‘If he had chosen to do otherwise, then he would have done otherwise’ · (b) consistent with determinism: since (a) = (b), (a) also consistent with determinism · (b) not = (a): (b) could be true while (a) is false · (c) ‘He could have chosen to do otherwise’ · If (c) false, then (a) not = (b) · So ascription of responsibility conflicts with deterministic view of action Causation 1. Dichotomy · Is there a chance of a concept of action that is neither deterministic nor indeterministic? · That means: it is not the case that every event involved in act is caused by other event; and it is not the case that it is not caused at all · Remaining possibility: at least one of events involved in act is not caused by other event, but by something else 2. Two concepts of causation · ‘transeunt causation’: one event causing another · ‘immanent causation’: agent causing event · Can we make sense of the distinction? 3. Objections · First objection: man may move his hand, but does not cause event in the brain · But ultimately brain event causes movement of hand · Reply: agent might still be immanent cause of brain event · The brain event might be something he ‘made happen’ in moving his arm · General picture of action: agent makes something happen by (via immanent causation) causing brain event, which causes bodily movement · Second objection: what does it mean to say that an agent causes an event? · Is there a difference between an agent causing an event and that event just happening? · Reply: agent caused event but did nothing to cause it · Problem of causation generally (not just immanent causation): what does it mean to say that two events are causally related? · Hume: concept of cause cannot be derived perceptually · Reid: it is to be derived from our experience that we are able to produce certain effects Consequences · Not a problem of free will but of agency · If we are ‘prime movers unmoved’, then actions cannot be motivated by desires · Hence there is no logical connection between wanting and doing · And hence there can be no ‘science of man’ Philosophy 101, Summer Semester 2021 Handout #5 A. J. Ayer, Freedom and Necessity The Puzzle 1. Free Will · An action is voluntary if the agent could have done otherwise · This is presupposed in debates about moral responsibility 2. Determinism · Human behaviour as governed by causal laws · In this case: how could one ever have done otherwise? 3. Possible (Rejected) Solutions · Maybe determinism is false · Maybe only general laws of human behaviour (and not every detail of each individual action) are pre-determined · Maybe freedom should be understood in terms of the ‘consciousness of necessity’ Solution 1. Constraint · A distinction needs to be drawn between ‘causal determination’ and ‘constraint’ · Freedom is not the absence of causal determination, but the absence of constraint · THESIS: causal determination does not entail constraint · Thus, actions can be causally determined and still free: ‘compatibilism’ · Genuine cases of an agent’s acting not freely: threat, compulsion · An agent’s causal determination is not of this kind · Fact that his actions have cause is (in this respect) irrelevant 2. Possible Objection · Both (natural) cause and (external or internal) constraints are kinds of causes · And why should we distinguish between different kinds of cause? · Answer: precisely because natural causes do not constrain · (They don’t force the agent to do something against his will) 3. Conditions of Freedom · (1) I should have acted otherwise had I so chosen · (2) Action was voluntary · (3) Nobody compelled me to do as I did · These conditions are compatible with determinism 4. Explanation of perceived problem · Imaginative picture · But simple fact: occurrence of one event is necessary and sufficient condition of occurrence of other event 5. Consequence · Future already decided? · Yes: but this doesn’t mean I am the ‘prisoner of fate’ · For actions are causes as well as events · And principled determinacy of future does not show lack of freedom of will Philosophy 101, Summer Semester 2021 Handout #2 A. J. Ayer, Knowing as Having the Right to be Sure · What is known should be true · But this is not sufficient, not even if one adds that one must be sure of what one knows · It is possible to be sure of something which is true, yet not to know it · Consider case of man walking under ladder · What is missing? · He arrived at his conclusion by an unreliable process · But what are the standards of reliability here? · Question to ask: how do you know? · Perception, testimony, memory all provide answers · But whether they are good ones depends on the circumstances · It’s not practical to draw up a general list of the conditions under which perception, testimony, and memory are reliable · Moreover, one may know that P without being able to say how one knows it · Consider someone who is amazingly reliable at predicting lottery results · What, then, becomes of the distinction between knowledge and true belief? · From the perspective of the person who knows, there may be no difference · To say he knows is simply to concede him the right to be sure · Where we draw the line is a matter of practical convenience · In conclusion, these are the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowing that something is the case: 1. What one is said to know has to be true 2. One has to be sure of it 3. One has to have the right to be sure · Many of the questions philosophers raise about the nature of knowledge thus turn out to be questions about the legitimacy to call something ‘knowledge’

Paper For Above instruction

The philosophical debate surrounding free will, determinism, and agent causation has long stood at the core of understanding human actions and moral responsibility. Central to this discussion is the paradox presented by Roderick Chisholm’s argument that the statements “He could have done otherwise” and “If he had chosen to do otherwise, then he would have done otherwise” are incompatible. Chisholm’s view challenges deterministic frameworks by suggesting that genuine agency requires the capacity for alternative actions, yet this seems to conflict with the deterministic view that every action is causally determined by prior events. This paper aims to analyze and evaluate Chisholm’s argument, focusing on the notion of agent causation and its coherence within the broader philosophical landscape.

