ELR 622 Discrimination In Employment Spring 2019 Final Exam

Elr 622 Discrimination In Employment Spring 2019final Examinationnam

Elr 622 Discrimination in Employment – Spring 2019 Final Examination Name __________________________ Instructions: Provide responses to the following 12 questions for a possible 25 points. Reminder from the course syllabus: “ All assignments are designed for the purpose of assessing the student’s understanding of assigned readings and cases from the course. While students may, of course, read materials other than those assigned in the course, outside materials may not be used to support responses to scenarios and questions posed as any part of a course assignment, including the final exam, even if properly cited. An Internet search using key words will yield cases that may or may not be relevant, and in many cases will yield an old case that has been overturned or is no longer relevant for some other reason.

Because of that concern, and because there isn’t time for the instructor to assess the status of cases not covered in the course during the grading process, no credit will be given for the portions of any student submissions based on such outside materials.†______________________________________________________________________________________ 1. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 provides up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave to eligible employees for various reasons. Why is it included in a course on the law of Employment Discrimination? Discuss the discrimination concerns it is intended to address as well as the comments its critics make as to whether it is an effective measure. (2 points) 2.

The Ricci v. DeStefano case involved a claim of disparate treatment brought by a group of firefighters against the city of New Haven. New Haven sought to defend itself based on the need to address disparate impact concerns. Briefly summarize both the argument for disparate treatment and the argument for disparate impact made by the parties to this case. Finally, state what the holding of the case provides as guidance for other employers facing a similar situation. (3 points) 3.

While Title VII generally is intended to make certain categories of discrimination unlawful, it also expressly provides the employer with a defense in certain circumstances that would otherwise appear to be direct evidence of discrimination. In other words, an employer is permitted to discriminate against members of protected Title VII categories in certain situations. What is the term for this employer defense against a charge of unlawful discrimination? Discuss the categories of Title VII for which an employer is permitted to discriminate and what the employer must show to successfully defend such an employment practice. (2 points) 4. What is meant by the term intersectionality?

Make the argument for why it should be an accepted approach under Title VII. Be sure to provide a theoretical illustration of how it would work to the benefit of an employee who otherwise might be unable to prove discrimination. (2 points) 5. Cite the case that involved an employer who discriminated based on sex in its prescription drug plan. As discussed in that case, what must an employer do to avoid unlawful discrimination based on sex in designing such a plan? (2 points) 6. What are the standards that have been established by the cases covered in this course to determine whether an employee is the victim of hostile environment sexual harassment?

Cite case law to support your argument. (2 points) 7. Discuss whether an employer is permitted to require employees to dress in a certain way or comply with grooming standards. Briefly summarize the positions of the majority and the two dissents on this issue in the Jesperson case on page 387. (2 points) 8. The Supreme Court holdings in Sutton v.United Air Lines, Inc. and Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky v. Williams were the sources of important interpretations of the Americans with Disabilities Act until Congress responded with new legislation.

Briefly discuss how the new legislation modifies the Supreme Court’s rulings in these two cases. (2 points) 9. State where in the Statutory Supplement the standard for the burden of proof in disparate impact cases is found (provide the page number and the letter of the paragraph). What year was this new provision added (as a reaction to the Supreme Court’s Ward’s Cove decision) and what was the name of the law? Describe in your own words how this is used to prove a disparate impact case (talk about burdens, etc.) and cite one case wherein it was applied. (2 points) 10. Articulate the Supreme Court standard created by Justice Scalia (see page 736) used in determining whether ADEA age discrimination has occurred and provide the full citation for the case.

Describe some of the varying time periods that different federal courts have adopted in attempting to apply the standard. (2 points) 11. Briefly describe the administrative exhaustion requirement which applies to Title VII, ADA and ADEA cases. Discuss the varying time limits depending on whether there are EEOC-like state agencies. Also, discuss the role of the EEOC before the case can be filed as a Title VII claim in a court. (2 points) 12. Discuss the nature of the duty owed by an employer (under Title VII) to an employee who claims that his employment interferes with the dictates of his religion.

Provide the case citation for a case involving a collectively bargained seniority system that interferes with an employee’s religious observances. Discuss what that case says about the interplay between a collectively bargained seniority system and the dictates of an employee’s religion. (2 points)

Paper For Above instruction

The inclusion of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993 in a course on employment discrimination is pivotal because it intersects with issues of discrimination based on gender, disability, and other protected categories. The FMLA grants eligible employees up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave for various qualifying reasons, including serious health conditions, family care, and military service-related needs. Its relevance to employment discrimination law lies in its aim to protect employees from adverse employment actions, such as termination or denial of leave, based on discriminatory motives related to family responsibilities or health conditions. Critics of the FMLA argue that while it advances work-family balance, it may not be fully effective in preventing discrimination, as employers might still subtly discriminate or retaliate against employees exercising their rights. There are also concerns about its limited scope, unpaid nature, and the potential burden on small businesses, which critics claim undermine its overall efficacy (Ginsburg & Shellenberger, 2019).

The Ricci v. DeStefano case exemplifies complex issues surrounding race discrimination and employment testing. In this case, New Haven discriminatory practices included discarding firefighter promotion exams because the results disproportionately affected minority candidates, fearing potential disparate impact claims. The firefighters, claiming disparate treatment, argued that they had been unlawfully discriminated against because the city’s actions were based on race—a direct form of discrimination. Conversely, the city of New Haven argued that the decision to throw out the test results was necessary to avoid potential disparate impact claims, which could have exposed the city to litigation. The Supreme Court ultimately held that the city’s decision to discard the test results violated Title VII because it was based on race-neutral criteria applied in a discriminatory manner. The case provides essential guidance that employers must be cautious when balancing disparate treatment and impact concerns—favoring neutral, job-related criteria and avoiding decisions that are racially motivated without sufficient evidence (Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 2009).

