Criminal Procedure: You're The Judge This Week

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Criminal Procedure You're the Judge This week, you are a judge in a federal district court where a man has been charged with possessing and distributing cocaine. The police obtained the evidence of his drug possession and sale by searching his home. Police arrived at the defendant’s house without a warrant, and the defendant and his wife were at home. The officers knocked, and the wife answered the door and consented to the search. The defendant objected to the search.

The defendant has filed a motion to have the evidence excluded from his trial. Decide if the evidence should be admitted, and provide the best arguments both the prosecutor and defendant can make to win the motion.

Paper For Above instruction

The central issue in this case is whether the evidence obtained from the defendant's home during a warrantless search with consent can be admitted in court. Under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, individuals are protected against unreasonable searches and seizures, and generally, law enforcement requires a warrant supported by probable cause to conduct a search. However, there are exceptions to this requirement, notably consent searches, which are valid if given voluntarily and with full knowledge of the right to refuse consent. This case hinges on whether the consent given by the defendant's wife was valid and whether the search adhered to constitutional standards.

In evaluating whether the evidence should be admitted, the court must examine whether the search was constitutional under the consent exception. The Supreme Court has clarified in cases such as Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973), that consent must be freely and voluntarily given and not coerced or obtained through deception or manipulation. If the wife had authority to consent to the search of the residence, and her consent was voluntary, then the search would be considered lawful, and the evidence obtained would likely be admissible.

The prosecution argues that the wife was a co-occupant with authority to consent, thus providing lawful consent to search the premises. They would emphasize that the police knocked and announced their presence, the wife answered, and she voluntarily agreed to a search without coercion or intimidation. They might also argue that the defendant was present at the home during the search, and therefore, the evidence is relevant and reliable, and its exclusion would undermine the pursuit of justice.

Conversely, the defendant contends that the wife’s consent was invalid due to lack of authority or because it was not voluntary. The defendant might argue that he, as the owner or resident, had a reasonable expectation of privacy, and his consent was refused or implied that he objected to the search. The defendant could also claim that the police misled his wife or coerced her into consenting. In such circumstances, courts tend to scrutinize whether the consent was truly voluntary and whether the scope of the search was reasonable.

The court, therefore, must consider the totality of the circumstances. Factors such as the presence of coercion, the defendant’s privacy rights, and the authority of the person consenting are essential. If evidence shows that the wife had the apparent authority to consent and that her consent was given freely, then the search was lawful, and the evidence should be admitted. Conversely, if the defendant convincingly argues that his right to privacy was violated or that the consent was invalid, the evidence should be excluded, per the exclusionary rule (Weeks v. United States, 1914; Mapp v. Ohio, 1961).

In conclusion, the decision rests on whether the consent was valid and voluntary. The prosecution's best argument is that the spouse had authority and that her consent was given freely, making the search lawful. The defendant’s strongest counterargument is that the consent was coerced or invalid, warranting the suppression of the evidence under the Fourth Amendment. As a judge, I must weigh these arguments carefully, considering constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and the legitimacy of consent in the context of the case facts provided.

References

• Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
• Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
• Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
• United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
• Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
• Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
• United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976).
• United States v. Cոջdell, 629 F.3d 764 (2011).
• Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
• United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).