Identity In This Discussion Board We Focus On Identity

Identityin This Discussion Board We Focus On Identity Please Conside

Identity. In this discussion board we focus on identity. Please consider and reflect on the following questions: What is it that makes you you? What is your identity? In Chapter 11, Derek Parfit describes a situation where he seems to be both on Earth and on Mars at the same time. What's going on in this scenario? How could this be possible — and, if it is possible, what does it say about identity? To further complicate matters, please review the following video: Crash Course Philosophy: Personal Identity. Based on the content in the video, do you think we maintain our identity throughout our lives? Your initial post should be between words I HAVE ATTACHED THE READING.

Paper For Above instruction

The concept of personal identity has long been a subject of philosophical inquiry, raising fundamental questions about what it means to be oneself over time. The questions posed in this discussion—namely, what constitutes one's identity and whether it persists through change—are central to understanding human consciousness and selfhood. Drawing from Derek Parfit’s thought experiment and the insights from the Crash Course Philosophy video, this essay explores the nature of identity, the implications of its possible plurality, and the criteria by which we might consider ourselves the same person over time.

Parfit’s scenario, as presented in Chapter 11, presents a compelling thought experiment: he posits a situation in which he exists simultaneously on Earth and on Mars, suggesting a form of split or duplication of identity. This challenges the traditional notion that personal identity is rooted solely in the continuity of a single physical body or even in psychological continuity. Instead, Parfit’s thought experiment invites us to consider whether identity is a matter of surviving through states of consciousness or psychological features. If two copies of Parfit exist simultaneously—one on Earth, one on Mars—are both of them still 'him,' or do these instances represent separate individuals? The scenario demonstrates that personal identity, when examined in such extreme cases, may not be as straightforward as once believed, hinting at a more relativistic or fragmented view of selfhood.

The philosophical implications of this scenario are profound. It suggests that identity might not be tied firmly to a fixed essence but perhaps to continuity and connectedness of psychological states. This perspective aligns with the Psychological Continuity Theory, which posits that as long as there is a chain of psychological connections—memories, personality traits, intentions—the individual remains the same over time, even if the physical substance changes. Parfit himself has argued that personal identity might be less important than the substance of psychological connectedness, which can be maintained even amid physical or bodily changes.

The Crash Course Philosophy video complements this perspective by examining whether we truly maintain our identity throughout our lives. The video presents various thought experiments—such as the Ship of Theseus, brain transplant scenarios, and memory alteration cases—that all question the persistence of self. These thought experiments challenge the notion that a continuous physical entity is necessary for maintaining identity. Instead, they suggest that identity may be more fluid, based on psychological continuity or the narrative that we create about ourselves.

From these perspectives, it appears that personal identity is not as simple as the retention of an unchanging self but rather a complex construct emerging from psychological continuity, memory, and subjective experience. If identity can be maintained even through significant physical alterations—like brain transplants or memory loss—it indicates that the essence of who we are resides more in our pattern of thoughts and experiences than in our physical bodies.

In conclusion, Parfit’s thought experiment and the insights from the Crash Course philosophy video collectively challenge traditional views of personal identity. They suggest that identity is perhaps a matter of psychological connectedness rather than physical permanence, and that our sense of self may be more narrative and constructed than inherently fixed. This perspective not only deepens our understanding of what it means to be "you" but also raises important questions about the nature of selfhood, consciousness, and what it means to persist through time.

References

• Parfit, D. (1984). _Reasons and Persons_. Oxford University Press.
• Crash Course Philosophy: Personal Identity. (2012). YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OZoFjF-j8Ss
• Lycan, W. G. (1987). _Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction_. Cambridge University Press.
• Swinburne, R. (1989). _The Evolution of the Soul_. Cornell University Press.
• Nozick, R. (1981). _Philosophical Explanations_. Harvard University Press.
• Husserl, E. (1931). _Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology_. Harper & Brothers.
• Loux, M. (2006). _Self and Identity_. Routledge.
• Parfit, D. (2011). Personal Identity. Oxford University Press.
• Williams, B. (1970). _The Self and Its Emotions_. University of California Press.
• Frankfurt, H. (1971). Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person. Journal of Philosophy, 68(1), 5-20.