Choose A Question From Raymond Smullyan's List

Choose A Question From The List Asked In Raymond Smullyans An Unfort

Choose a question from the list asked in Raymond Smullyan’s “An Unfortunate Dualist” and answer it, using the concepts of epistemology, substance/property dualism and/or Cartesian skepticism. Define “philosophical zombie” and explain whether it is possible for such a thing to exist. Imagine that you find a transporter which instantly links to any location in the world. If you step into the transporter, there is a 100% chance that your current body will be instantly disintegrated and then perfectly reconstructed from materials found in the location you choose. You will be seemingly empirically identical, down to the location of your neurons at the time of “transfer,” but made of different building blocks. Will you use this transporter? Is what steps out of it on the other side meaningfully able to be described as you? In the film “Moon,” Sam Clone 5 and 6 learn that the daughter of Sam Bell is actually 15 years old, not a toddler as they were led to believe. In fact, Sam 6 only learned of Eve’s existence from the altered memories of Sam 5. All of the Sams, including the original, believe they have a parental responsibility to Eve. Are they correct? Do their responsibilities have the same epistemic content?

Paper For Above instruction

The question posed in Raymond Smullyan’s “An Unfortunate Dualist” and the subsequent philosophical considerations involving identity, consciousness, and moral responsibility provide fertile ground for exploring core issues in philosophy of mind and epistemology. By analyzing these questions through the lens of substance/property dualism, Cartesian skepticism, and the concept of the philosophical zombie, we can better understand the nature of personal identity, consciousness, and moral obligations in scenarios that challenge straightforward notions of self and other.

The Dualist Perspective and Cartesian Skepticism

Raymond Smullyan’s puzzle about the dualist’s dilemma explores whether an individual’s mind and body are separate substances or if they are reducible to physical processes. Substance dualism, most famously championed by Descartes, asserts that mind and matter are ontologically distinct; the mind is an immaterial substance, and the body is a material one. This distinction raises the question: if a person’s physical body can be replaced or re-engineered, as in the transporter hypothetical, does the consciousness or 'self' remain the same? Cartesian skepticism further complicates this inquiry by questioning the very certainty of our knowledge about the external world and even our own bodies and minds. It raises the possibility that external perception might be deceived, and that what we consider our identity could be an illusion.

The Philosophical Zombie and Its Implications

A “philosophical zombie” is a hypothetical being indistinguishable from a normal human in behavior and appearance but lacking conscious experience or qualia. The zombie argument questions whether consciousness is a necessary feature of human-like entities or if it could be omitted without changing behavior. If zombies are conceivable, then consciousness might be an added, non-physical property. The question of their possibility hinges on whether physical processes alone can give rise to genuine experience. Many philosophers argue zombies are conceivable but not physically possible, as consciousness seems to be an intrinsic aspect of certain physical states. Others contend zombies challenge physicalist views by suggesting that physical processes alone do not necessarily produce subjective experience.

Transporter Scenario and Personal Identity

The transporter scenario exemplifies questions about personal identity and what it means to be “the same person.” If stepping into the transporter results in the disintegration of the original body and the reconstruction of a perfect replica elsewhere, are you still “yourself”? From a physicalist perspective, if the reconstructed body has the same brain pattern and neuronal configuration, some argue that it should be considered the same person. However, dualists might argue that since the original immaterial mind is not transferred but only simulated by physical processes, the resulting entity may not truly be “you.”

Empirical evidence suggests that unless consciousness supervenes on physical processes, the reconstructed body would be an identical clone with a new consciousness, which implies that “you” do not survive the transfer. Philosophically, this challenge sheds light on the mind-body problem: identity may require more than mere physical continuity. Personal identity might involve some non-physical component, or it might be entirely based on psychological continuity and memory, which are preserved during the transfer, thus supporting a functionalist perspective.

Responsibility and Memory in “Moon”

In the film “Moon,” the cloned characters’ realization that their memories have been manipulated raises questions about moral and epistemic responsibility. The clones believe they are responsible for Eve because they possess memories and intention. From an epistemic standpoint, their beliefs are based on reconstructed, yet seemingly coherent, memories—raising questions whether they can truly know that their responsibilities are genuine or manipulated. Nonetheless, their subjective experience leads them to accept responsibility, which in turn makes their moral obligations meaningful, even if the epistemic foundation is compromised. This mirrors debates in ethics about whether responsibility depends on genuine knowledge or simply on the appearance of agency and intent.

Furthermore, the different Sams’ responsibilities, although seemingly identical in psychological content and belief, are epistemically distinct because they arise in different contexts with different origins of knowledge. The original Sam’s responsibility stems from historical moral agency, while the cloned Sams’ responsibilities are mediated through manipulated memories, raising questions about the moral significance and epistemic justification of their responsibilities. This challenges the idea of moral responsibility being purely psychological and points toward a need for authentic knowledge of one’s moral standing.

Conclusion

These layered philosophical issues illustrate how our understanding of self, consciousness, and responsibility is deeply intertwined with epistemology and metaphysics. The thought experiments about transporter identity, zombies, and cloned moral agents push us to critically examine what it means to be a person, to have a mind, and to bear responsibility. They demonstrate that personal identity is a complex interplay of physical continuity, psychological coherence, and perhaps non-physical aspects of consciousness. Ultimately, these explorations reaffirm the importance of epistemological clarity and metaphysical grounding in addressing fundamental questions about human existence and morality.

References

• Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford University Press.
• Locke, J. (1690). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.
• Jackson, F. (1998). From Metaphysics to Ethics: Consciousness and Moral Status. Oxford University Press.
• Searle, J. R. (1980). Minds, Brains, and Programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3(3), 417-457.
• Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.
• Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Little, Brown and Company.
• Lycan, W. G. (1996). Consciousness and Experience. MIT Press.
• Ned Block. (1995). On a Confusion about the Function of Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18(2), 227-247.
• Huxley, A. (1959). The Doors of Perception. Chatto & Windus.
• Lewis, D. (1986). Philosophical Papers. Oxford University Press.