Here Is An Example That Actually Occurred In Los Angeles, CA

Here Is An Example That Actually Occurred In Los Angeles Californiaa

Studies show that people who are innocent are less likely to enter into a plea bargain than those who are guilty. Thus, innocent people who are ultimately convicted will suffer more severely from the penalty of an increased sentence. Innocent people who are eventually acquitted still incur the costs of a defense. What are the implications of this to a justice system that relies on plea bargains? The overriding duty of the prosecutor is to see that justice is done.

This means that if a prosecutor, at any point, even after conviction, becomes convinced that a person is not guilty of the crime of which he was convicted, the prosecutor should seek dismissal of the case or try to overturn the conviction. This is exactly what the prosecutor eventually did in Alex's case. However, prosecutors are usually judged on their conviction rate. In addition, district attorneys are politicians who could sacrifice their popularity if they allowed someone to go free who was thought by large numbers of the public to be guilty. Thus, prosecutors may push for plea bargains in which innocent people plead guilty to crimes they did not commit.

On the other hand, prosecutors who want to keep up their conviction rates may agree to plea bargains that don't adequately punish a defendant and don't effectively deter crime. In most jurisdictions, the judge who will preside over the trial is not permitted to be involved in the plea bargain. The judge can only accept the plea bargain or reject it. The idea is that the judge who presides over the trial could become biased toward the prosecution if he knows that the defendant is thinking seriously of admitting guilt. By the same token, the prosecutor doesn't want to try a case in the Courtroom of a judge who thinks that the prosecution has been unreasonable in its plea bargain negotiations.

Judges almost always accept plea bargains. Question #2: Many people charge that the legislatures of some states and the federal Congress have increased the length of sentences for some crimes, not because the law-makers believed that the severity of the crime justified the longer sentence but only to give prosecutors an edge in plea bargaining. Is this good public policy? Explain your reasons.

Paper For Above instruction

The reliance on plea bargaining within the criminal justice system presents significant ethical, legal, and policy challenges, particularly when the system's structural incentives may distort justice. As highlighted by the case of Alex in Los Angeles, the plea bargain system expedites case resolution and reduces judicial and prosecutorial workloads but often exposes innocent defendants to disproportionate punishment, especially if they lack resources for adequate defense or if prosecutorial incentives prioritize conviction rates over justice.

One core implication of the system is the increased risk of wrongful conviction or excessive sentencing for innocent individuals who are less likely to accept plea deals, which tend to favor guilty defendants. This discrepancy stems from the fact that innocent suspects, unaware of the strength of their case or unwilling to accept a plea that could lead to severe punishment, may refuse to cooperate or plead guilty, thus facing extended trials and harsher penalties if convicted at trial. Conversely, guilty defendants often accept plea deals to reduce their potential sentence, thereby skewing the system toward plea bargains rather than factual innocence or guilt.

This dynamic raises concerns about the fundamental purpose of the justice system—ensuring justice rather than merely enabling expedient case closures. When prosecutors are judged primarily on their conviction rates, there may be a pressure to accept plea bargains that are not necessarily in the interest of justice, especially if they serve political or institutional goals. The case of Alex illustrates this dilemma: despite evidence suggesting his innocence, he faced substantial costs and a potentially wrongful conviction driven by systemic incentives.

The role of judges also complicates the plea bargain process. Since judges typically do not participate in negotiations, their ability to ensure justice and fairness may be limited. While safeguards are intended to prevent biases, the widespread acceptance of plea bargains without rigorous judicial scrutiny can lead to injustices, especially when plea deals are used to obscure the true extent of guilt or innocence.

Regarding legislation that extends sentences in order to aid prosecutors in plea bargaining, this practice raises serious policy questions. On the one hand, longer sentences can serve as a deterrent and provide leverage for prosecutors to negotiate plea deals quickly. However, when these extended sentences are motivated less by a desire to proportionally punish wrongdoing and more by strategic interests, they threaten to undermine the principles of fairness and proportionality that underpin just sentencing practices.

Such legislative strategies can incentivize a "trial penalty" where defendants are pressured to plead guilty to avoid harsher sentences at trial, regardless of actual guilt. This compromises the presumption of innocence and risks condemning individuals based on strategic considerations rather than merit. Public policy should prioritize balanced sentencing that reflects the severity of the offense, upholds fairness, and guards against coercive plea bargaining strategies that may unjustly penalize the innocent or unduly punish offenders.

In conclusion, while plea bargaining remains a necessary component of modern criminal justice for efficiency, systemic incentives and legislative trends that distort sentencing to favor prosecutorial leverage pose serious ethical and legal challenges. Ensuring justice requires reforms that promote transparency, judicial oversight of plea deals, and sentencing policies rooted in proportionality and fairness. These reforms can help safeguard against wrongful convictions and uphold the integrity of the justice system, balancing efficiency with the core principles of justice.

References

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