Lecture 13: France And European Taxation In Domain States

Lecture 13 Francef19taxation In Europedomain States And Tax Statesstar

Lecture 13 Francef19taxation In Europedomain States And Tax Statesstar

Starting around 1500, there was a significant increase in tax revenues and the size of armies in Spain, France, the Austrian Empire, and England. Monarchs consolidated territories, which facilitated defense, and hired mercenaries from within and outside their countries. In contrast, China moved directly toward conscription of mass armies by 200 BCE. Revenues in this period were primarily used for military purposes, accounting for approximately 90% of the expenditures.

In France, the state was built up from a core around Paris, which was royal property, with these provinces directly ruled by the king. Additional provinces were integrated over time, some retaining their inherited rules, leading to a patchwork of governance. These provinces comprised estates—clergy, nobility, and commoners—each with distinct privileges. The provincial Estates, representing these classes, had varying rights depending on local customs, especially in newly acquired peripheral provinces. France also had an Estates General representing the entire country. However, it failed to restrain the king in the 1440s during the conflict with England, was last called in 1614, and was not reconvened until 1789.

After 1500, French kings engaged in bargaining with provincial estates—now called parlements—seeking tax exemptions, often leading to a tax burden on non-elites. To increase revenue, kings borrowed from Italian, Swiss, and German financial centers, often pledging future tax receipts. Loan repayments were sometimes renegotiated or defaulted. Additionally, the sale of offices became a prevalent method to raise funds; these offices could be made hereditary for a fee (the paulette), creating a venal office system that complicated taxation and privilege distribution. The credibility of French kings among foreign lenders was low, prompting them to borrow from officeholders, who had a vested interest in the system, a practice known as “inside finance.”

Administrative centralization was pursued through the appointment of intendants—royally appointed officials sent into provinces to oversee tax collection, independent of local elites and venal officeholders. These intendants, often recently ennobled men with assistants, aimed to streamline administration. A significant consequence was the increased uniformity of taxation across France, reducing regional resistance but reinforcing aristocratic privileges and exempting many from taxes. Towns and municipalities lost autonomy, and towns often elected magistrates before 1650.

The aristocracy primarily resided in Paris, attending the court, with social privileges reinforced and little involvement in agricultural production. No social class was cohesive enough to act collectively, affording the monarchy significant leeway to grant favors to aristocrats and to benefit certain bourgeoisie members through offices and exemptions. The Fronde rebellion (1648-1653), driven by aristocratic opposition to heavy taxation and centralization, was suppressed militarily. Post-rebellion, France further centralized authority, with increased appointment of intendants, greater taxation uniformity, and diminished power of parlements. Peasants bore various obligations under the old seigneurial system. The aristocracy’s privileges persisted, and their social privileges were reinforced, especially as they gathered in Paris.

As the eighteenth century progressed, France experienced economic expansion and growth of the bourgeoisie, coupled with intellectual changes driven by the Enlightenment, which questioned traditional rights and privileges, including the divine right of kings. Religious conflicts persisted—Protestants, notably Huguenots, lost rights in 1685, prompting many to emigrate. The regime’s vested interests obstructed reforms, leading to fiscal crisis from the 1770s, with resistance from the Parlement of Paris against more uniform taxation. Meanwhile, the social and political institutions failed to establish the principle of parliamentary supremacy, permitting the king to bypass these bodies until the outbreak of the French Revolution.

Paper For Above instruction

The evolution of taxation and governance in France and England from the early modern period to the Enlightenment highlights contrasting paths in the development of centralized authority and constitutional government. France’s trajectory was marked by top-down patrimonialism, a fragmented socio-political structure rooted in the remnants of the feudal and absolutist state, with privileges distributed among estates to maintain social order and control. The monarchy’s reliance on borrowing, sale of offices, and administrative centralization aimed to reinforce royal authority, but also fostered corruption and resistance from entrenched noble interests. These systemic features impeded the development of parliamentary control over taxation and limited reforms, ultimately culminating in the fiscal crises that contributed to revolutionary upheaval.

In contrast, England’s gradual evolution toward parliamentary sovereignty and a bureaucratic state was driven by distinct historical institutional structures. Post-1066 Norman conquest, England developed a system integrating local governance with royal authority, characterized by counties, hundreds, and manor courts, with shared authority among royal officials and local free men. The establishment of the Magna Carta in 1215, asserting barons’ rights to approve taxation, became a cornerstone for the development of parliamentary institutions. Over time, representatives from counties and boroughs formed the House of Commons, which, along with the House of Lords, implemented checks on royal power. The emergence of a legal system based on Common Law further supported property rights and legal equality, fostering a culture of consent and legal accountability.

The political struggles of the 17th century, including the English Civil War and the Glorious Revolution, solidified parliamentary supremacy. These conflicts were rooted in tensions over taxation, religion, and royal authority, with Parliament asserting its right to approve taxes, laws, and royal expenditure. The revolution of 1688 established a constitutional monarchy, limited royal prerogative, and reinforced parliamentary control, creating a political culture of constitutionalism and rule of law (Fukuyama, 2011). This institutional framework facilitated the development of a bureaucratic state less patrimonial and more responsive to representative oversight, contrasting sharply with France’s persistent reliance on patrimonialism and estate-based privileges.

Several factors explain the divergent paths. First, the top-down, centralized organization of French society and state, with patrimonialism as a dominant logic, fostered corruption and social fragmentation, obstructing parliamentary development (Tocqueville, 1835). Second, the Protestant Reformation and the moral drive for equality among Protestants provided a social basis for collective action and resistance to absolute monarchy in England. Third, the legal and customary institutions, including the Magna Carta and Common Law, institutionalized rights and limits on royal authority, nurturing a culture of legal resistance and parliamentary authority (Finer, 1997). Fourth, the social solidarity among property-owning classes in England, rooted in local governance and shared legal rights, contrasted with France’s fractious estate system that hindered unified political action.

Overall, the institutional differences between France and England underscore how historical, legal, social, and religious factors shaped the development of taxation, governance, and political authority. England’s evolution fostered parliamentary sovereignty and bureaucratic professionalism, establishing a foundation for constitutional government and civil liberties that persisted into modern times. France’s patrimonial and estate-based system, characterized by centralized royal authority and vested interests, delayed parliamentary development and contributed to its revolutionary upheaval in the late 18th century. These historical trajectories illustrate the profound impact of institutional structures and social cohesion on state formation and governance dynamics.

References

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