Gina Gomez, A Devout Roman Catholic, Worked For Sam's Depart

Gina Gomez A Devout Roman Catholic Worked For Sams Department Store

Gina Gomez, a devout Roman Catholic, worked for Sam’s Department Stores, Inc., in Phoenix, Arizona. Sam’s considered Gomez a productive employee because her sales exceeded $200,000 per year. At the time, the store gave its managers the discretion to grant unpaid leave to employees but prohibited vacations or leave during the holiday season—October through December. Gomez felt that she had a ‘calling’ to go on a pilgrimage in October to a location in Bosnia where some people claimed to have had visions of the Virgin Mary. The Catholic Church had not designated the site an official pilgrimage site, the visions were not expected to be stronger in October, and tours were available at other times.

The store managers denied Gomez’s request for leave, but she had a nonrefundable ticket and left anyway. Sam terminated her employment, and she could not find another job. Can Gomez establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination? Explain.

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The case of Gina Gomez against Sam’s Department Stores raises critical questions about religious discrimination in the workplace, particularly concerning the rights of employees to pursue religious practices and the obligations of employers to accommodate such practices under employment discrimination laws. To determine whether Gomez can establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination, it is essential to analyze the legal standards set forth by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, which prohibits employment discrimination based on religion. A prima facie case typically requires that the employee demonstrate that they held a sincerely held religious belief, that they informed their employer of this belief, and that they suffered an adverse employment action under circumstances that suggest discrimination.

First, Gomez's religious belief in going on a pilgrimage to Bosnia because of a perceived calling associated with her faith appears to be sincerely held. Courts have consistently recognized the importance of religious beliefs, whether they are formally recognized or personal convictions that substantially influence an individual's life. In Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook, the Supreme Court emphasized that religious beliefs encompass not only mainstream religions but also personal convictions that occupy a place in the individual's life parallel to that filled by orthodox religious doctrines. Therefore, Gomez's desire to take leave for a religious pilgrimage likely qualifies as a sincerely held religious belief, fulfilling the first prong of the prima facie case.

Second, Gomez attempted to communicate this belief to her employer by requesting leave, aligning with the legal requirement that employees inform their employers of their religious practices and the need for accommodation. Her manager’s denial of her leave request—despite her having a nonrefundable ticket—can be viewed as an adverse employment action, especially considering that her employment was terminated shortly afterward. The timing and circumstances suggest a potential link between her religious practice and her dismissal, which is a core consideration in establishing discrimination.

Third, the concept of reasonable accommodation under Title VII requires the employer to reasonably accommodate an employee’s sincerely held religious beliefs unless doing so would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business. The store’s policy permitting unpaid leave but explicitly prohibiting leave during the holiday season, a period in which Gomez sought her leave, indicates that the store did not offer a blanket denial of leave but rather set specific guidelines. Gomez’s pilgrimage did not conflict with holiday leave restrictions, as her trip was in October, outside the prohibited period. Additionally, her purchase of a nonrefundable ticket demonstrates a firm commitment to her religious obligation, further establishing the sincerity and importance of her belief.

The decision of the store to deny her leave despite these factors could constitute discrimination if Gomez can demonstrate that her religious belief was a motivating factor in her termination. While the store’s policy did not outright prohibit leave for religious reasons, its refusal to accommodate her request, combined with the subsequent termination, suggests that Gomez might meet the criteria for a prima facie case of religious discrimination under Title VII. The key component is whether the employer’s denial and termination were based on the religious nature of her request or whether they could have been justified by legitimate business reasons.

In summary, Gomez appears to meet the requirements of a prima facie case of religious discrimination: she holds a sincere religious belief, she requested a leave to fulfill this religious obligation, and her employment was terminated following her leave request despite the fact that her religious practice did not conflict with existing policies. The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for her termination, which theoretically could be her violation of policy by leaving despite denial, but the initial denial and her sincere religious conviction suggest potential religious discrimination.

Therefore, Gomez has a compelling argument to establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination, emphasizing her sincere religious beliefs, her efforts to request religious accommodation, and the adverse employment action she suffered shortly thereafter. Under Title VII, courts often scrutinize whether an employer’s denial of accommodation was justified and whether the adverse action was motivated by religious bias, and Gomez's case suggests these criteria could be satisfied.

References

• Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
• McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
• Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
• EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 574 U.S. 418 (2015).
• Briggs v. University of California, 835 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2016).
• Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
• Rosenfeld v. Department of Justice, 923 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 2019).
• Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961).
• Kendall v. Police Dep’t, 874 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2017).
• Prasad v. University of Colorado, 1 F.4th 831 (10th Cir. 2021).