Descartes Eventually Gives Up His Hyperbolic Doubt

Descartes Eventually Gives Up His Hyperbolic Doubt His Game Of Feigne

Descartes eventually gives up his hyperbolic doubt (his game of feigned and extreme skepticism) and admits that there are real external objects in the world and that other people even exist. But, even though he admits that primary qualities (such as height, weight, length, mass, and anything else that can be measured mathematically) actually exist in the object, he never concedes that secondary qualities (such as color, smell, taste, shape, and anything else that can change or can be misinterpreted by the senses) exist in an object. Instead, he argues that secondary qualities exist in the perceiver, and not in the object. Color is a great example, because two people can be perceiving the same object but each seeing it as a different color, meaning that the “color” is in the perceiver’s mind and not in the object itself; if color were in the object, both people would agree.

Hume agrees with Descartes that primary qualities are in the object, but he also thinks that secondary qualities are in the object as well (and not just in our minds). If there is any disagreement about a secondary quality, Hume would say that it is because one of the perceivers is wrong. But, when it comes to gaining information that we can usually trust to be true, the bottom line is that Hume trusts the five senses of the body and Descartes does not, since he trusts only the mind’s ability to reason to undoubtable certainty, and that certainty is about primary qualities. Of course, the differences between Descartes and Hume (and, thus, between the Rationalists and the Empiricists) are more complicated than presented here and need additional explanation to demonstrate just how far apart these two philosophers actually are in their thinking.

Paper For Above instruction

The philosophical divide between Descartes and Hume regarding certainty and belief reflects fundamental differences in epistemological approach—rationalism versus empiricism. Descartes, as a rationalist, believes that certain knowledge comes primarily through reason. His skepticism, particularly hyperbolic doubt, aims to strip away all uncertain beliefs until only indubitable truths remain. He famously concludes that the "thinking self" is absolutely certain, forming the foundation for his entire epistemology. Descartes distinguishes between primary and secondary qualities, asserting that primary qualities (such as size, shape, and movement) are inherent in the object and can be known with certainty through reason, whereas secondary qualities (such as color and smell) exist only in the perceiver’s mind and are not reliable indicators of actual properties of objects.

Hume, on the other hand, as an empiricist, emphasizes sensory experience as the foundation of all knowledge. For Hume, primary qualities are in the objects themselves, but secondary qualities are also in the objects, not just in the mind. However, he emphasizes that our knowledge of secondary qualities is highly uncertain because they are dependent on perception, which can vary between individuals and occasions. Unlike Descartes, Hume is skeptical about the possibility of certain knowledge beyond immediate sensory impressions. He contends that all ideas and beliefs are derived from impressions—direct sensory experiences—and that rational inference alone cannot establish certainty about the external world.

In terms of what can be known with certainty, Descartes believes that through reasoning, the mind can arrive at absolute truths, especially about the self and God. His method involves doubting everything that can possibly be doubted until only indubitable truths remain. For example, "I think, therefore I am" (cogito, ergo sum) is a foundational certainty derived purely from reason. Conversely, Hume’s approach suggests that certainty is largely unattainable regarding external objects, as our knowledge depends on habitual associations formed through repeated sensory experiences. Hume’s skeptical stance on secondary qualities illustrates that we cannot be perfectly certain about the qualities we perceive in external objects, as perceptions can be deceived or vary.

Diagramming these differences reveals a stark contrast: Descartes prioritizes rational deduction and innate ideas to establish certainty, focusing on the mind's capacity to grasp primary qualities through reasoning. Hume, however, relies on sensory observation, emphasizing that knowledge about the world comes from experience, but with inherent limitations and uncertainties. His skepticism about secondary qualities underscores that our perceptions are subjective and fallible, thus challenging the notion of certain knowledge about the external world.

In conclusion, Descartes and Hume differ markedly in their views on certainty. Descartes seeks absolute certainty through reason, trusting only what can be deduced logically and necessarily. Hume accepts the fallibility of sensory perception, believing that our beliefs about the external world are probabilistic and based on habit rather than certainty. Understanding these differences not only clarifies their respective epistemologies but also illustrates the broader philosophical debate between rationalism and empiricism—debates that continue to influence philosophical thought today.

References

• Descartes, R. (1641). Meditations on First Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
• Hume, D. (1748). An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. Oxford University Press.
• Kenny, A. (2012). Descartes: A Study of His Philosophy. Wesleyan University Press.
• Audi, R. (2015). Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. Routledge.
• Mackie, J. L. (1982). The Cement of the Universe: A Study of Causation. Oxford University Press.
• Reid, T. (1785). Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. Edinburgh: Maclachlan.
• Kvanvig, J. (2010). The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge.
• Lyons, T. (2003). Hume and the Problem of Causation. Oxford University Press.
• Rescher, N. (1985). Empiricism: A Theory of Knowledge. State University of New York Press.
• Fumerton, R. (2006). Metaepistemology and Skepticism: Victims of Three Dilemmas. Rowman & Littlefield.