Final Examination Fall 2020 Due Date December 7

Final Examinationfall 2020due Date December 7 2020no Later Than 7

Answer one question from each part of the six-part examination:

Part I: Discuss whether Congress can require individuals to purchase a good or service via the Commerce Clause, especially in scenarios where individuals have never been in the market for that product. Explain the outcome of N.F.I.B. v. Sebelius regarding the ACA mandate and the Commerce power.

Part II: Analyze the scope of presidential immunity from lawsuits during office, referencing Nixon v. Fitzgerald and Clinton v. Jones. Discuss executive and legislative immunity from civil and criminal suits, citing relevant case law.

Part III: Examine limitations on congressional delegation of policy-making powers to the executive, with respect to Schechter Poultry and United States v. Curtiss-Wright. Include the significance of Gibbons v. Ogden and McCulloch v. Maryland.

Part IV: Explain why the Supreme Court in Clinton v. City of New York prohibited a line-item veto and compare this with INS v. Chadha. Discuss whether the Court’s ruling in US v. Nixon supported executive privilege and interpret the Court’s reasoning regarding confidentiality and presidential communications.

Part V: Discuss the significance of Boumediene v. Bush and Rasul v. Bush in limiting presidential and congressional powers, and analyze how Korematsu and Youngstown Sheet demonstrate expansion and limits of presidential power.

Part VI: Evaluate how Wickard v. Filburn influences decisions in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Katzenbach v. McClung, Gonzales v. Raich, and US v. Lopez.

Additionally, assess whether the Florida inspection law violates the Commerce Clause by discriminating against out-of-state fruits and if the Hawaii Fruit and Vegetable Commission has standing to sue Florida. Address the legal issues, relevant precedents, and apply constitutional rules to determine if the statute is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.

Paper For Above instruction

The scope of Congress's commerce power and its capacity to mandate individual participation in economic activities has been a longstanding constitutional debate. The quintessential case, N.F.I.B. v. Sebelius, tested the limits of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause when attempting to enforce the individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The core issue was whether Congress could compel individuals to purchase health insurance, even if they had never been in the market for such a product.

In N.F.I.B. v. Sebelius (2012), the Supreme Court divided on this issue. The Court distinguished between the regulation of existing activity and the regulation of inactivity. The Court held that Congress could regulate existing activities—like buying insurance—if those activities, in aggregate, have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, citing Wickard v. Filburn and Gonzalez v. Raich. However, compelling individuals to purchase insurance before they are in the market or choose not to participate was viewed as an unconstitutional overreach of Congress’s Commerce power because it effectively imposed a tax rather than a regulation of commerce itself.

The Court upheld the individual mandate as a valid exercise of Congress's taxing power but invalidated its basis as an exercise of the Commerce Clause. The dissent emphasized that the mandate coerces individuals into commerce and thus exceeds the scope of Congress's regulatory authority. This decision reaffirmed that while Congress has broad powers to regulate commercial activity, it cannot compel participation in commerce as a matter of obligation, preventing a shift toward an all-encompassing federal authority over citizens’ personal choices.

Turning to the scope of presidential immunity, Nixon v. US and Clinton v. Jones highlight distinctions between executive immunity and accountability. In Nixon, the Court recognized executive privilege to preserve confidentiality of presidential communications but rejected an absolute claim, emphasizing that no person, including the President, is above the law. In Clinton v. Jones, the Court rejected presidential immunity from civil litigation for acts committed before assuming office, asserting that the President does not possess complete immunity from private lawsuits to ensure accountability.

Regarding delegation of legislative authority, cases like Schechter Poultry and United States v. Curtiss-Wright impose limits on Congress’s ability to delegate policymaking powers to the executive. The Court established that delegation must be accompanied by intelligible principles directing the agency’s exercise of authority. Conversely, unwarranted delegation that grants unchecked discretion violates the separation of powers outlined in Gibbons v. Ogden and McCulloch v. Maryland, emphasizing Congress's primary role in setting policy.

The ruling in Clinton v. City of New York struck down the line-item veto as incompatible with Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution, which grants Congress the exclusive power to originate revenue bills and pass legislation. The Court concluded that the veto process altered the fundamental legislative process, violating the nondelegation doctrine, and thus contravened constitutional separation of powers. This decision aligns with the precedent set in INS v. Chadha, which invalidated legislative vetoes that bypassed bicameralism and presentment; both rulings underscore the importance of legislative procedures being protected from executive encroachment.

The Boumediene and Rasul cases expand judicial authority to ensure detainees’ rights under the Habeas Corpus Clause and limit the executive’s power to detain individuals without trial, demonstrating judicial checks on presidential authority. Contrastingly, Korematsu upheld executive wartime powers, leading to an expansion of presidential authority during crisis. Meanwhile, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer demarcated the limits of presidential power, emphasizing that the President cannot wield undefined constitutional powers absent congressional authorization.

Finally, the decisions in Wickard v. Filburn and subsequent cases like Heart of Atlanta Motel, Katzenbach v. McClung, Gonzales v. Raich, and U.S. v. Lopez demonstrate the broad scope of Congress’s commerce power. Wickard established that even local activities affecting interstate commerce could be regulated. The Florida inspection law case illustrates that when states discriminate against out-of-state commerce without substantial justification, such laws violate the Commerce Clause. The Hawaii Growers' standing depends on demonstrating injury in fact, typical of the standing doctrine, and the Court's jurisprudence supports that injury must be concrete and particularized.

References

• Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
• McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
• Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
• Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
• United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
• INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
• Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
• Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
• Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
• Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).