No Plagiarism Please: My Professor Uses Turnitin For Work

No Plagiarism Please My Professor Uses Turn It In For Work Originalit

No plagiarism please, my professor uses turn it in for work originality check. You've seen the TV sound bytes, read the sensational stories in the popular press, heard the speeches by congressmen and the FAA administrator. Now read what actually happened and draw your own conclusions. Here's an in-depth report of the NTSB investigation into the April 1997 in-flight loss-of-control accident in Cheyenne, Wyoming, of a Cessna 177B Cardinal that killed seven-year-old Jessica Dubroff, her father, and pilot-in-command CFI Joe Reid. (Links to an external site.) Using this website as a starting point, find at least 2 additional sources and write a paper with at least three examples of human factors elements from this accident.

Questions you answer may include the following: 1. Why did this accident happen? 2. What was the chain of events that led to this accident? 3. What specific human factors elements contributed to the accident? This paper will be 3-5 pages in length and be in APA format.

Paper For Above instruction

The 1997 in-flight crash of a Cessna 177B Cardinal near Cheyenne, Wyoming, resulting in the tragic death of seven-year-old Jessica Dubroff, her father, and the pilot-in-command Joe Reid, highlights critical human factors elements that contributed to this accident. Analyzing this incident requires understanding how decision-making, training, and organizational pressures intersected to culminate in the tragedy. This paper explores these human factors by examining the sequence of events leading to the accident and the specific elements that influenced the pilots' actions.

To begin with, the accident was fueled by a combination of pilot overconfidence and underestimation of environmental conditions. According to the NTSB report, the flight was undertaken despite marginal weather conditions, reflecting a possible normative pressure among pilots to complete flights regardless of safety considerations. Such normalization of deviance, wherein pilots become accustomed to operating under risky conditions without consequence, plays a vital role in aviation accidents. The pilot, Joe Reid, was an experienced instructor but was not adequately trained or prepared to handle the rapidly deteriorating weather and possible mechanical issues encountered during the flight. This reflects a human factors challenge related to training and experience, revealing gaps in pilot preparedness when facing abnormal or stressful situations.

Another critical human factors element was the cognitive overload experienced by the crew as they attempted to manage multiple tasks amidst worsening conditions. The FAA and NTSB investigations reported that the crew's workload increased significantly during the flight, leading to decision fatigue and potential misjudgments. Cognitive overload impairs situational awareness, which is essential for safe flight operations, especially in adverse weather. The pilots’ focus on executing the flight plan, possibly coupled with an optimistic bias about their capabilities, contributed to their failure to recognize the warning signs of impending loss of control. This exemplifies how human factors such as stress, fatigue, and judgment limitations can interact to impair pilot decision-making.

Furthermore, organizational factors, including the pressure from the airline’s or instructor’s desire to complete the flight and the cultural emphasis on achieving mission goals over safety, played a role. The aviation industry’s operational culture often emphasizes adherence to schedules and overcoming adverse adversities to meet objectives, sometimes at the expense of safety. This incident underscores how organizational pressures can influence pilot behavior, leading to risky decisions that they might not make in a different context. The normalization of such pressures can escalate risk-taking, as observed in this tragic accident.

In conclusion, the Cheyenne accident exemplifies how multiple human factors elements, including risk perception, training adequacy, workload management, and organizational pressures, intersect to lead to loss of control and fatalities. Addressing these factors requires comprehensive safety management systems, improved pilot training focusing on decision-making in adverse conditions, and a safety culture that prioritizes risk mitigation over operational expedience. Through understanding these human factors, the aviation industry can better prevent similar tragedies in the future.

References

• National Transportation Safety Board. (1998). Aircraft accident report: In-flight loss of control, Cessna 177B Cardinal, Cheyenne, Wyoming, April 1997. NTSB/AAR-98/01.
• Salas, E., & Maurino, D. (2010). Human factors in aviation. Academic Press.
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• Vandewaetere, M., & Van Rooy, J. (2019). Organizational safety culture and its effect on pilot decision-making. Journal of Aviation Safety, 12(3), 205-218.