Henry Kissinger Chapters 14-17 ✓ Solved

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Henry Kissinger Chapters 14151617name

This will be the most difficult of the quizzes given so far, but not just because of quantity – four chapters of Henry Kissinger’s ON CHINA; but also because of the nature of the questions. As this class has grown in ability week by week, your ability to answer tougher questions has grown. The end goal is to have provided you with enough context so as to hone your ability to put questions to a rigorous analytic test.

1. U.S.-China relations are subject to a ‘yo-yo’ — ups and downs, practically all the time. The general U.S. media leaves the impression that the main fault is with China; but Kissinger also points to our contribution to the yo-yo syndrome. Which is one of the following options.

2. Prior to 1971, the technical answer in international law regarding the U.S. Embassy in Taipei is one of these options.

3. Although President Ronald Reagan repeatedly insisted that the U.S. did not support a two-China policy, what was the reaction of the Chinese ambassador when Kissinger explained this?

4. China’s position on Taiwan has been an impediment to better China-U.S. relations. The U.S. expects China to pledge not to use force, but China states it is a domestic affair. What does China say?

5. Reagan’s first term China/Taiwan policy was a product of a combination of factors. What is one the options?

6. The Taiwan Relations Act of 1982 promised U.S. arms to Taiwan. What struck Kissinger most about the contradiction of a ONE-China policy and military support?

7. As you understand Kissinger’s views on U.S. policy, what would you consider the best encapsulating phrase?

8. When did Kissinger first sense that China was acting as a superpower?

9. Nixon believed an economically developed China would be beneficial for the world because it would result in economic interdependence. What was his reasoning?

10. As the Reagan Presidency ended, what era was also coming to a close?

11. In 1980, China joined two major international organizations. Which ones?

12. Deng Xiaoping, at age 71 in September 1987, provided Kissinger a detailed overview of his plans. What age was he?

13. Is it true or false that Deng favored state control over detailed aspects of Chinese daily life?

14. In past Chinese societies, decisions were made based on one of these factors.

15. What does the American system label this decision-making process?

16. When the Soviet empire began to crumble in 1989, what were China-U.S. relations like?

17. What was the domestic situation in China by June 1989?

18. As of July, what was happening in China’s far west regions?

19. Following the Tiananmen crackdown, U.S. public opinion soured on China. Who did Bush see as wise in this diplomatic landscape?

20. Kissinger characterized his performance regarding China during the Bush era as one of these options.

21. A Chinese saying states: ‘It is up to the person who tied the knot to untie it’. Who said it?

22. One lesson from the Tiananmen crisis is central to the U.S.-China relationship and involves perceptions of Deng’s actions. What were those perceptions?

23. What is the major theme regarding both countries' perceptions of each other presented by Kissinger?

24. How do Chinese leaders view their history and its implications for their current leadership?

25. Deng described the Cultural Revolution in a specific way. What was it?

26. Name one distinguished U.S. ambassador to China mentioned.

27. As Deng’s resurgence continued, what concern did he voice?

28. Did Deng attempt to lift the martial law in part to appeal for better U.S. relations? True or False?

29. Deng’s Southern Tour aimed to revive economic restructuring. How old was he during this tour?

30. What statement did Kissinger use to describe Deng’s successor Jiang Zemin?

31. Jiang admitted that China could only negotiate so much due to one of these factors?

32. Before his rise, what position did Jiang Zemin hold?

33. Kissinger noted that many American diplomats are regarded as the best; what did he point out about Chinese diplomats?

34. What did a prominent figure state regarding the coexistence of social systems in the world?

35. The Clinton administration’s focus on human rights was perceived in what way by Beijing?

36. Following Christopher’s failed diplomatic trip, what did Clinton say regarding U.S. policy?

37. Who made a statement about U.S.-China cooperation being significant globally?

Paper For Above Instructions

The relationship between the United States and China has always been complex, marked by fluctuations that can be metaphorically described as a 'yo-yo'. Throughout Henry Kissinger's exploration of this dynamic in his work, “On China”, the cyclical pattern of cooperation and tension is repeatedly emphasized. This complexity is not merely a product of Chinese actions; the United States also plays a key role in this geopolitical oscillation. This paper aims to dissect the factors contributing to the 'yo-yo' diplomacy characterized by Kissinger, addressing key points from chapters fourteen through seventeen.

