Module 5 Lab 1: Analysis Of A Telnet Session Hijack After Re ✓ Solved

Module 5 Lab 1. Analysis of a Telnet Session Hijack After re

Module 5 Lab 1. Analysis of a Telnet Session Hijack After reading the instructions for this lab, compose a 300-word narrative about your understanding of the telnet session hijack. No quotations or plagiarism allowed. Minimum 300 words.

Paros After reading the instructions for this lab, compose a 300-word narrative about your understanding of Paros and session hijacking. Include a screenshot that shows your sniffing as Appendix A. The screenshot must include date/time and evidence you are using your own computer. No quotations or plagiarism allowed. Minimum 300 words.

Paper For Above Instructions

Introduction

This paper addresses two lab deliverables: (1) an analysis and explanation of a Telnet session hijack and (2) an examination of Paros proxy use and session hijacking techniques, with guidance for capturing and documenting evidence (Appendix A). The discussion synthesizes networking fundamentals, attack vectors, and practical mitigation strategies to demonstrate comprehension of session hijacking concepts and Paros-based interception (Postel & Reynolds, 1983; OWASP, 2019).

Telnet Session Hijack: Analysis and Understanding

Telnet is a legacy, plaintext remote terminal protocol that lacks encryption and robust authentication mechanisms; therefore, it is inherently vulnerable to session hijacking attacks (Postel & Reynolds, 1983). A Telnet session hijack typically involves an attacker intercepting or predicting the TCP stream between a Telnet client and server, then injecting commands or taking over the session once the legitimate connection state is understood. Common vectors include ARP spoofing on a local network to conduct man-in-the-middle (MITM) interception, packet capture to retrieve session credentials or cookies, and sequence number prediction or TCP reset manipulation to desynchronize the legitimate client and insert attacker packets (RFC 826; Kurose & Ross, 2020).

Once the attacker has visibility of the unencrypted Telnet traffic, they can replay authentication, extract plain credentials, or send interactive commands under the victim’s established session context. The attack success depends on the attacker’s ability to maintain TCP state and avoid detection; techniques such as forging MAC addresses or using spoofed IP addresses enable traffic redirection and concealment of origin (RFC 826). Defenses include migrating to encrypted remote access protocols such as SSH, employing strong mutual authentication, network segmentation and enforcing switch security features (e.g., port security, dynamic ARP inspection), and using TLS or VPN tunnels to protect remote management traffic (NIST SP 800-63; OWASP, 2019). Monitoring for anomalous sequence resets, unexpected retransmissions, or ARP table inconsistencies helps detect possible hijacking attempts (Kurose & Ross, 2020).

Paros Proxy and Session Hijacking: Practical Understanding

Paros Proxy is an intercepting web proxy designed for web application analysis that can trap and modify HTTP/HTTPS requests and responses in transit. When configured as a browser proxy (typically using localhost and a defined port), Paros enables a user to inspect, replay, and alter web session traffic to identify weaknesses in session management, including insecure cookies, predictable session identifiers, and lack of transport-layer protection (Paros Project, 2007; Stuttard & Pinto, 2011). In the context of session hijacking, Paros illustrates how an attacker positioned as a proxy or MITM can capture session tokens and reuse them to impersonate victims.

Using Paros to demonstrate session hijacking involves configuring the browser to route HTTP/HTTPS traffic through Paros, enabling request trapping, and performing actions on a target web application to capture session identifiers and cookie attributes. Paros’s trapping functionality allows stepwise inspection and modification (e.g., altering cookie values or session IDs) before forwarding requests to the server, simulating how an attacker manipulates live sessions (Paros Project, 2007). Key weaknesses to observe include absent Secure or HttpOnly cookie flags, insufficient session expiration, and session fixation opportunities. Mitigations include enforcing HTTPS with HSTS, setting Secure and HttpOnly flags on cookies, using strong, random session identifiers, and implementing short session lifetimes combined with server-side binding of session to additional context (IP, user agent) where appropriate (OWASP, 2019; Stuttard & Pinto, 2011).

Operational and Evidence Considerations (Appendix A)

For lab documentation, an Appendix A screenshot should demonstrate the Paros capture window containing a trapped HTTP/HTTPS request showing the session token or cookie. The screenshot must include the host machine’s date/time display and a visible element that proves the capture originated on the student’s own computer (for example, a desktop clock or an open terminal with a username prompt). When preparing evidence, ensure sensitive credentials are redacted in deliverables while retaining enough context to validate the capture (timestamps, request URL, and captured headers). Maintain chain-of-custody notes for any captured data and avoid testing these techniques on networks or systems without explicit authorization (SANS, 2001).

Mitigation and Best Practices

Effective mitigation of Telnet- and proxy-facilitated session hijacking relies on removing plaintext channels, hardening session management, and improving network-level security. Replace Telnet with SSH or other encrypted management channels; enforce two-factor authentication for administrative access; apply network controls such as ARP inspection and switch port locking to reduce local MITM risks (RFC 826; NIST SP 800-63). For web applications, adopt OWASP session management recommendations: use strong random session IDs, mark cookies Secure and HttpOnly, deploy strict transport security (HSTS), and rotate sessions on privilege changes (OWASP, 2019). Regularly use intercepting proxies like Paros or modern equivalents (e.g., Burp Suite, OWASP ZAP) in authorized testing to validate controls and detect exploitable session management flaws (Stuttard & Pinto, 2011).

Conclusion

Understanding Telnet session hijacking and the role of intercepting proxies such as Paros gives practical insight into how unencrypted channels and weak session management expose users to takeover attacks. Combining protocol replacement, network hardening, and secure session implementation reduces risk. Authorized use of proxy tools for testing, combined with sound evidence documentation practices, supports validation of controls and remediation efforts (OWASP, 2019; NIST SP 800 series).

Appendix A — Screenshot Instructions

Include a screenshot showing the Paros capture/trap window with the intercepted HTTP/HTTPS request or cookie header. The image must display the host machine’s date/time and an element proving the capture is from your computer (for example, a visible desktop clock, terminal window with username, or a filename that includes your user ID). Redact sensitive credentials before submission if necessary.

References

  • Postel, J., & Reynolds, J. (1983). Telnet Protocol Specification. RFC 854. Retrieved from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc854
  • Plummer, D. (1982). An Ethernet Address Resolution Protocol. RFC 826. Retrieved from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc826
  • OWASP Foundation. (2019). Session Management Cheat Sheet. Open Web Application Security Project. https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Session_Management_Cheat_Sheet.html
  • Stuttard, D., & Pinto, M. (2011). The Web Application Hacker's Handbook: Finding and Exploiting Security Flaws. Wiley.
  • Paros Project. (2007). Paros Proxy Documentation. http://parosproxy.sourceforge.net/
  • NIST. (2017). Digital Identity Guidelines (SP 800-63-3). National Institute of Standards and Technology. https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/
  • Kurose, J. F., & Ross, K. W. (2020). Computer Networking: A Top-Down Approach (8th ed.). Pearson.
  • SANS Institute. (2001). Session Hijacking: A Primer. SANS Reading Room. https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/detection/session-hijacking-primer-1023
  • Mansfield-Devine, S. (2006). Session Hijacking. Network Security, 2006(9), 12–16. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1353-4858(06)70098-7
  • Zalewski, M. (2011). Silence on the Wire: A Field Guide to Passive Reconnaissance and Indirect Attacks. No Starch Press.

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