Formulate Kim's Causal Exclusion Problem For Mental To Physi

Formulate Kims Causal Exclusion Problem For Mental To Physical Caus

Formulate Kim’s “Causal Exclusion”—problem for mental-to-physical causation as clearly as possible. Your paper must have these following parts: State and explain the conclusion of the argument in your own words. Identify and state each of the principles that serve as premises in this argument. Explain these principles in your own words. Explain why these group of principles cannot all be true together—at least one of them must be false if the others are true. Conclude by saying which principle you would reject and give a reason for rejecting that principle. MUST BE NO SHORTER OR MORE THAN WORDS Below you can utilize the link for this assignment but there’s more on google you can use on Kim’s “Casual Exclusion” problem for mental-to-physical causation.

Paper For Above instruction

Kim’s causal exclusion problem is a prominent philosophical challenge concerning the relationship between mental causation and physical causation. It questions how mental events can exert causal influence if the physical domain is fully governed by physical laws and determined by physical causes. In essence, Kim's argument is aimed at reconciling mental causation with a physically closed universe, a universe where every physical event has a sufficient physical cause. The conclusion of Kim’s causal exclusion argument, in straightforward terms, is that mental causes cannot be genuinely causal if physical causes are sufficient to explain physical events, leading to a form of causal redundancy for mental causes.

To delve into the premises, Kim relies on three core principles: the principle of causal sufficiency, the principle of causal closure, and the principle of mental causation. The principle of causal sufficiency states that every effect has a sufficient cause; in the physical realm, this means that physical events have physical causes that fully account for their occurrence. The principle of causal closure asserts that physical events can only be caused by other physical events, implying the physical universe is causally closed under physical laws. Lastly, the principle of mental causation posits that mental states or events can cause physical states or events, which aligns with our common sense and everyday experiences of mental influence.

Explaining these principles in one's own words renders them as follows: the principle of causal sufficiency emphasizes that causes fully account for their effects; the principle of causal closure underscores that the physical universe is self-sufficient regarding causation, leaving no room for non-physical causes; and the principle of mental causation affirms that mental states, such as beliefs or desires, can produce physical effects, like bodily movements or neural activations.

The core tension arises because these principles, taken together, lead to a problematic implication: if the physical domain is causally closed, then physical causes exhaust the causal story of physical effects. Therefore, if mental causes are genuine, they either need to be reducible to or identical with physical causes or they risk being redundant. But if mental causes are not reducible, then their causal efficacy seems incompatible with the physical closure. Conversely, if mental causes are reducible, then mental causation is trivial or illusory. This mutual exclusivity indicates that not all three principles can be true simultaneously—some must be relinquished.

Kim argues that maintaining causal closure and the causal sufficiency of physical causes, while also endorsing genuine mental causation, leads to a conflict. To avoid this conflict, one must reject or modify at least one of these principles. The most plausible candidate for rejection is the principle of mental causation as independent and efficacious. Kim suggests that mental causes are not irreducible causes but rather supervenient on physical causes, meaning mental states are dependent on, and determined by, physical states, with their causal efficacy reducible to physical causes. This view aligns with a physicalist perspective, which asserts that mental properties are ultimately physical.

Rejecting the principle of mental causation as an autonomous cause avoids the problem of causal exclusion. If mental causes are reducible and not independent, then the causal efficacy resides entirely in the physical domain, ensuring the consistency and causal completeness of the physical universe. This move, however, raises questions about the nature of mental properties and whether they can be fully accounted for by physical descriptions. It might diminish the role of mental causation in explaining actions, but it preserves the causal integrity of the physical world.

In conclusion, Kim's causal exclusion problem upholds the tension between mental causation and physical causality and challenges us to reconsider the status of mental properties within a physicalist framework. Rejection of the principle of independent mental causation appears to be the most coherent move, given the necessity to preserve causal closure and physical sufficiency. While this solution sidesteps the problem of causal exclusion, it encourages a re-evaluation of mental properties as supervenient, physically determined entities rather than autonomous causes, thus reshaping our understanding of mind-body relations within a scientifically grounded universe.

References

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