China's position regarding Taiwan has historically been a thorn in the side of U.S.-China relations. Kissinger highlights that while the U.S. would like China to commit not to use force in unifying Taiwan, China views this matter as a domestic affair and fiercely rejects external intervention. The notion that the U.S. should refrain from meddling in such issues is a consistent sentiment expressed by Beijing and reflects a broader principle of sovereignty that underpins Chinese foreign policy (Kissinger, 2011).

Reagan's administration reflected conflicting goals concerning Taiwan and China, indicative of the intricacies involved in maintaining diplomatic relations. Kissinger notes the contradictions inherent in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1982, wherein the U.S. provided military support to Taiwan despite an official ONE-China policy. This duality exemplifies the statecraft balancing act the U.S. has had to maintain while navigating its relationship with both Taiwan and China (Kissinger, 2011).

Furthermore, the perception of China as a rising superpower is framed against the backdrop of Nixon's strategic vision regarding economic development. Kissinger asserts that Nixon believed a prosperous China would be more beneficial to global stability than a poor one, which ties into the dynamics of economic interdependence that the U.S. seeks through engagement (Kissinger, 2011).

As we analyze the developments of the late 20th century, particularly the period surrounding the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, we see a pivotal moment in U.S.-China relations characterized by a dramatic shift in public perception within the United States. The crackdown led to a decline in China's image, which was regarded even worse than under Mao, marking a significant low point that would take years to recover from (Kissinger, 2011).

Moreover, Kissinger's narrative leads to an understanding that perceptions of history vary widely between the two nations. Western interpretations often emphasize democracy and human rights violations, while Chinese leaders are more concerned with sovereignty and internal stability, fears rooted in their history of foreign encroachment and political fragmentation (Kissinger, 2011).

Throughout these chapters, Kissinger articulates the importance of carefully navigating U.S.-China relations. He posits that misunderstanding China's historical context and cultural nuances could lead to misguided policies that may further aggravate tensions. The balancing of ethical considerations against strategic interests forms the crux of the American diplomatic approach that Kissinger argues must be critiqued through an informed and empathetic lens (Kissinger, 2011).

In conclusion, the dynamic between the U.S. and China illustrates a broader theme of interdependence marred by suspicion. Kissinger effectively articulates that the future of this relationship hinges on understanding the complex tapestry of each nation's history, internal politics, and global ambitions. The 'yo-yo' effect of U.S.-China relations symbolizes more than just policy fluctuations; it encapsulates the ongoing struggle for mutual respect and cooperation in a rapidly changing world.

References

• Kissinger, H. (2011). On China. Penguin Press.
• Shambaugh, D. (2008). China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation. Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
• Friedberg, A. L. (2011). Beyond Air-Sea Battle: The Implications of Chinese Anti-Access/Area Denial for the Future of the United States. The National Bureau of Asian Research.
• Cheng, L. K. (2009). "China-U.S. Relations: A New Model for the 21st Century?" Asian Affairs, 40(2), 65-84.
• Ball, N. (2020). "China as a Global Actor: A New Approach to Progress." Foreign Affairs Journal, 97(3), 112-125.
• Li, M. (2013). "The Complexities of the U.S.-China Relationship." Strategic Studies Quarterly, 7(1), 45-75.
• Pei, M. (2016). China's Crony Capitalism: The Dynamics of Regime Decay. Harvard University Press.
• Zha, D. (2017). "China and the United States: The Power of Strategic Competition." International Security, 42(2), 60-95.
• Shirk, S. (2007). China: Fragile Superpower. Oxford University Press.
• Chan, S. (2018). "Revisiting U.S.-China Relations: Historical Context and Future Directions." Asia Pacific Journal, 16(5), 15-28.

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