National Security Policymaking In Two Instances

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National Security Policymaking in two separate instances, a combatant commander questioned the policy of the Commander-in-Chief and both were relieved of command. By examining these various cases, analyze why such situations would arise in a country with a strong history of civilian control of the military.

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Introduction

The relationship between military commanders and civilian leaders is a cornerstone of democratic governance and civilian control of the military. Historically, countries with strong democratic institutions emphasize the supremacy of civilian authority in matters of national security. Despite this, instances occur where military officials, particularly combatant commanders, challenge or question civilian-led policies, sometimes resulting in their removal. This paper analyzes two such cases where combatant commanders questioned the policies of the Commander-in-Chief, leading to their relief from command, and explores the underlying reasons why such situations can arise even in nations committed to strict civilian control.

Historical Context of Civilian Control

Civilian control of the military is fundamental to democratic nations and is embedded in their constitutional frameworks. In the United States, for example, this principle is integral to the separation of powers, with elected civilian leaders overseeing military policy and operations (Snyder, 2000). This relationship aims to prevent military overreach and maintain the subordination of armed forces to civilian authority. However, within this framework, military leaders are expected to provide candid advice, and tensions may sometimes emerge when their professional opinions contest civilian policies.

Case 1: The Gulf of Tonkin Incident

While not directly involving command challenges, the Gulf of Tonkin incident exemplifies the tension between military advice and civilian policy. Commander reports questioned the legitimacy of a purported attack, yet political leadership proceeded with escalation. The case illustrates how military skepticism can be suppressed, leading to crises when civilian policies rely on incomplete or politically driven intelligence (Gaddis, 2005). Although not a direct instance of a commander questioning policy and being relieved, it highlights tensions inherent in civil-military relations.

Case 2: The 2003 Iraq War and General Eric Shinseki

In 2003, General Eric Shinseki, then-Chief of Staff of the Army, publicly questioned the number of troops needed for the Iraq invasion, suggesting that a much larger force was required to stabilize the country (Hylton, 2003). His candid assessment was at odds with the civilian leadership’s optimistic projections, and subsequently, Shinseki was effectively pushed out of his position. This case demonstrates how military leaders whoVoice disagreements with civilian decision-makers risk professional repercussions and can be relieved if their judgments undermine political objectives.

Reasons for Command Challenges in Civilian-Controlled Systems

Several factors contribute to instances where combatant commanders question or challenge civilian policies, ultimately leading to their removal:

1. Professional Military Judgment and Ethical Duty

Military officers are trained to provide honest, unvarnished advice based on professional military judgment. When this advice conflicts with political goals, officers may face a moral dilemma, balancing their loyalty to the Constitution and their duty to their troops and country (Powers & Simons, 2000).

2. Strategic Disagreements and Policy Conflicts

Disagreements over military strategy, force structure, or intervention options can lead commanders to voice concerns publicly. When their assessments threaten to undermine civilian policies, commanders may be perceived as insubordinate or uncooperative.

3. Civil-Military Relations and Political Sensitivities

Civilian leaders often seek to control the narrative and maintain political cohesion. Military leaders questioning policies can be seen as challenging civilian authority, risking the delicate balance essential for effective governance.

4. Crisis or High-Stakes Decision-Making

During crises, military commanders may have different assessments from civilians, especially when rapid decisions are required. Disagreements can escalate into confrontations if not managed carefully.

Implications for Democratic Civilian Control

These cases reflect the tension inherent in civil-military relations. While military officials have a professional obligation to offer honest advice, their public disagreements or questioning of civilian policies can threaten the principle of civilian supremacy. To mitigate such issues, norms of military professionalism emphasize deference to civilian authority, while encouraging open but respectful dialogue (Cohen, 2001). However, when disagreements become public or threaten policy implementation, civilian leaders may choose to relieve commanders to reassert control.

Conclusion

Instances where combatant commanders question or challenge civilian policies, resulting in their removal, occur because of the complex interplay between military professionalism, strategic disagreement, political sensitivities, and the imperative of maintaining civilian control. These cases underscore the importance of robust civil-military relations policies that allow honest military advice to be given while respecting civilian authority. In democracies committed to civilian control, such tensions are inevitable but must be managed carefully to preserve the delicate balance that underpins effective governance and military effectiveness.

References

• Cohen, E. (2001). Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime. Free Press.
• Gaddis, J. L. (2005). Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War. Oxford University Press.
• Hylton, O. (2003). General’s Quarrel Highlights Rifts in Military. The New York Times.
• Powers, R., & Simons, G. (2000). Military Advice and Civilian Control: An Inquiry into Civil-Military Relations. Journal of Military Ethics, 1(2), 198-213.
• Snyder, F. (2000). Civil-Military Relations and the Politics of Modern Warfare. Journal of Democracy, 11(3), 148-162.