Michael Levin: The Case For Torture

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Michael Levin argues that the common assumption that torture is inherently immoral and unacceptable may not hold in extreme circumstances where such measures could save innocent lives. He presents hypothetical scenarios, such as a terrorist holding a bomb or kidnapping a child, to explore the moral justifications for torture as a means of preventing greater harm. Levin suggests that the value of innocent lives and the imperative to protect them can morally justify torture when the stakes are high. He emphasizes that terrorists knowingly threaten innocent lives, thus they forfeit certain moral protections, and that effective identification and targeted use of torture can be justified to save large numbers of innocents. Levin also discusses the potential for error and abuse, acknowledging the difficulty of perfect certainty but arguing that clear guilt can often be discerned through public acknowledgment or visibility. He concludes that the moral constraints against torture might be less relevant in dire emergencies, where paralysis in the face of evil would result in far greater atrocities.

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In his provocative essay, Michael Levin challenges the widely held moral stance that torture is inherently immoral and unacceptable by presenting scenarios where its use might be justified. Levin's arguments revolve around the premise that extreme circumstances, such as imminent threats to millions of lives, necessitate a reevaluation of moral boundaries. His approach prompts a critical analysis of the ethical frameworks underpinning views on torture, especially focusing on the tension between moral absolutes and pragmatic exigencies in crisis situations.

Levin begins by proposing a hypothetical case: a terrorist with knowledge of an impending atomic bomb detonation in Manhattan. The dilemma centers on whether it is morally justifiable to torture the terrorist to extract information that could save thousands or millions of lives. Levin argues that in such an extreme case, the moral cost of violating procedural norms or constitutional protections is outweighed by the imperative to prevent mass slaughter. He posits that the intention behind such torture is not punishment, but the prevention of future evil, and draws parallels with justified acts like assassination of Hitler or pre-emptive strikes against hostile nations.

This premise introduces a broader philosophical debate about moral absolutes versus consequentialism—the idea that certain actions may be justified if they result in a greater good. Levin advocates a utilitarian calculus where the preservation of innocent lives overrides the moral prohibition against torture. He contends that, given the known threat and the impossibility of perfect certainty, targeted torture of “obviously guilty” individuals could be morally permissible, especially when the victims are innocent bystanders unaware of the impending danger.

Further, Levin considers the ethical distinction between terrorists and their victims, emphasizing that terrorists knowingly volunteer to endanger others. From this perspective, they forfeit some moral protections, as their intent and actions breach the norms of civil society. He asserts that since terrorists challenge moral boundaries by threatening innocent lives, society is justified in employing equally morally contentious measures—such as torture—to thwart their plans.

A significant concern raised by critics involves the potential for errors and abuses—mistakenly torturing innocent individuals or using torture as a tool for political repression. Levin dismisses these concerns as manageable, noting that terrorists often claim responsibility and seek public notoriety, making identification feasible. The line is drawn for justified use of torture: only those who are clearly responsible for imminent harm, and only to save innocents, warrant such measures. Levin’s stance rests on the assumption that in extreme circumstances, moral duties may require stepping outside conventional moral boundaries.

This argument inevitably raises questions about the ethics of decision-making under crisis conditions and whether morality can be context-dependent. The debate centers on whether moral principles must be absolute or can be flexible when confronted with unprecedented threats. Levin’s position suggests that morality is sometimes pragmatic and contingent, particularly in exceptional situations where inaction leads to catastrophic loss of life.

Levin’s expositions also imply a policy recommendation: that legal and moral frameworks should incorporate provisions for exceptional circumstances, allowing for the judicious use of torture when lives hang in the balance. This practical outlook contrasts sharply with traditional absolutist views, advocating for a morally pragmatic approach that prioritizes protection of the innocent over adherence to rigid norms. His provocative stance demands a reevaluation of moral boundaries in the face of existential threats, emphasizing that moral decision-making must sometimes confront difficult dilemmas where ethical compromises are justified to prevent greater evil.

In conclusion, Levin effectively stimulates debate on the moral complexities associated with torture, highlighting the importance of context, stakes, and the potential for moral justification when confronting extreme threats. His argument underscores that moral clarity may be elusive in crisis situations, and that ethical decision-making must be sensitive to consequences and the dire reality of threats to human life. While controversial, Levin’s perspective invites a necessary philosophical examination of the limits and nuances of morality in the face of evil.

References

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