Do The Prompt: 21,100 Words In Skepticism About Moral Respon

Do The Prompt 21100 Wordsin Skepticism About Moral Responsibility

Do the prompt 2. 1100 words. In “Skepticism about Moral Responsibilityâ€, Gideon Rosen argues that confident positive judgements of moral responsibility are never justified. This conclusion seems incredible. What is Rosen’s argument for it? And where does the argument go wrong? After spelling out the structure of Rosen’s argument, explain in what way you think Rosen’s argument is unsound. In particular, either explain why you think the argument is invalid, or say which premise you think is false, and explain why it is false. (If you think more than one premise is false, focus on the one against which you think you can level your strongest objection.)

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Gideon Rosen’s skepticism about moral responsibility presents a profound challenge to our intuitive judgments about moral agency. Rosen argues that confident positive judgments of moral responsibility are never justified, primarily based on a skeptical analysis of the epistemic and metaphysical grounds for such judgments. This essay delineates Rosen’s argument, explores its logical structure, and critically assesses where it may go wrong, particularly focusing on the premises that underpin his skepticism and evaluating whether they are ultimately tenable.

Rosen’s core argument against the justification of moral responsibility hinges on a series of interconnected claims. First, he contends that our knowledge of ourselves as agents is deeply fallible. This fallibility stems from the complexity of human psychology, the opacity of self-knowledge, and the influence of subconscious factors. Because of this, Rosen suggests that confidently attributing moral responsibility—especially in the sense of deserved praise or blame—is unjustified. Second, Rosen draws from the deterministic and compatibilist debates, highlighting that our actions are often influenced by factors beyond our control, such as genetics, upbringing, and social context. This undermines the assumption that agents possess the kind of free will necessary for moral responsibility.

Third, Rosen emphasizes the difficulty of establishing a causal chain from an agent’s character or intentions to their actions, given the causal complexity of human behavior. Without clear evidence that an agent’s morally relevant mental states directly caused the action, confident attribution of moral responsibility is unwarranted. Consequently, he concludes that positive moral judgments are not only unjustified but inherently unjustifiable given our epistemic limitations. This skepticism aims to undermine the common practice of holding individuals morally responsible, suggesting that such judgments are never truly justified or warranted by the available evidence.

Critically examining Rosen’s argument reveals several potential weak points. One of the main concerns relates to the leap from epistemic fallibility to the conclusion that moral responsibility is never justified. It might be the case that fallibility in knowledge about ourselves does not entail that moral judgments are always unjustified—merely that they should be held tentatively or with humility. Furthermore, Rosen’s reliance on deterministic influences and causal complexity presumes that free will is incompatible with such influences, an assumption that many compatibilists challenge. They argue that moral responsibility can still be meaningful even if determinism or causal influences are present, provided that certain conditions—such as voluntary control or rational deliberation—are met.

Moreover, Rosen’s skepticism presupposes that moral responsibility requires infallible or certain evidence, which may not be a necessary condition for moral judgments in practical contexts. It is possible that moral responsibility is a normative concept that does not require absolute epistemic certainty but instead relies on reasonable belief or justification. If this is correct, Rosen’s argument loses its force because it hinges on a very high standard of justification that might be too demanding to reflect the practical workings of morality.

Focusing on the argument’s validity, one could argue that Rosen’s reasoning is structurally sound but rests on premises that are overly stringent. For example, if onePremise (P1): Our epistemic access to the relevant facts concerning moral responsibility is fundamentally flawed; and Premise (P2): Because of this epistemic flaw, moral responsibility can never be justified—then the conclusion naturally follows. However, this form of reasoning presumes that justified moral responsibility requires infallible knowledge, which is a contentious point. Critics may contend that even with imperfect knowledge, moral responsibility can still be justified on probabilistic or reasonable grounds, thus challenging the second premise.

In conclusion, while Rosen’s skepticism raises important questions about the epistemic conditions for moral responsibility, it may be undermined by claims that moral judgments do not require absolute certainty. Instead, they can be justified through practical reasoning, normative standards that tolerate fallibility, and compatibilist notions of free will that accommodate causal influences. Therefore, Rosen’s argument, though compelling in highlighting the challenges and limitations of moral knowledge, may be unsound because it relies on overly demanding premises that do not align with our everyday moral reasoning and practice.

References

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