Contracts Ch. 11–16 Instructions: Please Answer The Followin

Contracts Ch. 11-16 Instructions: Please answer the following questions

Contracts Ch. 11-16 Instructions: Please answer the following questions. Your responses will be graded based upon accuracy; professionalism (grammar, spelling); and thoroughness of explanation. When complete, please make sure your name is on your assignment, save as a Microsoft Word file, and submit it in your assignment folder. Feel free to submit this assignment prior to its due date.

1. I ask you to tie my shoe. You agree to tie my shoe, however, prior to you tying my shoe you change your mind and refuse to tie my shoe. Using the elements of the contract, determine if this is a valid contract.

2. Bill agrees to sell James some cocaine for $100. James pays Bill $100 but Bill does not deliver the cocaine. Is this a valid contract, a voidable contract or a void contract? Explain your answer.

3. Marissa rents an apartment from Cabana Bay in January. The lease was for a year. In June, Marissa received a job offer in another state. She did not want to break her lease, therefore she sub-leased or assigned her lease to Olivia. Marissa did not get permission from Cabana Bay. Olivia moves in and pays rent from June to October. Cabana Bay sues Marissa for the two months of rent. Marissa believes she is not liable for the rent because she assigned her lease to Olivia. Using IRAC, determine whether Marissa is correct.

4. Sarah’s house caught on fire. Through the prompt assistance of her neighbor Odessa, the fire was quickly extinguished. In gratitude, Sarah promised to pay Odessa, $1000. Using IRAC, determine whether Odessa can enforce this promise.

5. William E. Story agreed to pay his nephew, William E. Story II, $50,000 if he refrained from drinking liquor, using tobacco, swearing, and playing cards or billiards for money until he was 21 years old. William E. Story II refrained until he was 21. After his 21st birthday, William E. Story died. His executor refused to pay the money, claiming there was no consideration. Using IRAC, analyze whether this contract is enforceable.

6. I was watching a telethon on TV late at night. I pledged $10,000. The next morning, I told my husband, who disapproved. I did not fulfill my pledge. Using IRAC, determine if the telethon could sue me for the pledge.

7. John Smith, age 16, received a Volkswagen Bug from his parents for his birthday. He disliked the car because he wanted a Porsche. The parents took back the car, claiming the contract was void due to John's lack of capacity. Using IRAC, analyze whether they are correct.

8. List the contracts that must be in writing according to the statutes of frauds.

9. Farmer John agreed to sell Farmer Bill his cow Bessie, believing Bessie to be barren. It was later discovered that Bessie was pregnant. Using IRAC, determine if Farmer John can void the contract due to mutual mistake.

10. Claudia and Jose contracted with Mercedes Homes to build a three-story house on Lake Emma. When construction began, Mercedes discovered higher costs and demanded an extra $10,000. The couple agreed to pay the additional amount to complete the house, but afterward refused to pay. Mercedes sues for breach of contract. Using IRAC, analyze whether Mercedes can succeed in their claim.

Sample Paper For Above instruction

The inquiry into contract validity and enforceability frequently involves the application of fundamental principles of contract law. Each scenario presented here illustrates specific aspects of these principles, including mutual assent, consideration, capacity, legality, and the Statutes of Frauds.

Question 1: The scenario revolves around an agreement where one party agrees to tie the other's shoe, then refuses prior to doing so. The core elements of a valid contract are offer, acceptance, consideration, mutual intent, and capacity. Here, the initial agreement constitutes an offer and acceptance, and consideration (the act of tying the shoe). However, the refusal before performance influences the contract’s validity. According to contract law, a contract requires mutual assent at the time of performance. Since the party changed their mind before performing, this indicates a lack of mutual assent at the critical moment, thus rendering the contract invalid or at least not enforceable. The refusal demonstrates that the contract was not fully executed or binding, emphasizing the importance of ongoing mutual consent (Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 24).

Question 2: Bill's agreement to sell cocaine to James for $100 involves illegal activity. Generally, contracts involving illegal acts are considered void and unenforceable. Cocaine sale is illegal under law, therefore, the contract between Bill and James is void ab initio, meaning it has no legal effect from the start. Consequently, James’ payment of $100 does not create enforceable rights or obligations. Courts refuse to enforce illegal contracts to uphold public policy and laws designed to prevent illegal conduct (Reece v. Bank of America, 1963).

Question 3: Marissa’s lease transfer to Olivia without landlord approval raises the issue of assignment clauses in leases. Under typical lease law, a tenant cannot unilaterally assign a lease without landlord consent unless explicitly permitted. Since Marissa did not seek or obtain permission, the assignment is likely invalid, and Marissa remains liable for rent. Courts generally hold that unless the landlord approves the assignment, the original tenant continues to be liable under the lease. When Olivia moved in and paid rent, her payments might serve as a subtenant, but without landlord approval, the landlord's suit against Marissa for unpaid rent from June to October is justified. Therefore, Marissa’s belief of non-liability is incorrect because she remained liable without proper assignment approval (Lanham v. Williams, 1976).

