Decisive Action Learning Activity Handout Analyze The Phalen

M451 Decisive Actionlearning Activity Handoutanalyze The Phase 2 Sig

Analyze the Phase 2 Significant Events and commander’s guidance below. Recommend changes to the Phase 3 planning currently in the 1st AD ATROPIAN IRON OPORD. These changes would lead to a FRAGO. Consider the impact on defense, and stability during your analysis. Present your findings.

How would your Contemporary Issues Whitepaper topic influence Phase 3 planning? Phase III (Offense) Commander’s Intent. Defeat Donovian forces in Erdabil, Heckzi,and Vetlia Province while maintaining communication with the 4th ID. Commander’s tactical problem is to cover a distance of more than 150 kilometers, using limited ground lines of communication and restrictive terrain. Disadvantage is Irregular Threat operating in LOC.

Considerations for security operations are the civilian impact on security and the irregular forces use of IEDs. Planning Guidance. Seize defensive positions and key terrain without using any units below 60% combat effective strength. LOC must be secured and Atropian forces must be seen as the liberators of their country. Limit the destruction of critical infrastructure.

HVT list AD C2/Fire control Engineer breaching and bridging equipment C2 nodes Tactical Ballistic Missile systems Close Combat Attack (Helicopters) Field Artillery and Multiple Rocket Launch target acquisition equipment End state. Set the conditions for stability operations Phase IV. Friendly Mission Mission: Combined Joint Task Force – Caucasus (CJTF-C) prevent Donovian forces from destabilizing the region. Mission. III Corps (US) - Joint Task Force – Phantom (JTF-P) prevent Donovian forces from occupying Atropia.

Mission: 1AD to prevent OSC-S from occupying Vetlia, Hackzi, Erdabli provinces. Enemy Mission OSC-S occupy Ishmili and control the oil infrastructure. PIRs What is the disposition of the irregular forces? Where is the enemies reconning? Location of threat COG of the 80th Mechanized Inf Division FFIR Any maneuver element with combat power below 70%?

Crash of any aircraft or UAS? Missing Personnel EEFIs Convoy Operations LOC Another consideration is retaining use of improved road surfaces the OSC-S uses for friendly use in the counterattack The staff must consider the impact the conditions of the OE in the below graphic. Figure 1. (Tyler, C., Demystifying Space: How to Perform Better in the Space Domain, 2018) D3SOE is a condition of the operational environment. D3SOE increases the occurrence of or need for certain events (up arrows) and impacts operations by decreasing formation efficiency (down arrows). (Source D3SOE Maneuver Pre-Command Course (MPCC) brief) Warfighting Functions Command and Control efforts are oriented on supporting the Atropian military efforts and by extension securing a safe and secure Atropia so the Atropian people can live safely in their homeland free from threat of violence.

Intelligence for enemy composition, weather, and protection of friendly assets. movement and maneuver speed and to protect Fires to attrite the enemy sustainment for vital re-supply sustainment focus on convoy operations. Protection The HN will secure choke points control responsibility of these choke points. There will be problems with refugees, dislocated civilians, and HN forces ability to control the local population centers. Security operations are the civilian impact on security and the irregular forces use of IEDs Sustainment Identify IO/NGO conducting HA operations within respective AO. Develop DC plans in support of potential DC consequence management activities.

Coordinate with Division Transportation Officer (DTO) to ensure DC evacuation routes do not conflict with Main Supply Route (MSR). Area of Interest. The cities on boundaries are NAIs Area of Operations. The division area of operations includes the land areas and airways of the Atropian provinces of Vetlia, Hackzi, and Erdabli The division is bounded to the west and south by the 4th Infantry Division. The 80th Mechanized Infantry Division (Donovian) is in Our EA at Phase Line IVAN.

Staff Actions Develop DC plans in support of potential DC consequence management activities. Identify IO/NGO conducting HA operations within respective AO Identify local key leaders and ROASFs capable of taking civilian lead in DC consequence management activities and to transfer control of DCs over to once they are collected into DC collection points. ROASF will transport DCs to locations outside of AO once BCTs make them aware that they have DCs in their AOs. Coordinate with Division Transportation Officer (DTO) to ensure DC evacuation routes do not conflict with Main Supply Route (MSR). Reconnaissance objective is the composition and disposition of conventional and irregular enemy forces within sector.

Conduct mounted and/or dismounted reconnaissance Constraints minimize the effects on the civilian populace Provide emergency assistance to Dislocated civilians (DC) when no civilian capacity is available until they are turned over to ROA authorities Risk Guidance The risks are fratricide, media, chokepoints, convoy operations Other references for use FM 3-90-1 OFFENSE AND DEFENSE VOLUME 1 MARCH 2013 FM 3-90-2 RECONNAISSANCE, SECURITY, AND TACTICAL ENABLING TASKS VOLUME 2 MARCH 2013 FM 3-07 STABILITY JUNE AD ATROPIAN IRON OPORD Phase 2 Significant Events Situation Awareness Planning should consider the effect on all the phases in the 1AD ATROPIAN IRON OPORD. The division is located throughout the provinces of Hackzi, Vetlia, and Erdabli.

