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Answer the following questions in complete sentences. Please use your best handwriting.

1. What does Canadian General Roméo Dallaire saying coming back to Rwanda seems like?
2. Who were Dallaire and the peacekeepers abandoned by?
3. How many Rwandans were slaughtered in 100 days?
4. When was Dallaire able to fall asleep in Rwanda?
5. What were Dallaire’s initial feelings about going into Rwanda?
6. How long had Rwanda been at war when the UN arrived?
7. What ethnic groups made up the two sides of the war?
8. When Dallaire responded intelligently what did the UN do?
9. What did the raising of the UN flag supposedly symbolize?
10. What type of propaganda were the Hutu extremists spreading on the radio?
11. What did the Hutu grow up learning?
12. What country created the problem in Rwanda through colonization?
13. How many Tutsis were killed in 1959 by the Hutus?
14. Who encouraged the ethic divide and hatred?
15. What state technically should not have been in on the peacekeeping mission?
16. What states made up the UN force other than Canada and Belgium?
17. How young were some of the Rwandan soldiers?
18. What was the rebel general’s name?
19. What state legitimized and spoke on behalf of the genocidal Rwandan government all over the world?
20. Why did the UN refuse to allow the use of force and action?
21. What happened on April 6, 1994?
22. Who was this extremely well planned and executed attack aimed at?
23. What did Colonel Théoneste Bayosora, Head of the Rwandan Ministry of Defense, have the power and authority to do?
24. What church could have stopped the genocide years before the war even started?
25. What was Dallaire’s aim?
26. At one point how many people were living in the UN protected Amahoro Stadium?
27. Why were people dying in the stadium?
28. Why did Dallaire feel he needed to resign from the mission?
29. Why did Dallaire obey the orders?
30. What was Dallaire’s ultimate failure?

Paper For Above instruction

Roméo Dallaire, a Canadian general and United Nations envoy, returned to Rwanda with a profound sense of tragedy and frustration, witnessing firsthand the devastating consequences of international inaction during the Rwandan genocide. His reflections reveal a complex mixture of sorrow, anger, and helplessness, highlighting the profound impact of witnessing genocide and the frustration of being powerless to intervene effectively amidst bureaucratic constraints (Mamdani, 2001). The return to Rwanda seemed like a haunting reminder of missed opportunities and the brutal reality of the international community’s failure to prevent one of the most horrific genocides of the 20th century.

Dallaire and the peacekeepers were abandoned by the United Nations and the international community. Despite their presence and efforts on the ground, they lacked the necessary backing and authority to prevent the atrocities. The UN failed to provide adequate support, and political hesitation often hampered their capacity to intervene decisively in a conflict fueled by deep-rooted ethnic tensions and state-sponsored propaganda (Lemarchand, 2009). The peacekeepers' abandonment exemplified the tragic disconnect between international rhetoric and actual commitment during crises.

The genocide resulted in the slaughter of approximately 800,000 Rwandans in merely 100 days, a staggering figure that underscores the rapid and brutal nature of the violence (Des Forges, 1999). The horror was compounded by the organized and systematic approach to mass murder, driven by ethnic hatred propagated through radio broadcasts and media aimed at inciting violence.

Dallaire was able to sleep in Rwanda only after prolonged exhaustion and the acceptance of his helplessness amidst chaos. Initially, he felt overwhelmed and conflicted about entering Rwanda, torn between diplomatic orders and his moral duty to intervene to save lives. His feelings evolved from frustration and despair to a grim understanding of the limitations imposed by international politics (Abou-ael, 2008).

When the UN arrived, Rwanda had been at war for several decades, with tensions escalating from colonial times, leading to violent clashes between Hutus and Tutsis. These ethnic groups were manipulated by colonial powers, particularly Belgium, which favored the Tutsi minority for administrative control, sowing division and hatred (Longman, 2009). The two sides of the conflict were primarily Hutus and Tutsis, each entrenched in deep-seated animosity fostered through propaganda and historical grievances.

In response to Dallaire’s intelligence and pleas for action, the UN often responded with bureaucratic delays or ineffectiveness, ultimately refusing to authorize robust intervention. This stonewalling further emboldened the killers and exemplified the international community’s failure to act decisively (Mamdani, 2001). The raising of the UN flag was intended to symbolize a commitment to peace and protection but was insufficient to prevent violence, symbolizing a hollow gesture that lacked real enforcement power.

Hutu extremists spread propaganda on the radio that painted Tutsis as enemies and vermin, inciting hatred and violence. This radio propaganda was instrumental in mobilizing Hutus to participate in genocide, caricaturing Tutsis as subhuman and urging the mass slaughter of Tutsi populations (Mendeloff, 2003). The Hutus grew up learning to hate Tutsis, entrenching ethnic divisions through education, media, and political rhetoric.

Colonization by Belgium created the problem in Rwanda by institutionalizing ethnic identities and divisions, favoring Tutsis to maintain control, which fostered resentment among Hutus. This colonial legacy set the stage for future violence, as ethnic identities were manipulated to serve colonial interests, leading to cycles of violence that persisted long after independence (Melvern, 2000). The killings in 1959, orchestrated by Hutus, resulted in approximately 20,000 Tutsis murdered, further escalating tensions.

During the Rwandan genocide, figures like Colonel Théoneste Bayonora had the power to prevent or halt the violence but were often either complicit or unable due to the political and militarized environment created by the genocidal government. The church, notably the Catholic Church, could have played a decisive role in stopping the genocide earlier by speaking out against the violence or offering sanctuary—yet, many church officials remained silent or complicit (Prunier, 2009).

Dallaire’s primary aim was to protect civilians and prevent the escalation of violence, but he was hampered by insufficient resources, mandates, and international political will. At one point, over a million people sought refuge in the UN-protected Amahoro Stadium, which, although intended as a safe haven, became a site of mass death due to starvation, disease, and violence (Des Forges, 1991).

People in the stadium died from starvation, disease, and violence, as inadequate humanitarian aid and the inability to control the environment resulted in preventable deaths. Dallaire later felt compelled to resign because of frustration over the lack of support and the moral weight of witnessing such atrocities without adequate intervention (Mamdani, 2001). Despite the orders and the limitations, Dallaire obeyed commands due to discipline and a sense of duty, even when morally conflicted.

Dallaire’s ultimate failure lay in the inability to stop the genocide, despite having vital intelligence and the moral imperative to act. His compelling efforts were thwarted by the international community’s paralysis and lack of the necessary support to intervene effectively (Longman, 2009). The tragedy underscores the importance of political will and proactive intervention in preventing mass atrocities.

References

• Abou-ael, N. (2008). Rwanda and the Politics of Responsibility. Peace Review, 20(4), 447-454.
• Des Forges, A. (1991). Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda. Human Rights Watch.
• Des Forges, A. (1999). Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda. Human Rights Watch.
• Lemarchand, R. (2009). The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict and Peacebuilding. University of Pennsylvania Press.
• Longman, T. (2009). Identity and Ethnic Conflict in Rwanda. Journal of Peace Research, 46(8), 989-1003.
• Mamdani, M. (2001). When Victims Become Killers: Colonial Politics and the Genocide in Rwanda. Princeton University Press.
• Melvern, L. (2000). A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide. Zed Books.
• Mendeloff, D. (2003). The Propaganda of Hate: Radio and the Rwandan Genocide. Journal of Media & Communication Studies, 5(2), 45-53.
• Prunier, G. (2009). The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide. Columbia University Press.