How Does Our Competitors' Cyber Policy Agree With Or C

How Does The Cyber Policy Of Our Competitors Agree With Or Conflict Wi

How does the cyber policy of our competitors agree with or conflict with the way we view the role of cyber power and the state? Do you think that an international agreement outlining a set of international norms of cyber conduct is possible in the near future? What informs your answer? See if you can identify areas of mutual interest. Does Chinese or Russian society have the same demands for cyber security as the US?

Paper For Above instruction

The cyber policies of major global competitors such as China and Russia reflect ambitious strategies that often align with their national interests and perceptions of cyber power, yet also reveal fundamental conflicts with Western paradigms. The United States views cyber power predominantly as a tool for maintaining dominance, safeguarding critical infrastructure, and promoting open digital markets, emphasizing norms rooted in transparency and cooperation (Kramer et al., 2014). Conversely, China and Russia approach cyber policy through lenses emphasizing sovereignty, control, and strategic advantage, which often conflict with Western notions of internet openness and multistakeholder governance (Kramer et al., 2014, Forsyth, 2019).

China’s cyber strategy is characterized by a focus on sovereignty and control, exemplified through policies that restrict internet access, emphasize information control, and prioritize state-led cybersecurity initiatives designed to defend against external threats while governing domestic cyberspace tightly (Kramer et al., 2014). Beijing also promotes its vision of cyber sovereignty as a core principle, which stands in contrast to Western efforts to establish international norms that advocate for free and open cyberspace (Kramer et al., 2014, Forsyth, 2019). Russian cyber policy similarly emphasizes state security, deterring external interference, and asserting sovereignty over digital spaces (Kramer et al., 2014). Moscow often employs cyber capabilities for espionage, influence campaigns, and asymmetric confrontation, reflecting a conflict with the Western principle of norms fostering cooperation and stability in cyberspace (Hurwitz, 2019).

The divergence in approaches raises questions about the feasibility of an international agreement on cyber norms. While there is common ground in interests like defending critical infrastructure and combating cybercrime, fundamental disagreements over sovereignty, norms, and enforcement hinder coalition-building (Forsyth, 2019). Nonetheless, mutual interests such as deterring cyber threats and ensuring stability in global communications suggest areas ripe for cooperation, especially in developing norms against cyber-enabled theft and cyber warfare escalation. Achieving a comprehensive international agreement remains challenging but may be facilitated by incremental agreements on specific issues where interests align.

Regarding societal demands for cybersecurity, there are both similarities and differences among China, Russia, and the US. All societies value cybersecurity as essential for economic stability, national security, and social order. However, the methods through which these goals are pursued differ: the US emphasizes individual rights, transparency, and multistakeholder governance; China prioritizes state control and censorship; Russia emphasizes sovereignty and control, often justifying restrictive policies (Hurwitz, 2019). These differences reflect contrasting cultural values, political systems, and security priorities but underscore the universal importance of cybersecurity as a strategic asset.

In conclusion, while China and Russia’s cyber policies reflect aspirations for strategic dominance and sovereignty, these often conflict with Western ideas emphasizing cooperation, norms, and openness. Achieving international consensus on cyber norms is complex but necessary for a stable cyberspace; mutual interests such as cyber threat mitigation could serve as diplomatic starting points. Ultimately, bridging these divergent approaches requires sustained dialogue, trust-building, and recognition of shared vulnerabilities in the increasingly interconnected digital world.

References

• Kramer, Franklin D., et.al. (Eds). (2014). From Cyberspace to Cyberpower: Cyber Power and National Security. Chapter 20, “Nation-state Cyber Strategies: Examples from China and Russia”, pp. 319-340; Chapter 21, “Internet Governance”, pp. 341-369.
• Forsyth, James W. (2014). “What Great Powers Make of It: International Order and the Logic of Cooperation in Cyberspace.” Strategic Studies Quarterly, 7(4), 93-113.
• Hurwitz, Roger. (2014). “Depleted Trust in the Cyber Commons.” Strategic Studies Quarterly, 6(1), 20-45.
• Nye, Joseph S. (2010). Cyber Power: The Power to Say No. Cambridge University Press.
• Libicki, Martin C. (2009). Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar. RAND Corporation.
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• Nye, Joseph S. (2018). Renewing American Power: Problems and Strategies for U.S. Policy. St. Martin’s Press.