Discussion Question: In Week One, We Looked At The View Of R

Discussion Question: In Week One, we looked at the view of Ruth Benedict

In Week One, we examined Ruth Benedict's perspective on cultural relativity and the moral framework of societies, as discussed in Chapter 3 of Rosenstand's The Moral of the Story. Benedict asserts that notions of "normality" and "what is good" are culturally constructed, emphasizing that each society's beliefs and practices determine what is considered morally acceptable or commendable. This view suggests that moral standards are not universal but vary across different cultural contexts, allowing for a diversity of ethical systems and behaviors to be recognized as valid and morally good within their respective cultures.

Contrasting this, Christina Hoff Sommers advocates for the existence of universal human virtues that transcend cultural and situational differences. She argues that certain actions and traits—such as kindness, respect, honesty, and charity—are inherently right or wrong, regardless of cultural context. For instance, Sommers states that mistreating a child, humiliating others, or harming animals are universally wrong, while consideration, respect, and generosity are universally commendable. Rosenstand highlights the challenge in accepting this viewpoint, questioning whether virtues like honesty and decency can be regarded as absolute and suggesting that such assertions could be dismissed as “old-fashioned moralizing.”

Rosenstand’s characterization of moralizing refers to the tendency to impose fixed moral standards without acknowledging cultural diversity or engaging in critical debate. When someone "moralizes," they often present their moral views as universally applicable, dismissing alternative perspectives without sufficient justification. In this context, Rosenstand questions whether Sommers’s insistence on universal virtues oversimplifies complex moral realities and dismisses cultural differences, potentially leading to dogmatism rather than genuine moral understanding.

Sommers's repudiation of moral and ethical relativism suggests she advocates for moral objectivism—the idea that certain moral principles are objectively true and applicable to all humans irrespective of their cultural backgrounds. Her stance is rooted in the belief that human dignity and well-being are best protected by upholding universal virtues, which serve as moral anchors for ethical behavior worldwide. This perspective challenges relativistic views that see morality as solely socially constructed, arguing instead that some moral standards are grounded in human nature and rationality.

Whether her view is convincing enough to persuade a relativist depends on one's philosophical inclinations. Critics of moral universalism argue that moral standards are inherently linked to cultural contexts and that attempts to impose universal virtues risk cultural imperialism or ethnocentrism. On the other hand, proponents like Sommers believe that recognizing universal virtues provides a foundation for human rights and social justice, preventing moral chaos and fostering global cooperation. Evidence from cross-cultural studies indicates that certain virtues—such as fairness, empathy, and honesty—are valued universally, lending support to Sommers’s position. However, the interpretation and application of these virtues can vary, complicating the debate.

Sommers’s emphasis on universal virtues aligns closely with virtue ethics, a normative ethical theory that centers on developing moral character rather than adhering solely to rules or consequences. Virtue ethics, rooted in Aristotelian philosophy, stresses the importance of virtues such as courage, temperance, and justice as central to moral life. By asserting that these virtues are universally valid, Sommers echoes the virtue ethicist’s focus on moral virtues as guiding principles for human behavior, promoting a moral ideal that can serve as a common ground across diverse cultures.

In conclusion, the debate between cultural relativism and moral universalism encapsulates fundamental questions about the nature of morality. Ruth Benedict’s view highlights moral diversity rooted in cultural differences, while Christina Hoff Sommers advocates for intrinsic human virtues that transcend cultural boundaries. The strength of Sommers’s argument lies in the recognition of shared human needs and capacities, fostering a sense of moral coherence amidst diversity. Nevertheless, the challenge remains in balancing respect for cultural differences with the recognition of universal moral principles that can uphold human dignity and justice globally.

References

• Benedict, Ruth. “Anthropology and the Abnormal.” Rosenstand, Chapter 3. 1934.
• Rosenstand, Nina. The Moral of the Story: An Introduction to Ethics. 7th ed., McGraw-Hill Education, 2019.
• Sommers, Christina Hoff. “The Universal Virtues.” Rosenstand, Chapter 10. 2020.
• Gilligan, Carol. In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development. Harvard University Press, 1982.
• MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. University of Notre Dame Press, 2007.
• Harman, Elizabeth. “Cultural Relativism and Moral Objectivity.” Journal of Moral Philosophy, vol. 12, no. 3, 2015, pp. 255–273.
• Nagel, Thomas. The View from Nowhere. Oxford University Press, 1986.
• Kohlberg, Lawrence. “Stages of Moral Development and Moral Education.” Phi Delta Kappan, vol. 48, no. 7, 1967, pp. 375–380.
• Hare, R. M. Freedom and Reason. Oxford University Press, 1963.
• Shweder, Richard. “The Moral Life of Children.” University of Chicago Press, 1990.