Entrapment I. Introduction: Entrapment Is When Law Enforceme

ENTRAPMENT I. Introduction: Entrapment is when law enforcement officers or their go-betweens encourage or sway an individual to carry out a criminality, which s/he possessed no prior objective to do. If this is the case, the bylaw prohibits a guilty verdict (Sobel, u. d.).

Entrapment serves as a critical legal defense within criminal law, aiming to prevent undue influence or coercion by law enforcement agencies in prosecuting individuals for crimes they would not have otherwise committed. The concept hinges on the idea that the government or its agents should not induce or create criminal conduct in a person who was not predisposed to commit such an act. This principle ensures the protection of individual rights against overreach by law enforcement and maintains fairness in criminal proceedings (Sobel, n.d.).

II. Case Briefs on Entrapment Case Law

A. Case Brief 1: Jacobson v. United States (503 U.S. 540, 1992)

• Facts: Jacobson ordered magazines containing photographs of pre-adolescent males. Government agents used fake businesses and fabricated correspondences to lure him into purchasing child pornography. After prolonged investigation, Jacobson was arrested following a controlled delivery of the magazine. The defense argued entrapment, claiming the government induced him into committing the crime, as he had no prior inclination to do so.
• Issues: Whether government conduct was sufficiently outrageous to constitute entrapment; whether Jacobson was predisposed to commit the crime before government intervention.
• Decisions: The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's ruling, holding that the government’s conduct overstepped proper bounds and that Jacobson’s activities were not sufficiently predisposed to be considered criminal prior to government involvement.
• Reasoning: The Court emphasized that entrapment occurs only when the government induces an individual to commit a crime they would not have otherwise committed. The government's tactics in this case were found to be improper and amounted to overreach, breaching constitutional protections against abusive law enforcement practices.
• Dissenting Opinions: Dissenters argued that the Court failed to recognize the government's aggressive tactics as a violation of due process, and that Jacobson’s predisposition should have been the key factor without considering the entrapment defense.

B. Case Brief 2: Hampton v. United States (425 U.S. 484, 1976)

• Facts: Hampton was convicted of distributing heroin after selling to DEA informants. Hampton claimed entrapment due to government misconduct, arguing that the agents supplied him with the drugs, which violated due process. The government contended that Hampton had a predisposition to commit the crime regardless of government involvement.
• Issues: Whether the government's supply of heroin to Hampton negated the entrapment defense; whether the defendant's predisposition was relevant in this context.
• Decisions: The Supreme Court upheld Hampton’s conviction, ruling that the government’s conduct did not violate constitutional protections because Hampton was predisposed to commit the crime before government intervention.
• Reasoning: The Court clarified that if a defendant is predisposed to commit the crime, government procurement does not constitute entrapment, emphasizing that predisposition is central to the entrapment defense.
• Dissenting Opinions: Dissenters expressed concern that government misconduct, such as supplying illegal substances, may infringe on due process, regardless of predisposition, and such conduct should be scrutinized more rigorously.

C. Case Brief 3: United States v. Russell (411 U.S. 423, 1973)

• Facts: Russell was convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine after police supplied him with chemicals to produce the drug. Russell contested that the government’s involvement amounted to entrapment, claiming he was not predisposed to manufacture methamphetamine prior to government intervention.
• Issues: Whether the government’s procurement of chemicals to facilitate drug manufacturing amounted to entrapment, considering Russell’s predisposition.
• Decisions: The Supreme Court rejected the entrapment defense, holding that the government's conduct was not misconduct, provided Russell was predisposed to produce the drug.
• Reasoning: The Court emphasized a predisposition-based test, ruling that the government’s actions did not amount to entrapment because Russell was motivated and inclined to manufacture methamphetamine independent of government influence.
• Dissenting Opinions: Dissenters argued that government involvement in chemical supply could cross the line into misconduct, especially if it effectively induces criminal activity; thus, entrapment should have been considered.

III. Addressing the Scenario and Questions

A. Probable Cause to Approach the Defendant at the Traffic Light

In the scenario, law enforcement observed the suspect waiting at the traffic light, made eye contact, and approached him. Under constitutional law, probable cause exists when there is reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that suspects are involved in criminal activity. Approaching the suspect based solely on his presence at the intersection may not inherently establish probable cause unless additional suspicious behavior or evidence exists. However, in a controlled investigation or under reasonable suspicion, law enforcement may have justification for initial contact, especially if consistent with standard policing practices (California v. Acevedo, 1991).

B. Validity of the Entrapment Defense

Considering the scenario, the entrapment defense could be viable if it is demonstrated that law enforcement induced or encouraged the individual to commit the crime of purchasing drugs, and that he had no prior intent or predisposition. If, however, evidence suggests the individual was predisposed to buy drugs, or that law enforcement merely provided an opportunity, the defense would likely be invalid. Based on case law, the government’s role in facilitating or encouraging a crime is central to the entrapment analysis. The defense is valid only when the law enforcement conduct was a significant inducement and the accused lacked predisposition (Jacobson v. United States, 1992).

C. Opportunity versus Entrapment

Providing an opportunity to commit a crime is not equivalent to entrapment. Opportunity refers to circumstances where a person could commit a crime, while entrapment involves active encouragement, coercion, or inducement by law enforcement. Merely allowing or enabling someone to commit a crime does not violate legal standards, whereas誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘誘