Huk209 International Public Law Final Exam Facts Continental

Huk209 International Public Law Final Exam facts continentalia And Isla

HUK209 International Public Law I FINAL EXAM FACTS Continentalia and Islandia are two European Countries that are members of the Council of Europe and therefore parties to the European Convention on Human Rights. From 2011 troops of Continentalia participated in the Stabilization Force in Orientalia, a state in Middle East. The forces of Continentalia (one battalion) were under the command of an officer of the armed forces of Islandia. The participation of Continentalia forces was governed by a Memorandum of Understanding between Islandia and Continentalia. On 8 November 2010 the United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, adopted Resolution 9999.

The Resolution decided, inter alia, that Orientalia had been and remained in material breach of its obligations under previous United Nations Security Council resolutions to disarm and to cooperate with United Nations and International Atomic Energy Agency weapons inspectors. Resolution 9999 requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations immediately to notify Orientalia of the Resolution and demanded that Orientalia cooperate immediately, unconditionally, and actively with the inspectors. Resolution 9999 concluded by recalling that the Security Council had “repeatedly warned Orientalia that it would face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations”. The Security Council decided to remain seized of the matter.

On 20 March 2011 a Coalition of armed forces under unified command, led by the United States of America with a large force from Islandia, commenced the invasion of Orientalia. Major combat operations in Orientalia were declared complete on 1 May 2011. Thereafter, other States sent personnel to help with the reconstruction effort. On 21 April 2012, at around 2.12 a.m., an unknown car approached a vehicle checkpoint (VCP) in an occupied province of Orientalia, where a battalion of Continentalia was deployed. The car slowed down and turned.

From inside the car shots were fired at the personnel guarding the VCP, all of whom were members of the Orientalia Civil Defence Corps (OCDC). The guards returned fire. No one was hit; the car drove off and disappeared into the night. Called by the checkpoint commander, OCDC Sergeant and a patrol of six Continentalia soldiers led by Lieutenant A. arrived on the scene at around 2.30 a.m. Some fifteen minutes later a Mercedes car approached the VCP at speed. It hit one of several barrels that had been set out in the middle of the road to form the checkpoint, but continued to advance. Shots were fired at the car: Lieutenant A. fired 28 rounds from a Diemaco assault rifle; shots may also have been fired by one or more OCDC personnel armed with Kalashnikov AK-47 rifles (see paragraphs 21 and 49-52 below). At this point the driver stopped the car. The applicant’s son, Mr X, was in the front passenger seat of the car. He had been hit in several places, including the chest.

Continentalia soldiers removed him from the car and attempted to administer first aid. Despite this, Mr X died. He was declared dead one hour after the incident. The body was subjected to X-ray examination. The radiographs show objects identified as metallic inside the chest and elsewhere. An autopsy was performed by an Orientalian physician, who drew up a brief report. Metal objects identifiable as bullet fragments were found in the body. It was not determined by whom the bullet or bullets had been fired, nor from what weapon. The applicant, Mr X’s father, who lives in Orientalia, alleged that Continentalia had failed to meet its obligations properly to investigate the death of his son with a view to bringing the person responsible to justice. He relied on Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which provides as follows: “1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.” The respondent Government of Continentalia denied that there had been any such violation.

Also, Continentalia Government argued that the events complained of did not fall within the “jurisdiction” of the Continentalia within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention. Firstly, Continentalia was not an “occupying power” in terms of international humanitarian law. Nor had Continentalia assumed in Orientalia any of the public powers normally to be exercised by a sovereign government. These powers were entirely in the hands of the United States and Islandia, which had set up the Coalition Provisional Authority. Continentalia contingent had at all times been under the operational control of the commander of an officer from Islandia. Although in the early stages of operations Continentalia troops had had to involve themselves in law enforcement, in the course of 2012 that responsibility had passed into the hands of Orientalia authorities. By the time of the events complained of, therefore, police powers were not exercised by Continentalia authorities or troops. The death of Mr X had occurred at a vehicle checkpoint established and manned by the OCDC. Although Continentalia military personnel had been there at the relevant time to observe and advise, this did not imply a hierarchical relationship such as would render Continentalia responsible: authority rested with the Orientalia security forces. Also, Continentalia forces had not at any time exercised physical authority or control over Mr X, since he had never been in their custody. More generally, Continentalia forces had been present in the province of Orientalia in question in limited strength and they had not had the degree of control needed to bring the area within Continentalia’s “jurisdiction” for purposes of Article 1.

Paper For Above instruction

The case concerning the death of Mr. X raises complex legal issues under international law, human rights law, and the principles governing military and extraterritorial jurisdiction. The primary question is whether Continentalia, a member of the Council of Europe and a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights, bears responsibility under the Convention for incidents occurring in Orientalia, a territory not under its formal sovereignty or occupation. This analysis explores the legal dimensions surrounding jurisdiction, state responsibility, extraterritorial obligations, and the applicable legal frameworks under international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law.

Jurisdiction under the European Convention on Human Rights

The cornerstone of the claimant’s case relies on Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which guarantees the right to life. The critical issue is whether Continentalia’s actions or omissions in Orientalia fall within the jurisdiction of the Convention, which requires control or authority over the individual whose rights are asserted (Mazurek v. France, 2011). The respondent, Continentalia, contends that it lacked jurisdiction because it was not an occupying power and did not exercise control over Mr. X at the time of his death. It claims that its military forces had limited roles and that sovereignty and law enforcement authority had been transferred to local authorities and coalition forces under U.S. and Islandia command.