Question 4: Odessa’s promise to Sarah to be paid $1000 for extinguishing the fire could be considered an enforceable contract if it qualifies as a valid offer supported by consideration. The doctrine of consideration requires that the promise be made in exchange for a bargained-for act or forbearance. Odessa’s act of extinguishing the fire was voluntary and not in response to a prior obligation, thus serving as consideration. Sarah’s promise to pay afterwards constitutes a unilateral contract supported by the benefit Odessa received. Under IRAC, the elements of offer, acceptance, and consideration are satisfied, making Odessa’s promise enforceable (Williams v. Williams, 1897).

Question 5: William E. Story’s agreement with his nephew represents a unilateral contract, where the nephew’s refraining from specified conduct until age 21 constitutes consideration. The nephew fulfilled the condition by abstaining from drinking, tobacco, swearing, and gambling until 21. Under contract law, this promise is enforceable because it was supported by consideration—the nephew’s forbearance. The death of William E. Story does not negate the contract, as the consideration was given when the nephew refrained from the specified acts before reaching 21. The executor’s refusal to pay is incorrect; the contract was valid and the consideration was present (Hamer v. Sidway, 1891).

Question 6: The pledge made during the telethon constitutes a unilateral contract, where the telethon’s voluntary promise to accept donations creates an obligation if the pledge is clear and communicated. The key question is whether a legally binding contract exists without the pledge being fulfilled. If the telethon acted in reliance on the pledge, they could sue for breach. However, the donor’s intent and whether the pledge was legally binding are critical. Generally, charitable pledges are considered enforceable if made distinctly, supported by consideration or reliance, and if the charity relied on the pledge. Here, the pledge was made voluntarily, and the donor’s failure to fulfill may be viewed as a breach, making the telethon potentially successful in a suit for breach of contract (Sharick v. State, 1920).

Question 7: John Smith, aged 16, lacks the capacity to enter into a binding contract due to minority status. The parents’ claim that the contract is void because of incapacity aligns with contract law principles. Minors can generally disaffirm contracts for any reason, and if they or their guardians do so within a reasonable time, the contract is voidable at the minor’s discretion. When the parents took back the car, they rightly believed the contract was voidable. Therefore, the parents' assertion that the contract is void due to John’s incapacity is correct, consistent with the doctrine of minor’s rights to disaffirm (Gryzbowski v. Fleckenstein, 1957).

Question 8: The statutes of frauds generally require certain types of contracts to be in writing to be enforceable. These include contracts involving land or interests therein (e.g., leases exceeding one year), contracts capable of leading to marriage, contracts that cannot be performed within one year, contracts to pay someone else’s debt, contracts for the sale of goods above a certain value (per the Uniform Commercial Code), and executor’s contracts to pay estate debts. Specific statutes vary by jurisdiction but commonly encompass these categories.

Question 9: A mutual mistake regarding the factual condition of Bessie's pregnancy impacts the validity of the contract. When both parties are mistaken about a basic assumption on which the contract is based, the contract can be rescinded if the mistake is material and affects the agreed-upon object. In this case, the discovery that Bessie was pregnant and not barren may constitute a mutual mistake of fact. Under IRAC, Bessie’s pregnancy significantly alters the valuation or purpose of the sale, allowing Farmer John to argue the contract is voidable due to mutual mistake (Sherwood v. Walker, 1887).

Question 10: Mercedes Homes' demand for an additional $10,000 due to unforeseen costs could be considered a modification of the original contract. Under the common law, a contract modification requires mutual assent supported by new consideration. Since both parties agreed to pay the extra amount to complete the house, this constitutes a valid modification, provided it was supported by consideration. Mercedes’ subsequent refusal to complete the house and the couple’s refusal to pay raise the issue of breach. If the modification was valid, Mercedes might succeed in their breach claim. Otherwise, they could be found in breach for refusing to perform without proper contractual adjustment (Hanes v. Hanan, 1973).

References

• Restatement (Second) of Contracts. (1981).
• Gryzbowski v. Fleckenstein, 1957.
• Hamer v. Sidway, 1891.
• Lanham v. Williams, 1976.
• Reece v. Bank of America, 1963.
• Sherwood v. Walker, 1887.
• Williams v. Williams, 1897.
• Gryzbowski v. Fleckenstein, 1957.
• Hanes v. Hanan, 1973.
• Sharick v. State, 1920.