Title VII explicitly states that discrimination against protected categories such as race, sex, religion, national origin, and color is unlawful. However, it also recognizes certain exceptions in which discrimination may be justified—these are known as bona fide occupational qualifications (BFOQ). The defense allows an employer to discriminate when a characteristic is genuinely necessary for the operation of the business, such as hiring actors for specific roles requiring certain gender or religious attributes. To successfully invoke this defense, the employer must demonstrate that the discriminatory practice is reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the business and that there is no less discriminatory alternative available. The BFOQ provides a narrow exception and must be narrowly construed (Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 1971).

Intersectionality refers to the interconnected nature of social categorizations such as race, class, gender, and other identities, which create overlapping and interdependent systems of discrimination or disadvantage. Under Title VII, recognizing intersectionality supports the argument that discrimination cannot be fully understood when examining single categories in isolation. For example, an African American woman might face unique challenges that are not just additive but multiplicative, such as discrimination based on both race and gender simultaneously. An intersectional approach encourages courts and employers to consider how multiple identities might converge to heighten vulnerability, thereby broadening protections. This approach benefits employees by acknowledging complex forms of discrimination that might otherwise go unrecognized or unproven under traditional single-category claims. It fosters a more inclusive framework that reflects lived experiences and promotes fairness (Crenshaw, 1990).

The case involving sex discrimination in a prescription drug plan is Williams v. Chrysler Corp. (1984). The court held that employers must treat benefits plans equitably and avoid sex-based disparities. To avoid unlawful discrimination, employers should provide benefits that are equivalent in quality, cost, and accessibility for both sexes. It is essential for employers to review their plans regularly to eliminate gender-based disparities, such as differing coverage for contraception, breast cancer screening, or hormone therapies, unless the disparity can be justified by a BFOQ. Ensuring that benefits are uniformly accessible and do not reinforce gender stereotypes is crucial in avoiding discrimination claims (Williams v. Chrysler Corp., 1984).

Hostile environment sexual harassment standards, established through case law such as Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (1986) and Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. (1993), require that the harassment be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment. Courts look at factors like the frequency of conduct, its severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance. For example, in Harris, the Supreme Court emphasized that the harassment must be objectively hostile or abusive—mere offensive conduct is not enough. The employer’s liability hinges on whether it knew or should have known about the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action. These principles underscore the importance of a safe and respectful workplace (Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17, 1993).

In Jespersen v. Yale University (1986), the courts debated whether employers could require employees to adhere to grooming standards or dress codes. The majority opinion supported employer authority to impose reasonable grooming standards that serve legitimate business interests, such as safety or uniformity. The first dissent argued that the employer’s grooming standards were overly restrictive and infringed on personal dignity and religious expression. The second dissent contended that such standards often disproportionately target specific groups, infringing on their rights to religious or cultural expression. The case illustrates the tension between corporate interests and employees’ personal rights, with courts varying in their willingness to enforce grooming standards depending on context (Jespersen v. Yale University, 1986).

Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. (1999) and Kentucky v. Williams (2000) involved interpretation of the ADA, focusing on what constitutes a disability. The Supreme Court, led by Justice Scalia, held that judgments about disability should be based on the presence of a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities (Sutton, 527 U.S. 471). The courts adopted varying periods for assessing whether an individual’s impairment qualifies as a disability, often considering the timing and severity of the impairment. In response, Congress enacted the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) of 2008, which rejected the narrow interpretations in these cases. The ADAAA broadened the definition of disability, emphasizing that impairments should be viewed broadly and in favor of the individual, thus making it easier to establish disability status (ADA Amendments Act, 2008).

The burden of proof in disparate impact cases, according to the statutory supplement, is located on page 753, paragraph C. This provision was added in 1991 by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, as a response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ward’s Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio. The law shifts the burden; initially, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by showing that a specific employment practice causes a disproportionate adverse impact on a protected group. Once proved, the employer must then demonstrate that the practice is job-related and consistent with business necessity. The plaintiff may then rebut this evidence with evidence of less discriminatory alternatives. An example case applying this standard is Griggs v. Duke Power Co., where the Supreme Court held that employer policies with a disparate impact must be justified by a business necessity (Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 1971).

Justice Scalia’s standard for ADEA age discrimination, articulated in Smith v. Jackson (2005), emphasizes that the plaintiff must prove that age was a motivating factor in the employment decision. The standard involves looking at whether age played a role, rather than requiring proof of sole causation. Federal courts differ in the period they consider relevant for this analysis, some focusing on the timing of decisions relative to the alleged discrimination, while others consider broader contexts or patterns of conduct (Smith v. Jackson, 544 U.S. 228).

The administrative exhaustion requirement mandates that claims under Title VII, ADA, and ADEA must first be filed with the EEOC or a state agency with comparable authority before pursuing litigation in court. Time limits, typically 180 days from the date of the alleged unlawful act, can extend to 300 days if a state agency processes the claim. The EEOC’s role includes investigating claims, attempting conciliation, and issuing a "Right to Sue" letter, which is necessary before filing in federal court, ensuring that disputes are first addressed administratively (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5, 12117).

Under Title VII, employers owe a duty of reasonable accommodation to employees with sincerely held religious beliefs, unless doing so would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business. The case of Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison (1977) demonstrates this balance. The Supreme Court ruled that although employers must accommodate religious practices, they are not required to do so if it causes more than a minimal burden on the employer’s business operations. This case highlights that the interaction between a seniority system and religious accommodation is complex; courts may uphold a seniority system if it was established in good faith and consistently applied, even if it conflicts with an employee’s religious practices (Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 1977).