Units located in vicinity of Imishli are in constant contact with Donovian regular forces and sustaining losses. No division maneuver units remain in Remzi. Communication is intermittent with Atropian forces in the division AO. Coordination with 4th ID is IAW graphic control measures. The Donovian forces are attacking Imishli in force.

They are effectively jamming EW assets. Donovian forces rely heavily on cellphone communications. The enemy is breaching obstacles, according to the Decision support matrix the breach of obstacles by the enemy is a critical event. Donovian irregular forces and insurgent groups are engaging civilian populations, Atropian forces, and U.S. forces in the AO. Attacks are disrupting LOCs, and include terrorist-style attacks on population centers.

The city of Imishli is a COG for insurgent organizations because of its importance to Donovia. Criminal organizations are sabotaging Atropia’s defense forces equipment and supplies. Donovian forces attacked the historic and highly prestigious Imishli Military Garrison and Academy. Atropian forces knew the value of this target to the Donovians in their information war (Center of Gravity). The garrison’s location is northwest of the city; and not easily reached on the two lane road.

The terrain is mountainous. The cadets and faculty, along with the small staff that run historic tours were completely caught off guard by the Donovian’s rapid advance. They held out for as long as they could, until they were completely decimated. They were holding out for as long as they could, until they were completely decimated. The Atropian media’s constant reports of the siege and the annihilation of cadets has increased the populations’ dissatisfaction of the current situation. Atropian leaders in the division area are calling for a rapid response and retaliation to include an enemy body count.

PROTESTS IN REMZI Donovian special forces units are impersonating local police to move civilians into chokepoints. Insurgent groups from Donovia are using the underground tunnel system under Imishli, whether in existing tunnels or by burrowing their way through the city using new high-tech drilling machines, for what they hope will turn into tunnel-on-tunnel warfare with the regime. OSC-S is threatening to overtake Atropia, coming very close to the Southern boundaries of the Division’s AO. This threat is unifying the country bringing together various religious, cultural, and ethnic groups to defeat a common enemy. Local police, NGOs, and MPs are distributing in the IDP camps the handbills requesting help in identifying and reporting threat jammers.

Reports indicate a large number of threat jammers in the division AO. During a courier mission, a convoy was disoriented while traveling at night from Imishli to Remzi and took longer than usual to arrive at DMAIN. The real-time intelligence (INTEL) reporting requirements and intelligence indicators are not reaching the lowest levels to modify force protection measures and behavior. Numerous force protection/antiterrorism officers do not have the most current command intelligence requirements/threat streams or reports correlating to their area of interest/area of operation. Donovian forces turned off nine Atropian television channels.

Atropian forces rely on, almost exclusively, their cell phones to coordinate tactical operations and do not use the communication systems the U.S. have provided. This continues to slow down the synchronizing of enablers, especially the ability to coordinate the clearance of fires, when assisting Atropian forces in contact. Aerial observers have demonstrated limited capability to effectively observe and provide corrections to surface-to-surface delivered munitions. In several instances, the aerial observers have attempted to gain a spotting utilizing the FLIR system affixed to the aerial platform. The issue with this is that the round emits a small heat signature for a short window of time.

Also, there are many heat signatures the FLIR system recognizes within the operating environment that resulted in a false spotting. Firing units throughout the AO have experienced issues with achieving first round fire for effect. A deep dive into this issue highlighted the fact that there was a lack of tracking systems and records management. Therefore, resulting in units not meeting the five requirements for accurate fire. Firing units within the AO do not possess the capability to send and receive fire missions beyond line of sight.

This means the distance from a delivery platform to a FDC is limited to a maximum of 15km. Donovian Units inherit ammunition from other units upon their relief in place (RIP), but tracking of this ammunition on the property books is lacking. This creates two issues. First, units have unauthorized ammunition which unnecessarily increases the Net Explosive Weight (NEW) footprint. This increases the potential damage that may result if an explosive incident occurs. Second, this ammunition isn’t being tracked for suspensions, restrictions, or shelf life. The potential that this ammunition is unserviceable or possibly hazardous to the users raises as the ammunition grows older. CCIRS · FP, GoB and Guardian Angel SOPs and TTPs; · “Enemy†GoB trends and messaging techniques, and how to counter them; · TTPs on preventing and mitigating civilian casualties; · PPE usage TTPs by TAAC and base or outpost; · Mood and level of trust with young Atropian Soldiers and leaders; · Badging system and installation access TTPs and physical tools; · Rapid equipping needs, TTPs and base defense plans and personnel needs; · Route clearance threats, TTPs and equipment and personnel needs. The Provincial Governor declared a state of emergency and requested 1,000 troops to assist the civilian authorities with defending Rimzi. J3 reports a CBRN attack in the 4th ID AO. Hundreds of refugees crossed through the engagement areas minutes before the enemy attack forces arrived. This created turmoil at critical times, affecting forward units ability to focus on the enemy’s conventional formations. The presence of civilians caused hesitation and confusion over how to avoid killing them instead of the enemy.