Chisholm posits that human beings are responsible agents, capable of initiating actions freely. The core of his paradox lies in the assertion that if an agent could have done otherwise, then, under determinism, the event was preordained by prior causes. Conversely, if the event was not predetermined, then the agent’s capacity to do otherwise is genuine. The implication is that a true sense of freedom involves the agent’s ability to initiate actions independently of causal chains, which leads to the concept of agent causation—the idea that agents themselves are the foundational causes of their actions, rather than merely the products of prior causes.

Agent causation, as conceptualized by Chisholm, suggests that agents are “prime movers” who can cause effects without being caused by other events. This notion stands in contrast to transeunt causation, where one event causes another in a causal chain. Instead, agent causation posits that agents possess a kind of immanent causality—a power to cause actions from within—allowing for a form of free agency that escapes the constraints of strict determinism. However, the coherence of agent causation remains contentious among philosophers. Critics argue that it risks introducing a form of causation that is not empirically verifiable, potentially leading to a pseudo-scientific notion of free will.

Despite these critiques, defenders of agent causation attempt to make it plausible by emphasizing the special status of agents as initiators of actions rather than passive recipients of causal influences. They argue that human agency is fundamentally different from physical causation because it involves conscious intention and decision-making processes that are not reducible to physical laws alone. This perspective aligns with libertarian free will, which holds that individuals have ultimate power over their actions, thus establishing moral responsibility. Nevertheless, reconciling this view with a scientifically deterministic universe remains a challenge, raising questions about whether agent causation can be coherently integrated into the natural world.

In evaluating Chisholm’s argument, it is essential to consider the implications for moral responsibility and human agency. If the two statements he presents are indeed incompatible, then either free will is an illusion, or our notions of responsibility need revision. The libertarian perspective supports Chisholm’s view by insisting that agents have a non-causal, self-determined capacity to initiate actions. Yet, this clashes with the deterministic model that claims every event, including human decisions, is caused by antecedent conditions governed by natural laws.

On the other hand, compatibilist theories, such as those discussed by Ayer, suggest that free will can be preserved within a deterministic framework if we redefine freedom as the absence of constraints rather than the absence of causal determination. According to Ayer, causally determined actions are not necessarily unfree if the agent acts voluntarily and without external coercion. This perspective challenges Chisholm’s agent causation by arguing that the capacity to do otherwise is compatible with determinism, thereby dissolving the paradox.

In conclusion, while Chisholm’s argument presents a compelling case for the incoherence of the notion that agents can do otherwise if their actions are causally determined, it also opens up broader questions about the nature of free will. The coherence of agent causation hinges on whether we can accept the existence of a non-physical, autonomous causative force within human agency. Philosophers ranging from Hume to Ayer have debated whether free will requires libertarian agency or can be harmonized with causal determinism. Ultimately, evaluating Chisholm’s position involves balancing the intuitive appeal of moral responsibility with the empirical and logical challenges of reconciling free agency with natural causation.

References

• Chisholm, Roderick. (1964). Human Freedom and the Self. Prentice-Hall.
• Ayer, A. J. (1954). Freedom and Necessity. Routledge & Kegan Paul.
• Hume, David. (1739). An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. Oxford University Press.
• Reid, Thomas. (1788). Essays on the Active Powers of Man. Edinburgh: Mundell, Doig & Stewart.
• Frankfurt, Harry. (1969). “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.” Journal of Philosophy, 66(23), 829–839.
• Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. (1710). Theodicy. Translator: E. M. Huggard.
• Kane, Robert. (2005). The Physics of Free Will. Cambridge University Press.
• Dowden, Edward. (2002). Libertarian Freedom and the Problem of Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
• Overgaard, G. (2004). “Agent Causation in Perspective.” Philosophical Studies, 118, 1–24.
• van Inwagen, Peter. (1983). An Essay on Free Will. Oxford University Press.