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In “Sensations and Brain Processes,” J.J.C. Smart considers the objection to the identity thesis that one can imagine being turned to stone while still experiencing sensations like images, aches, and pains. In her essay “In Defense of Mind-Body-Dualism,” Brie Gertler transforms this objection into an argument for dualism. Write a double-spaced, 750-word paper explaining how Smart responds to this objection, particularly focusing on the first paragraph of his reply to objection 7. Additionally, examine how Brie Gertler addresses Smart’s objection to conceivability arguments by revising premise 1 and premise 2 of her argument for dualism.

Paper For Above Instructions

The ongoing philosophical debate surrounding the mind-body problem is rich with arguments and counterarguments, particularly centered around the identity thesis and dualism. Two significant figures in this discourse are J.J.C. Smart and Brie Gertler. In “Sensations and Brain Processes,” Smart addresses an objection to the identity thesis, particularly the idea that one can conceive of themselves as independent from their physical body while still possessing sensations. Meanwhile, Gertler, in her essay “In Defense of Mind-Body-Dualism,” counters Smart's position and provides a dualist perspective that challenges the identity thesis's validity. This paper will delve into Smart's response to the objection and Gertler's articulation of dualism using her revisions of key premises in her argument.

Smart’s examination of the objection begins with the assertion that the ability to conceive of an experience does not necessarily validate its existence or suggest that the experience and the physical state are distinct. In the first paragraph of his response to objection 7, Smart posits that the act of imagining oneself in a completely different state does not entail that the original state is a separable entity from the brain processes that underpin sensations. He suggests that conceivability does not equate to logical possibility. Just because something can be imagined does not mean it can occur in actual reality. For Smart, the identity thesis remains strong; feelings, sensations, and pains are directly tied to brain processes, and isolating an experience from its physical instantiation leads to a misunderstanding of the relationship between mind and body.

Smart's argument pivots on the nature of sensations being hardwired to their physical substrate. He effectively highlights that while one might envision their existence in a state devoid of a physical body, it remains a mere figment of the imagination, not reflective of the true nature of the mind-body relationship. The actual mechanisms that give rise to sensations are rooted in our neurological constitution. Thus, the objection can be considered invalid as it misinterprets the implications of the identity thesis by conflating theoretical possibility with actual existence.

Conversely, Brie Gertler takes a different approach regarding the above objection. In her essay, she acknowledges the challenge posed by Smart’s identity thesis but positions her dualist perspective in a nuanced manner. Gertler accepts that Smart's contention about the relationship between sensations and brain processes presents a formidable challenge. However, she re-examines the premises underlying the conceivability argument and articulates her adjustments to premised formulations. In addressing Smart's claim, she seeks to reinforce her case for dualism by refining what she perceives as the weak points in the original argument.

Gertler revises premises 1 and 2 of her argument in a strategic manner, aiming to bolster her dualist stance against Smart’s objections. Premise 1 traditionally posits that if one can conceive of a scenario without sensations, then it stands to reason that sensations are not elementally tied to the physical state of an organism. Smart's contestation that merely conceiving a notion does not substantiate its legitimacy provokes Gertler to refine this premise. She introduces further considerations about the nature of imagination and possibility, emphasizing that conceivability can serve as a valid basis for arguing against physicalism. In her revision, Gertler argues that it is entirely possible to conceive of a being that exists without physicality yet retains subjective experiences.

Gertler's revised premise 2 further delineates her argument surrounding dualism, where she asserts that physicalism cannot fully account for the qualitative aspects of conscious experience. She emphasizes that subjective experiences, or qualia, cannot be reduced to neural processes and highlights the failures of physicalism to provide satisfactory explanations for phenomena of consciousness. Gertler builds upon Smart's rejection of conceivability but utilizes it to carve out a distinct space for her dualist arguments. She posits that acknowledging the separability of sensations from their physical correlates allows for a dualistic interpretation of consciousness and existence.

Ultimately, Gertler concludes that dualism provides a more comprehensive framework for understanding the nuances of consciousness and the mind-body relationship than physicalism. She aims to illustrate that by revising the language and expectations attached to premises, one can emerge with a robust argument in favor of mind-body dualism. While Smart effectively dismisses the objection based on the premise of logical possibility versus conceivable frameworks, Gertler reinvigorates the dialogue by asserting the legitimate interrogations posed to the identity thesis through her refined argumentation.

In summary, the philosophical discourse between J.J.C. Smart and Brie Gertler reveals essential insights into the mind-body problem. Smart underscores the limitations of conceivability as a counterargument to the identity thesis and affirms the direct connection between brain processes and sensations. Gertler, on the other hand, responds critically to Smart's assertions by revising her premises and reinforcing the validity of dualism in explaining consciousness. This philosophical exchange not only challenges existing notions of identity but also underscores the complexities inherent in understanding the relationship between mind and body.

References

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