Keohane And Olson Chapter 5 Question 6 In The International
Keohane And Olson Chapter 5 Question 6in The International Treaty
Keohane and Olson, Chapter 5, Question 6: In the international treaty “game” described by Keohane & Olmstead Figure 5.5, both countries would be better off if each contributed to the clean-up of a shared pollution problem, but this is not what we expect to happen. Why is this better outcome unlikely to occur? Your response should show depth and detail and should reference assigned reading materials (use citations where possible at least 3 references including the book chapter). Citing real world examples will be helpful in meeting the minimum 350 to 400-word length requirement. Include citations and references in accordance with APA guidelines. Must be Plagiarism Free!!!
Paper For Above instruction
The issue depicted in Keohane and Olson’s Chapter 5, particularly in Figure 5.5, revolves around the strategic dilemma faced by nations in managing shared environmental problems, such as pollution. Despite the collective benefit of cooperation, individual countries have little incentive to contribute voluntarily to pollution cleanup efforts, highlighting the classic problem of collective action in international environmental treaties (Keohane & Olmstead, 2021). This challenge is rooted in the principles of game theory, where each country’s decision to contribute—or not—depends on expectations about the others' actions, leading to suboptimal outcomes for all parties involved.
The core reason why the mutually beneficial outcome of universal cooperation is unlikely to occur is rooted in the issue of free-riding. In the context of international treaties, free-riding occurs when a country benefits from the pollution reduction efforts of others without contributing itself (Keohane & Olmstead, 2021). This is particularly problematic because the benefits of environmental cleanup are shared globally, but the costs are borne locally, creating an imbalance that disincentivizes individual action. When each country assumes others will bear the burden, it rationally chooses to defect rather than cooperate, leading to a situation where no one invests sufficiently in the cleanup.
Real-world examples illustrate this dilemma. The Paris Agreement on climate change exemplifies the challenge of collective action. Despite broad international consensus, some countries, motivated by economic or political considerations, have failed to meet their commitments to reduce emissions (Falkner, 2016). For instance, major emitters like the United States initially signed but later withdrew from the agreement, citing concerns over economic competitiveness and sovereignty. Such actions undermine collective efforts because they distort the expectation that all parties will adhere to their commitments, thereby reducing overall effectiveness and trust among nations (Stern, 2015).
Furthermore, the tragedy of the commons offers a vivid illustration of this problem. The overexploitation of shared natural resources such as fisheries or air quality demonstrates the tendency of individual actors to prioritize immediate gains over sustainable management, resulting in environmental degradation (Hardin, 1968). These examples underscore why cooperation remains elusive—without enforceable agreements, significant incentives to free-ride inhibit the achievement of mutually beneficial environmental outcomes.
In conclusion, the most significant obstacles to rational, cooperative international efforts in environmental pollution control lie in concerns over free-riding and the difficulty of enforcing compliance. When countries perceive that they can enjoy environmental benefits without incurring costs, they are disinclined to contribute, thus rendering the ideal outcome of mutual cooperation unlikely. Overcoming these barriers necessitates robust international institutions, transparent monitoring, and mechanisms for compliance that can foster trust and accountability among nations.
References
Falkner, R. (2016). The Paris Agreement and the new logic of international climate politics. International Affairs, 92(5), 1107-1125.
Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162(3859), 1243-1248.
Keohane, R. O., & Olmstead, S. M. (2021). International environmental cooperation. In M. C. Leiserowitz, et al. (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of environmental policy. Oxford University Press.
Stern, N. (2015). Why are we waiting? The logic, urgency, and promise of tackling climate change. Mit Press.