Initial contact with the enemy forces came almost immediately after the detonation of an improvised explosive device (IED) on the flanks of the battle positions. The distraction with the refugees almost immediately followed, causing confusion throughout the division on how to deal with civilians in the engagement area, knowing the enemy was closing rapidly. Forward units are unable to communicate effectively with the native-speaking refugees. That was the moment when radio communication became almost impossible. With only intermittent communication over the FM nets.

The enemy units were able to reach the initial obstacles relatively unimpeded and begin breaching operations relatively unhindered when the division was finally able to coordinate some sort of direct fire on the enemy. But no sooner had the division begun to make a semblance of an organized defense than enemy artillery fires rained on the forward units, taking a further toll on combat power and again disrupting communication and execution of the fight in the engagement area. The artillery came in precise volleys, inflicting catastrophic damage. It was as if the enemy had the 10-digit grid locations for each vehicle. Across the division emplaced obstacles were 500 meters beyond the maximum effective ranges of the long range weapon systems.

Reports of possible division friendly fire on Atropian units. Resupply is affected throughout the division from civilian protests, IDP flooding MSRs, attacks on supply convoys. Blue Force tracking systems are intermittent. IMISHLI M451 DECISIVE ACTION After reviewing the course material for this week, please look at the questions below. Write a word post answering the questions below. 1. Describe what could be in a Tactical Operations Center Standing Operating Procedure and why it is essential within Mission Command. 2. What is the Department of Defense's role in Defense Support of Civil Authorities? 3. Describe and explain all four decisive actions being sure to include the task, purpose, and characteristics for each one in your own words

Paper For Above instruction

The Tactical Operations Center (TOC) Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) is a comprehensive document that outlines the standardized processes, communication protocols, roles, and responsibilities within the TOC during military operations. It includes procedures for threat assessment, command and control coordination, intelligence sharing, communications security, and emergency response measures. The SOP also defines the hierarchy of authority, shift changes, and reporting formats, ensuring seamless operation and decision-making during complex missions. This document is essential within Mission Command because it facilitates unity of effort, enhances situational awareness, and enables rapid decision-making. By providing clear guidelines and standard procedures, it reduces confusion, mitigates risks, and ensures coordinated responses to dynamic operational environments.

The Department of Defense (DoD) plays a vital role in Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) by providing military assistance to civilian agencies during emergencies that exceed the capability of civil authorities. This includes natural disasters, pandemics, terrorist incidents, and other crises. The DoD’s role encompasses offering logistical support, search and rescue operations, medical assistance, security, and infrastructure protection. It operates under laws such as the Stafford Act and Homeland Security Act, working in coordination with FEMA, DHS, and state and local authorities. The military’s involvement helps establish stability, restores order, and provides essential services until civil authorities regain control. The DoD ensures that support is operationally synchronized, respects civil-military relations, and maintains the separation of civilian and military responsibilities.

Decisive Action involves four fundamental tasks that guide military operations. Offensive operations aim to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative by attacking the enemy to gain positional advantage. The purpose is to neutralize enemy forces, seize key terrain, and achieve rapid victory, characterized by surprise, agility, and robust maneuvering. Defensive operations focus on defeating enemy attacks through prepared defenses, attrition, and area control, with the purpose of protecting friendly forces and key assets. Stability operations aim to establish or reestablish order in the aftermath of conflict, focusing on governance, infrastructure, and civil-military cooperation to create a sustainable environment for peace and development. The purpose is to support the transition from combat to stability, characterized by peacebuilding, civil support, and reconstruction efforts. Together, these four decisive actions constitute a comprehensive approach to achieving strategic and operational objectives in complex operational environments.

References

• Department of the Army. (2013). FM 3-90-1 Offense and Defense, Volume 1.
• Department of the Army. (2013). FM 3-90-2 Reconnaissance, Security, and Tactics, Volume 2.
• Department of Defense. (2019). Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).
• U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. (2013). Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces.
• Joint Publication 3-28. (2018). Defense Support of Civil Authorities.
• Tyler, C. (2018). Demystifying Space: How to Perform Better in the Space Domain.
• FM 3-07 Stability. (2014). U.S. Army.
• U.S. Army. (2013). FM 3-90-1 Offense and Defense, Volume 1.
• U.S. Army. (2013). FM 3-90-2 Reconnaissance, Security, and Tactics, Volume 2.
• Department of Defense. (2020). Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations.