Choose One Of The Following Questions And Post An Answer

Chooseoneof The Following Questions And Post An An

Instructions: Please choose one of the following questions and post an answer/response by Thursday 11:59pm ET. Also please make sure to respond to at least two posts of your classmates and/or the instructor by Sunday 11:59pm ET. To earn full credit for this discussion assignment, you need to make three substantive posts (see Discussion Guidelines under Course Home). Make sure to include references to the course materials in your responses.

(1) Pascal makes an interesting argument about why we should believe in God. However, some people would not view this as a "rational" argument for God's existence per se, but rather merely a "rational" argument for buying an insurance policy. In other words, we buy an insurance policy for rational reasons, namely we believe that there might be a fire that destroys our property one day in the future. However, we do not buy an insurance policy because we actually believe that a fire exists at present. Indeed, if a fire did exist at present, we would call the fire department, rather than the insurance company—that would be the rational thing to do in a situation where an actual fire existed. Is Pascal's argument merely a rational argument for buying an insurance policy just in case God does exist? Or does Pascal's argument convince you that God does, in fact, exist? Why or why not? When answering this question make sure to include references to the assigned readings.

(2) Everyone makes mistakes. A mistake, by definition, is not something that is done on purpose or intentionally. Our beliefs also can be mistaken. Sometimes our mistaken beliefs are due to the fact that we did not have enough information or evidence to know any better. On the other hand, sometimes our mistaken beliefs are due to the fact that we were not paying close enough to the evidence that already was available to us. Consider the following claim: A person who does not believe in God is making a mistake (an epistemological error). Could not believing in God ever be due to the fact that a person does not have enough evidence to believe in God? What would Bergmann think? Would he agree? Why or why not? When answering this question make sure to include references to the assigned readings.

Paper For Above instruction

The philosophical discourse surrounding Pascal’s wager and the epistemology of belief in God raises profound questions about rationality, evidence, and decision-making under uncertainty. Pascal’s wager presents an argument that is often interpreted as pragmatic rather than purely evidential—framing belief in God as a rational 'bet' in the face of uncertainty about God's existence. Conversely, epistemologists such as Bergmann scrutinize the nature of belief and the evidential thresholds necessary for rational belief, challenging the notion that a lack of evidence necessarily results in epistemic error. This paper explores whether Pascal’s wager merely functions as a pragmatic insurance policy for divine belief, or whether it convincingly demonstrates God's actual existence. It also considers if non-belief in God could be an epistemic mistake due to insufficient evidence, as well as Bergmann's stance on this issue, referencing key philosophical texts and theories.

Pascal’s Wager: Rational Bet or Evidence of God's Existence?

Pascal’s wager (Pascal, 1657/1958) is often portrayed as a pragmatic argument that hinges on decision theory rather than empirical evidence. Pascal contends that while the evidence for God's existence may be inconclusive, believing in God is the rational choice if the potential gains—eternal happiness—outweigh the finite costs of belief. Critics argue that this is a form of prudential reasoning akin to purchasing insurance—betting on the existence of God as a safeguard against the possibility of eternal punishment or missing out on eternal bliss (Hick, 2007). Under this interpretation, Pascal’s argument does not provide evidence for God's existence but merely recommends belief as the most prudent option given the stakes involved. Therefore, some scholars see Pascal’s wager as psychological insurance rather than an epistemic proof that God exists (Dennet, 2014).

However, supporters of Pascal might counter that the wager implies a rational acknowledgment of the limits of human reason concerning divine matters. For example, Plantinga (2000) argues that faith can be rationally justified in light of certain sensus divinitatis and religious experiences that go beyond mere pragmatic considerations. From this perspective, Pascal’s wager could be seen not just as a utiles-based bet but as an invitation to consider the rationality of belief in the face of hidden divine realities. Nevertheless, critics remain skeptical about equating pragmatic bet-hedging with genuine evidence of divine existence. The wager primarily appeals to personal stakes rather than empirical validation, leading many to see it as a form of non-evidential reasoning (Craig, 2010).

Is Non-Belief in God an Epistemic Mistake?

Turning to the epistemological question, Bergmann (2003) emphasizes that belief formation should be grounded in adequate evidence. His virtue epistemology stresses that beliefs that are formed via intellectual virtues—such as attentiveness and diligence—are rational when supported by sufficient evidence. From Bergmann’s perspective, refusing to believe in God without sufficient evidence could be an epistemic mistake, amounting to intellectual negligence or failure to properly attend to available evidence. He advocates for a probabilistic approach, where beliefs should align with degrees of evidential support (Bergmann, 2009).

Nevertheless, Bergmann also recognizes that evidence for divine existence may be elusive or insufficient, and thus non-belief could be rational if the evidence is weak or ambiguous. He champions the idea that non-belief can be rational if one exercises intellectual virtues in weighing the evidence. If the evidence for God’s existence is genuinely lacking or inconclusive, non-belief might not be an epistemic mistake, but rather an epistemically justified stance in light of the available evidence (Bergmann, 2009). Consequently, this perspective aligns with the view that evidence, or the lack thereof, plays a crucial role in rational belief formation and that non-belief need not automatically be a failure of rationality.

Conclusion

In sum, Pascal’s wager serves more as a pragmatic safeguard rather than a proof of divine existence; it relies on decision-theoretic considerations rather than empirical evidence. While the wager may persuade some to adopt religious belief out of prudence, it does not conclusively demonstrate that God exists. From an epistemological standpoint, non-belief in God could be justified if supported by the absence of sufficient evidence, consistent with Bergmann’s virtue epistemology. Beliefs, including religious ones, should stem from adequate, attentive evaluation of evidence, and failing to believe when the evidence does not support belief is not necessarily an epistemic error. The debate underscores the complexity of rational belief at the intersection of faith, evidence, and rational decision-making.

References

• Bergmann, M. (2003). The Rationality of Religious Belief. Oxford University Press.
• Bergmann, M. (2009). Justification without belief: The epistemology of religious belief. Oxford University Press.
• Craig, W. L. (2010). The Kalam Cosmological Argument. Wipf and Stock Publishers.
• Dennet, D. C. (2014). Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking. W. W. Norton & Company.
• Hick, J. (2007). Evil and the God of Love. Palgrave Macmillan.
• Pascal, B. (1958). Pensées (A. J. Krailsheimer, Trans.). Penguin Classics. (Original work published 1657)
• Plantinga, A. (2000). Warranted Christian Belief. Oxford University Press.