In Sensations And Brain Processes JJC Smart Considers 910940 ✓ Solved

In Sensations And Brain Processes Jjc Smart Considers The Followi

In “Sensations and Brain Processes,” J.J.C. Smart considers an objection to the identity thesis: the claim that mental states are identical to brain states. The objection states that one can imagine oneself turned to stone and still having mental phenomena such as images, aches, and pains, which seems incompatible with the idea that mental states are identical to brain states, since in the imagined scenario, the mental states persist even if the physical state of the individual changes drastically. Brie Gertler, in her essay “In Defense of Mind-Body Dualism,” transforms this objection into an argument supporting dualism by questioning the conceivability of such scenarios and their implications for physicalism or dualism. The paper explores how Smart responds to the objection, particularly focusing on the first paragraph of his reply to objection 7, and examines how Gertler revises her premises in light of Smart’s response to strengthen her dualist argument.

Smart’s Response to the Conceivability Objection

Smart’s response to the objection concerning imagining oneself turned to stone while still experiencing mental phenomena is primarily centered on rejecting the validity of conceivability as a reliable guide to metaphysical truth. In the first paragraph of his reply to objection 7, Smart emphasizes that conceivability does not necessarily entail possibility. He argues that just because something can be coherently imagined—such as oneself persistently experiencing mental states while being turned to stone—that does not mean it is metaphysically possible or incompatible with the physicalist view. Smart claims that conceivability is a guide to possibility only when it aligns with scientific understanding, which typically requires correlation between mental states and brain states. Therefore, the fact that one can conceive of a scenario in which mental states persist despite drastic physical changes does not undermine the identity thesis but rather highlights the fallibility of conceivability arguments in metaphysics. Smart insists that the connection between mental states and brain states is better established through empirical science than through mere imaginative scenarios.

Gertler’s Revision of Premises in Response to Smart

Brie Gertler, in her defense of dualism, revises her initial premises—particularly premises 1 and 2—based on Smart’s critique of conceivability arguments. Initially, her argument hinged on the assumption that conceivability fails to reliably distinguish between physicalist and dualist theories, and that intuitive scenarios like the “stone” case support dualism. However, acknowledging Smart’s critique, Gertler adjusts her premises to emphasize that conceivability may not serve as a decisive epistemic tool for establishing metaphysical facts. Instead, she underscores the importance of phenomenological data and the limitations of scientific reductionism in capturing certain aspects of mental phenomena. Gertler revises her second premise to acknowledge that while conceivability can be informative, it must be complemented by other considerations, such as the qualitative features of mental states—what she terms “phenomenal experience”—which remain difficult to reduce to physical explanations. Consequently, her revised premise suggests that mental phenomena possess qualities resistant to reductive physical analysis, supporting dualism.

Implications for the Mind-Body Debate

The interaction between Smart’s rejection of conceivability as a guide and Gertler’s adjustment of her premises highlights a broader insight into the philosophy of mind: the epistemic limits of conceivability arguments. Smart’s emphasis on scientific and empirical evidence for mind-brain identities undermines the appeal of thought experiments like the stone scenario, which rely on intuitive plausibility. Gertler’s revision, meanwhile, seeks to preserve the intuitive immediacy of mental phenomena that appear to resist physical explanation, thus reaffirming dualism’s plausibility. These philosophical exchanges demonstrate the importance of complementing intuitions with empirical science and phenomenological data in debating the nature of mental states, ultimately suggesting that dualism might remain a viable position even in the face of powerful physicalist objections.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Smart responds to the conceivability objection by asserting that conceivability alone is insufficient to establish metaphysical possibility, emphasizing the role of empirical scientific evidence. Gertler adapts her argument for dualism by revising premises to acknowledge the limitations of conceivability and to foreground the persistent qualitative aspects of mental phenomena. Together, their perspectives illustrate the ongoing philosophical tension between physicalist and dualist explanations of the mind, highlighting the nuanced interplay between thought experiments, phenomenology, and empirical science in understanding consciousness.

References

• Smart, J. J. C. (1959). Sensations and Brain Processes. The Philosophical Review, 68(2), 141-156.
• Gertler, Brie. (2013). In Defense of Mind-Body Dualism. The Philosophical Quarterly, 63(252), 651-666.
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