Interpreting The Exclusionary Rule

Interpreting The Exclusionary Rule

Interpreting the Exclusionary Rule: Please respond to the following prompts. Watch the video titled “The Exclusionary Rule for Dummies – Mapp v Ohio and the 4th Amendment” (11 min 12 s). Next, examine two (2) exceptions to the rule and provide your opinion on whether each exception is constitutional. Based on the chapter's content related to stop and frisk, analyze two (2) actions in relation to the Fourth Amendment and the arrest process. Additionally, state which action—stop or frisk—you believe should have the greatest constitutional protection and provide a rationale for your response.

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The exclusionary rule is a fundamental principle within United States constitutional law, primarily aimed at protecting individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. It mandates that evidence obtained through violations of constitutional rights cannot be used in criminal prosecutions. While this rule is crucial for safeguarding citizens’ privacy rights, the legal system recognizes certain exceptions where evidence collected in violation may still be admissible, reflecting a nuanced balance between justice and constitutional protections.

One notable exception to the exclusionary rule is the "good faith" exception. This exception allows evidence obtained through searches conducted with a warrant later found to be defective or invalid, provided law enforcement officers acted in good faith reliance on the warrant. This exception aligns with the principle of reasonable reliance and aims to prevent the exclusion of evidence in cases where officers reasonably believed they were acting within legal bounds, thus maintaining the integrity of law enforcement actions. In my opinion, the good faith exception is constitutional because it emphasizes the importance of intent and reasonable reliance rather than strict adherence to procedural perfection, which may inadvertently hinder law enforcement’s ability to combat crime effectively.

Another exception is the "inevitable discovery" doctrine. According to this principle, evidence that was illegally obtained can still be admissible if prosecutors can demonstrate that the evidence would have been discovered inevitably through lawful means. This exception recognizes practical realities in law enforcement and aims to prevent unjust outcomes where illegal searches merely delay the discovery of evidence. From a constitutional perspective, I believe the inevitable discovery exception is justifiable, provided the prosecution convincingly proves that the evidence discovery was inevitable regardless of the illegal search. It underscores a pragmatic approach, balancing constitutional protections with the needs of law enforcement.

Regarding stop and frisk, two actions are particularly pertinent within the context of the Fourth Amendment and the arrest process: the legality of stop-and-frisk searches based on reasonable suspicion and the requirement for officers to have probable cause for arrest. The legality of stop-and-frisk procedures rests on the principle of reasonable suspicion, which is a lower standard than probable cause but still mandates specific articulable facts leading to a suspicion of criminal activity. This practice is constitutional when properly conducted because it aims to prevent crime without infringing excessively on individual rights. However, concerns about racial profiling and arbitrary stops have prompted courts to scrutinize such actions carefully.

The second action relates to arrests based on probable cause. An arrest without probable cause violates Fourth Amendment protections and is unconstitutional. Probable cause requires sufficient facts and circumstances to lead a reasonable person to believe that an individual has committed or is about to commit a crime. Arrests lacking probable cause are illegal and can lead to the exclusion of evidence obtained during or after such arrests. This protects individuals from wrongful detention and upholds the constitutional safeguard against unwarranted government intrusion.

In weighing stop and frisk, I believe that the action of the stop should have greater constitutional protection than frisk. While both actions are designed to prevent crime, stops serve as preliminary investigations, and their justification is based on reasonable suspicion. Frisking, being a more intrusive search for weapons or contraband, raises greater privacy concerns. The rationale is that reasonable suspicion to stop is a less invasive intrusion, and it strikes a better balance between individual rights and law enforcement needs. Protecting against unjustified frisks preserves personal privacy more strictly, whereas stops are necessary to identify potential threats before escalation, making the latter more justifiable under current legal standards.

In conclusion, the exception to the exclusionary rule such as the good faith and inevitable discovery doctrines are, in my view, constitutional because they serve pragmatic purposes without compromising fundamental rights excessively. Moreover, the actions of stop and frisk must adhere to constitutional standards, with stops deserving greater protection to safeguard individual privacy rights while enabling law enforcement to perform their duties effectively. Maintaining this balance is essential for upholding citizens' Fourth Amendment rights in a dynamic and often complex legal landscape.

References

• Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
• Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
• Fox, C. (2017). Search and Seizure Law: The Basics. American Bar Association.
• Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
• Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
• Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
• Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
• NYPD v. DeBour, 442 U.S. 690 (1979).
• Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
• Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).