Corruption Norms And Legal Enforcement Evidence From Diploma

Corruption Norms And Legal Enforcement Evidence From Diplomatic P

Corruption is a pervasive issue that has significant implications for governance, economic development, and public trust. Scholars and policymakers often identify several contributors that foster corrupt practices, with cultural norms and legal enforcement being among the most frequently cited. Cultural norms refer to the shared values and behaviors ingrained within a society that can influence individuals' propensity to engage in corrupt activities. Legal enforcement, on the other hand, pertains to the strength and effectiveness of laws and regulatory frameworks that deter misconduct. The challenge lies in distinguishing the influence of these two contributors, as they are often interconnected; cultural attitudes may shape enforcement policies, while enforcement effectiveness can reinforce or undermine cultural norms.

This study investigates the separate and combined effects of cultural norms and legal enforcement on corruption using empirical data from the parking behavior of United Nations (UN) diplomats in Manhattan. Diplomatic immunity, a legal principle that provides diplomats with immunity from local legal processes, plays a pivotal role in this context. It ensures that diplomats are protected from prosecution and enforcement actions, which, in turn, influences their behavior within host countries. Parking illegally is considered a form of corruption because it exploits diplomatic privileges, allowing officials from high-corruption countries to evade penalties for violations that ordinary citizens would face consequences for. Studying this phenomenon helps to reveal how norms and enforcement interact in real-world settings, especially when immunity is in place or revoked.

By analyzing diplomats in the United States, particularly in New York City, researchers can observe behaviors in a context where cultural background and legal frameworks intersect. U.S. cities host diplomats from diverse countries, each with distinct cultural norms regarding authority and legality. This heterogeneity makes the diplomatic parking violations a useful proxy for understanding broader cultural attitudes towards corruption. The main difficulty in studying corruption arises from its clandestine nature and the difficulty in measuring informal or illegal activities accurately over time or across contexts.

The authors compare countries like Norway and Nigeria to illustrate different cultural and enforcement environments. Norway, characterized by low corruption norms and strong legal enforcement, contrasts with Nigeria, which is known for higher corruption levels and weaker enforcement mechanisms. In November 2002, authorities gained the right to confiscate diplomatic license plates of violators, marking a significant change in enforcement policy. Following this policy shift, unpaid parking violations among diplomats dropped sharply, indicating the immediate effect of enforcement.

The authors conclude that both cultural norms and legal enforcement significantly influence corrupt behavior. Their experiment demonstrates that prior to November 2002, cultural norms primarily constrained diplomats' parking violations. After enforcement was strengthened, violations declined markedly, implying that legal enforcement can alter behavior but that cultural norms still play a critical role. Studying cultural background's influence on individual behavior aligns with prior research showing that shared values and social expectations shape actions across various contexts, including corruption.

Table 1 presents key results from regression analyses that examine determinants of unpaid parking violations. It highlights the positive association between countries' corruption indices and violations, as well as the effects of cultural and enforcement variables. Figure 1 illustrates the decline in violations following policy changes, visually emphasizing the impact of enforcement measures. These results suggest that legal enforcement is effective in reducing violations, especially in high-corruption countries, but cultural norms remain influential.

The authors use country-level measures such as foreign aid, military aid, and income per capita in their regressions to account for broader socio-economic factors that might influence corruption levels. Foreign aid and military aid are indicators of international engagement and reliance on external support, which can correlate with governance quality. Income per capita reflects economic development, often associated with lower corruption. Including these variables helps isolate the specific effects of norms and enforcement on violations, controlling for background differences among countries.

Table 3 displays the main regression results, showing that violations are positively linked to the corruption level of the diplomat's home country and negatively related to enforcement measures. The analysis of individual diplomat behavior over time indicates that those from high-corruption countries tend to accumulate more unpaid parking tickets over their stay in New York City. However, this behavior diminishes after enforcement policies tighten, suggesting that both norms and enforcement influence individual actions. The variation between Nigeria and Norway underscores the importance of enforcement strength: violations among Norwegian diplomats remained low, whereas Nigerian diplomats from high-corruption backgrounds continued to accumulate violations until enforcement measures were introduced, at which point their violations sharply decreased. This pattern indicates that enforcement can counteract behavioral predispositions driven by cultural norms.

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