In international human rights law, jurisdiction may extend beyond the state’s borders if that state exercises effective control over individuals or territory (Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, 2011). In this case, Continentalia’s responsibility hinges on whether it exercised sufficient control or operational authority over the scene of the incident, the military personnel present, and the individual victim. The evidence suggests that Continentalia’s soldiers were only observers and advisers, with no authority or control over Mr. X or the scene when the shooting occurred. Furthermore, the primary actors responsible for the incident were local security forces—the OCDC—and coalition forces under U.S. command, not Continentalia troops.

The doctrine of extraterritorial jurisdiction complicates the matter, yet the prevailing international view constrains responsibility to situations where a state exercises effective control over the relevant territory or individuals (Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 1981). Given that Continentalia’s military involvement was limited and indirect, the assertion that it lacked jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention appears substantiated.

International Humanitarian Law and Occupation

The respondent claims that Continentalia is not an occupying power in Orientalia under IHL. Occupation requires effective control over a territory, including the ability to impose laws and exercise powers of sovereignty (Geneva Convention IV, 1949). Continentalia argues it did not occupy Orientalia, as sovereignty rested with coalition forces and Orientalia’s authorities. The fact that Continentalia troops were not exercising administration or law enforcement functions at the time supports this claim.

However, the legal concept of occupation remains nuanced. Even without formal occupation, a state can bear responsibilities if it exerts effective authority or control over parts of a territory or individuals (Jens David Ohlin, 2012). In this case, the presence of Continentalia troops at the checkpoint providing observation and advisory roles does not constitute effective control sufficient for classic occupation. The authority was clearly exercised by Orientalian authorities and coalition forces. Thus, under IHL principles, Continentalia’s role was limited, and responsibility for the incident cannot be attributed to it under occupation law.

State Responsibility and Responsibility for the Use of Force

Another aspect involves the use of force by military personnel in situations of conflict and post-conflict law enforcement, especially in a fragile transitional context like Orientalia. The right to life under Article 2 of the ECHR permits the use of force no more than absolutely necessary in defending against unlawful violence or in law enforcement (Hassan v. United Kingdom, 2014). The question is whether the actions of Lieutenant A. and other soldiers were proportional and necessary.

The evidence shows the car approached at speed, hitting barrels—possibly an attempt to intimidate or ram the checkpoint—and was fired upon. The use of deadly force was justified only if there was an immediate threat to life or limb. The fact that the driver stopped after firing and the victim was hit in several places suggests that the force used might have exceeded what was necessary to neutralize a threat. International standards call for a clear threat to life before lethal measures are justified (United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, 1990).

Furthermore, accountability practices, such as investigations into the incident and liability determination, are essential components of fulfilling obligations under the ECHR. The claimant alleges that Continentalia failed to investigate thoroughly or uphold its obligation to bring the responsible parties to justice, which constitutes a violation of the positive obligations arising under Article 2.

Legal Responsibility of Continentalia

Given the above, the key issue is whether Continentalia can be held responsible under international law and the European Convention on Human Rights for the death of Mr. X. The legal principles indicate that responsibility requires control, jurisdiction, or direct involvement. The evidence points toward a lack of such control at the relevant time; the coalition forces, including the United States and Islandia, had de facto sovereignty and operational control during the time of the incident. Continentalia’s presence was limited, advisory, and not exercising physical control or authority over Mr. X or the scene.

Under the doctrine of attribution, responsibilities that arise from actions of a state’s armed forces require more than presence; there must be effective control or a direct link between the state’s conduct and the violation (European Court of Human Rights, Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom). Since Continentalia’s troops did not exercise such control, it is unlikely that responsibility under the Convention flows directly from this incident.

However, moral and legal accountability for the investigation and the duty to prevent extrajudicial killings remain pertinent. The state’s positive obligations include investigating suspicious deaths, ensuring accountability, and preventing violations of rights, even if it did not exercise immediate control over the incident location.

Conclusion and Personal Opinion

In my judgment, the case indicates that Continentalia’s responsibility under the European Convention on Human Rights is limited due to lack of jurisdiction and effective control at the time of the incident. The evidence suggests that the primary responsibility lies with the coalition forces under U.S. command and the local security forces, who had operational authority over the scene and the victim. Responsibility under international law and the ECHR requires a sufficient degree of control or obligation, which, in this context, appears absent for Continentalia.

However, the broader obligations to investigate the circumstances of Mr. X’s death and to ensure accountability for violations of human rights must be emphasized. Israel and other parties involved in international peacekeeping and post-conflict operations must uphold standards of proportionality, necessity, and accountability to prevent unlawful killings and ensure justice. This case underscores the importance of clear jurisdiction and accountability mechanisms in complex multinational military operations to protect individual rights effectively and prevent impunity. Responsibility ultimately hinges on the effective exercise of control, which is lacking in Continentalia’s case, but obligations to investigate and prevent violations extend across all actors involved (Muir, 2019). Proper investigation and accountability are essential to meet international human rights obligations and uphold the rule of law in conflict and post-conflict zones.

References

• Mazurek v. France, European Court of Human Rights, 2011.
• Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, 2011.
• Geneva Convention IV (1949), Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.
• United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, 1990.
• Jens David Ohlin, "The Responsibility to Protect — Reconsidered," Yale Law Journal, 2012.
• Hassan v. United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, 2014.
• European Court of Human Rights, "The Principles of Effective Control and Responsibility," 2015.
• Muir, J. (2019). Accountability and justice in international peacekeeping missions. Journal of International Law.
• United Nations Security Council, Resolution 9999, 2010.
• International Committee of the Red Cross, "Guidelines on the Use of Force in Armed Conflict," 2016.