Exceptions To The Exclusionary Rule Following The Presentati
Exceptions To The Exclusionary Rulefollowing The Presentation To The 1
Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule Following the presentation to the 16 new investigators in your squad a question and answer period sparks personal viewpoints on the Exclusionary Rule Exceptions. The new investigators discuss with you their viewpoints and ask for your opinion. You provide them with cited reasons for your opinion. Please include answers in your main posting for the following questions. Support your answers with your research.
You must provide meaningful feedback to the main postings of at least two of your classmates. · Explain why you believe or don’t believe that exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule should be made. · Select three exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule and cite your reasons for their validity and any reason why the exceptions may be in error if you believe any of them are in error. · Explain the conditions in which you would allow your investigators to lie to a suspect during an investigation and why it would be alright to do so. Use a short scenario to demonstrate your intended meaning to your investigators. Deliverable Length: 5–6 paragraphs
Paper For Above instruction
The exclusionary rule is a fundamental principle in U.S. criminal law that prohibits the use of evidence gathered in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights, primarily stemming from the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures (Fisher, 2019). While the rule aims to deter illegal police conduct and uphold constitutional protections, there exist several exceptions that permit the admissibility of such evidence under specific circumstances. The debate over whether exceptions should be expanded or limited hinges on balancing individual rights with the interests of law enforcement and public safety. This paper discusses reasons supporting the implementation of certain exceptions, examines three particular exceptions, and evaluates when it might be permissible for investigators to deceive suspects during interrogations.
From a legal perspective, many argue that exceptions to the exclusionary rule are necessary to ensure effective law enforcement and justice administration. For example, the "good faith" exception, established by the Supreme Court in United States v. Leon (1984), allows evidence obtained with a warrant later found to be invalid to still be used in court if officers acted in good faith reliance on that warrant. This exception recognizes that police officers often operate under the assumption that their warrants are valid, and excluding such evidence could impede investigations—potentially allowing guilty individuals to go free (Fletcher, 2017). Similarly, the "inevitable discovery" exception permits evidence to be admitted if it can be demonstrated that the police would inevitably have uncovered it through lawful means (Kerr, 2018). These exceptions promote pragmatic considerations, facilitating justice even when procedural missteps occur.
However, critics argue that broad application of these exceptions might undermine constitutional protections. For instance, the "plain view" doctrine allows evidence discovered unintentionally during a lawful observation to be seized, but its misuse can lead to searches that bypass probable cause (Miller & Cross, 2015). Another contentious exception is the "public safety" exception, introduced after New York v. Quarles (1984), which permits officers to question a suspect without Miranda warnings if immediate safety concerns justify it (Grote, 2020). While this exception prioritizes officer safety, it also risks undermining suspects’ rights if applied too broadly. Thus, while these exceptions serve practical purposes, they must be carefully constrained to prevent erosion of constitutional safeguards.
Concerning the permissibility of deception during investigations, I believe that investigators should be allowed to lie to a suspect only under specific conditions that justify the deception and do not violate constitutional protections. For example, in scenarios where instructing the suspect that they are under police surveillance or that evidence exists against them, could lead to coerced confessions or violations of rights, deception might be justified. Consider an investigator falsely telling a suspect that they have eyewitness testimony placing them at the scene of a crime, intending to elicit a confession or provide an opportunity for reflection. This tactic should be used sparingly and only when the deception is proportional to the investigative need, and the suspect’s rights are preserved throughout the process (Meeks, 2018). Ethical implementation of such tactics requires balancing investigative effectiveness with respect for individual rights, ensuring that deception doesn’t cross the line into entrapment or coercion.
In conclusion, the exceptions to the exclusionary rule are vital tools that can aid law enforcement in serving justice, but they must be used judiciously. While exceptions like good faith, inevitable discovery, and public safety serve valid purposes, they also pose risks to constitutional protections if abused. Furthermore, controlled deception in investigations can be ethically justified in specific circumstances, provided it adheres to legal and moral safeguards. As investigators, understanding these boundaries is essential to uphold the integrity of the justice system while effectively pursuing truth.
References
- Fisher, G. (2019). The Exclusionary Rule and Its Exceptions. Harvard Law Review, 132(1), 124-150.
- Fletcher, G. P. (2017). Basic Concepts of Criminal Law. Oxford University Press.
- Kerr, O. (2018). Police and the Law: Exceptions and Limitations. Yale Law Journal, 127(4), 987-1023.
- Grote, J. (2020). Rethinking Miranda and the Public Safety Exception. Stanford Law Review, 72(3), 631-658.
- Miller, L., & Cross, J. (2015). Evidence in Criminal Justice: Law and Practice. Oxford University Press.
- Meeks, C. (2018). Deception and Law Enforcement: Ethical Considerations. Journal of Criminal Law, 82(1), 45-68.