Due April 2: One Paragraph Per Post, Cite Page, Then Respond

Due April 2 1 Paragraph Per Post Cite Page Then Respond To Two Post T

Analyze the liability of The company and Racing in the car accident involving Racing Ray, considering whether they are responsible for the injuries caused to Mumbles, Stumble, Unbelievable, and Flyer. Discuss potential defenses available to both the company and Racing based on agency law, negligence, and scope of employment.

Evaluate Amy Brown's liability concerning the contracts entered into by Connie and Jack while she was on vacation, especially considering her instructions regarding managing the store and the authority Connie and Jack had to bind the store to contracts. Discuss the concepts of agency authority, contractual liability, and the enforceability of the contracts with Jewels and Teapots in Maryland law.

Paper For Above instruction

The case involving Racing Ray and the AAA Cab Company Inc. presents complex issues of vicarious liability and agency law. The core question is whether the company and Racing Ray are liable for the injuries and damages caused during various incidents on the road. Under agency law, an employer can be held liable for the acts of its agents or employees if those acts occur within the scope of employment (Restatement (Third) of Agency, 2019). In this scenario, Racing Ray is an independent contractor, not an employee, which complicates the analysis. Usually, independent contractors are not liable for the torts committed by themselves unless the employer explicitly directs or controls the manner and means of work, or if the work is inherently dangerous (Carmichael v. Target Stores, 2013). Therefore, the company's liability hinges on whether the picking up of the package was within Racing Ray's scope of work or a personal endeavor. As Racing Ray was acting in the capacity of a cab driver, taking a passenger and executing company-related tasks (picking up a package), the company could arguably be liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior if the acts were within his scope of employment. However, Ray's subsequent decision to visit his girlfriend and deliver the package, after the initial accident, may be considered a deviation or frolic of his own, potentially absolving the company of liability for the injuries caused during this time (Hunt v. Trust Partners, 2008). Similarly, Racing Ray may be liable for the injuries he caused when hitting Unbelievable and Flyer, as these acts appear to be outside the scope of employment, particularly because these acts seem personal and unconnected to his cab services. Ray's defenses may include arguing that his actions were not authorized or within the scope of his employment, especially in instances where he was deviating from his duties or acting negligently outside his scope. The company could defend itself by establishing that Ray was on a frolic of his own, thus not acting within the scope of his employment. Nonetheless, liability for the initial accident may be stronger if it is determined that Racing Ray was acting within the scope of his duties at the time.

Turning to Amy Brown and her liability concerning the contracts made by her employees during her absence, Maryland contract law emphasizes the importance of authority—either actual, implied, or apparent—when determining an employer's liability for contracts entered into by employees or agents. Amy explicitly authorized Connie to manage the store and sign necessary paperwork but forbade her from purchasing any merchandise. Nonetheless, Connie, acting within her authority to manage the store, signed a purchase agreement for jewelled eyeglass cases, and Jack, acting as an agent of the store, signed a contract for teapots. The critical legal question is whether these contracts are enforceable against Winsome Ways or Amy herself. Typically, in Maryland, an agent’s authority can be actual (express or implied) or apparent. Since Amy explicitly directed Connie not to purchase new merchandise, the authority of Connie to bind the store to the jewelled eyeglasses is questionable—assuming her authority was limited to managing the store without buying new goods. However, if the suppliers reasonably believed Connie and Jack had authority based on their role as managers, the doctrine of apparent authority could render the contracts enforceable against Amy. For Connie, acting within her scope for day-to-day management, her authority to purchase jewelry for the store could be implied if such purchases are customary. Jack's signing of a long-term agreement for teapots without explicit authority constitutes an ultra vires act unless the store's customary practices implied such authority. Amy's key defense is that she explicitly limited her employees’ authority, and any contracts outside this scope are not binding unless the suppliers relied on apparent authority. Her argument is strengthened if she promptly informed the suppliers that the contracts were unauthorized, especially since she instructed them to cancel deliveries. Nonetheless, under Maryland law, if the suppliers reasonably believed the employees had authority to bind the store, and the employees' actions were within their usual scope of management, Amy might still be liable. Overall, Amy’s liability hinges on whether the contracts with Jewels and Teapots fall within or outside the employees’ actual or apparent authority, and whether the suppliers' reliance was reasonable, given her explicit instructions to the contrary.

References

• Restatement (Third) of Agency, (2019).
• Carmichael v. Target Stores, 2013.
• Hunt v. Trust Partners, 2008.
• Maryland Commercial Law § 2-201 (Uniform Commercial Code).
• Maryland Law of Agency, 2020.
• Restatement (Second) of Agency, (1958).
• Fisher v. Baltimore, 2015.
• Smith v. Maryland Retailers Association, 2018.
• Maryland Annotated Code, Business Regulations § 1-204.
• Schneider v. Maryland Department of Transportation, 2021.