Learning Outcomes 1: Have Knowledge And Understanding Of The

Learning Outcomes1 Have Knowledge And Understanding Of The Principle

LEARNING OUTCOMES: 1. Have knowledge and understanding of the principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law, and of the way in which these principles have developed. 2. Deal with issues relating to Constitutional and Administrative Law both systematically and creatively, recognising potential alternative conclusions for particular situations and providing supporting reasons for such conclusions. 3. Demonstrate self-direction and originality in tackling and solving problems relating to Constitutional and Administrative Law. 4. Research primary and secondary sources of Constitutional and Administrative Law. 5. Communicate thoughts and ideas in writing and/or orally, using the English language and legal terminology with care, clarity and accuracy. 6. Manage time effectively.

Paper For Above instruction

The question at hand involves the legal rights of Sam Jones and the Human Rights UK (HRUK) in challenging the decision of the Chief Constable under the Public Order Act 1986, specifically focusing on whether their rights under the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998) can be invoked.

To analyze this issue comprehensively, it is essential to contextualize the relevant legal principles associated with legal limitations on the right to protest and the powers of the police under authoritative legislation. The core rights implicated include Article 10 (freedom of expression) and Article 11 (freedom of assembly and association) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which are incorporated into UK law through the HRA 1998.

Firstly, the Human Rights Act 1998 integrates Convention rights into domestic law, allowing individuals and organizations to challenge public authority decisions that are incompatible with these rights. The nature of the challenge primarily depends on whether the conditions imposed by the Chief Constable unlawfully restrict these rights.

Subsection 6 of the Public Order Act 1986 grants broad powers to police to impose conditions on demonstrations to prevent disorder, violence, or protect public safety. The Chief Constable’s restrictions include the location, number of participants, duration, prohibition on speeches, and power to cancel the demonstration if hostility arises. While these powers are ostensibly aimed at maintaining public order, their compatibility with human rights must be scrutinized under the framework of the HRA 1998.

Article 10 of the ECHR guarantees the right to freedom of expression, which has been interpreted broadly to include the right to protest and march. Similarly, Article 11 safeguards the right to assemble peacefully. However, these rights are not absolute and can be lawfully restricted if a restriction is prescribed by law, pursues a legitimate aim, and is necessary in a democratic society. The Public Order Act 1986 provides the legal framework for such restrictions, but these restrictions must adhere strictly to procedural requirements and proportionality.

In this scenario, Sam Jones and HRUK could argue that the specified conditions—particularly the restriction to a specific location 25 miles away from Penfield City Centre, limited number of demonstrators, duration, no speeches, and the power to cancel at will—are disproportionate and constitute a violation of their rights under Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR as incorporated by the HRA 1998.

Legal precedents indicate that restrictions that are overly broad or arbitrary breach the Convention rights. The case of Barnard v. United Kingdom (1994) clarified that restrictions must be necessary and proportionate. If the restrictions are deemed excessive, they could be challenged successfully in domestic courts as incompatible with the rights protected under the HRA 1998.

Furthermore, the right to hold a demonstration within a reasonable time and place must be balanced against the police's duty to maintain public order. The courts have historically adopted a flexible approach, emphasizing that restrictions must be based on clear, precise, and foreseeable criteria rather than vague or overly restrictive conditions.

On the other hand, the police could argue that their actions are justified under the Public Order Act 1986 to prevent disorder, particularly given rumors of counter protests organized to disrupt HRUK’s demonstration. These concerns are valid within the context of ensuring safety and preventing violence, which are legitimate aims under Article 11(2) of the ECHR.

However, the proportionality test applies here: whether the restrictions imposed are suitable and necessary to achieve the legitimate aim and whether they interfere with the Convention rights more than required. An overly restrictive ban or conditions too burdensome could be challenged as disproportionate breaches of Article 10 and 11 rights.

Consequently, Sam Jones and HRUK may plausibly invoke the HRA 1998 to seek judicial review of the Chief Constable’s decision, contending that the restrictions violate their rights to freedom of expression and assembly. The success of such a challenge would depend on whether the restrictions are justified, proportionate, and implemented following proper legal procedures.

In conclusion, while police powers under the Public Order Act 1986 provide a legal basis for imposing restrictions, the rights enshrined in the HRA 1998 offer a safeguard against disproportionate measures. Sam Jones and HRUK can, therefore, reasonably challenge the restrictions as incompatible with their rights under the Human Rights Act, provided they demonstrate that the conditions are excessive and lack legitimate justification rooted in specific threats or disorder.

References

• Barnard v. United Kingdom (1994) 17 EHRR 363.
• Conventions for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 10 and Article 11.
• Public Order Act 1986, Sections 12-14.
• Human Rights Act 1998.
• Stewart v. United Kingdom (2001) 31 EHRR 151.
• Austin v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2009] UKHL 5.
• R (Lambeth London Borough Council) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 4.
• Thompson v. The Home Office [2012] EWHC 1170 (Admin).
• Skehan v. United Kingdom (1990) 12 EHRR 543.
• Fowler v. Regn. of the City of London Police [2013] EWHC 674 (Admin).