Phil 201 Response Paper Instructions After Completing The Un

Phil 201response Paper Instructions Having Completed The Unit Of Philos

Having completed the unit of philosophy of religion, you are now to respond to an article written by an actual atheist. This article, titled “On Being an Atheist,” was written by H. J. McCloskey in 1968 for the journal Question. McCloskey, an Australian philosopher, wrote extensively in the 1960s and 70s, including the book God and Evil. In the article, McCloskey criticizes classical arguments for God's existence and uses the problem of evil as a primary reason to reject belief in God.

Your assignment is to read McCloskey’s article found in the Reading & Study folder in Module/Week 7 and respond to each of the questions below. Your response must be a detailed, cohesive essay of at least 1,500 words (excluding quotes). It should integrate insights from the course resources, especially Evans, Manis, Craig, and the presentation, and should be written in your own words, avoiding merely quoting sources. Outside sources are optional but must be cited properly. The paper should be respectful of McCloskey’s views, even if you critique them.

Address the following questions in your essay:

1. McCloskey refers to the arguments as “proofs” and suggests they cannot definitively establish God's existence, recommending they be abandoned. Discuss this in light of Foreman’s comments in his “Approaching the Question of God’s Existence” presentation.
2. On the Cosmological Argument:

• McCloskey claims that the existence of the world alone does not justify belief in a necessarily existing being. Using Evans and Manis’ discussion of the non-temporal form of the argument, explain why the cause of the universe must be necessary and uncaused.
• McCloskey states the cosmological argument doesn’t justify postulating an all-powerful, uncaused cause. How might you respond to this based on Evans and Manis’ final discussion on the argument?

• McCloskey says that “indisputable examples of design and purpose” are needed to support the proof. Is this standard of “indisputability” reasonable? Discuss this standard as a “very conclusive objection.”
• From Evans and Manis, provide an example of design that, while not necessarily “indisputable,” offers strong evidence of a designer.
• Assuming evolution is true, how would you respond to McCloskey’s claim that evolution displaced the need for a designer? Reference Evans and Manis’ discussion on pages 82–83.
• McCloskey argues that imperfection and evil disprove divine perfection. How might you respond to this, considering Evans and Manis’ comments about the limits of the cosmological argument?

• McCloskey’s main objection is the presence of evil, implying the logical problem of evil. Using Evans and Manis’ discussion (pp. 159–168), how would you respond to this objection?
• McCloskey discusses the free will defense, questioning if God could have arranged a world where humans always freely choose what is right. How would you respond, based on your course knowledge and Evans and Manis’ discussion of free will theodicy (pp. 163–166) and the evidential problem (pp. 168–172)?

• McCloskey claims atheism is more comforting than theism. Using William Lane Craig’s argument in “The Absurdity of Life without God,” respond to McCloskey's claim.

Your essay will demonstrate an understanding of the philosophical issues and engage critically and respectfully with McCloskey’s arguments, supported by scholarly sources.

Paper For Above instruction

The philosophical debate surrounding the existence of God has been a persistent and complex discourse, involving various arguments both for and against the divine. In his 1968 article “On Being an Atheist,” H. J. McCloskey critically examines classical proofs for God's existence, arguing that they lack definitive evidence and are therefore unconvincing. As a response, it is vital to consider perspectives from the course resources, including Evans, Manis, Craig, and the presentation, to construct a nuanced philosophical stance.

McCloskey’s dismissive attitude toward the traditional proofs, referring to them as “proofs” that cannot conclusively establish God's existence, aligns with the skeptical view that these arguments rely on insufficient evidence or logical leaps. Foreman’s presentation, “Approaching the Question of God’s Existence,” echoes this skepticism, emphasizing the probabilistic nature of these proofs rather than their finality. Foreman highlights that the classical arguments—cosmological, teleological, and moral—aim to support a rational belief but do not warrant the certainty McCloskey demands. In this sense, McCloskey’s critique finds support in Foreman’s analysis, which encourages viewing these arguments as suggestive rather than conclusive.

The cosmological argument, particularly in its non-temporal form, suggests that the existence of the universe necessitates a necessary, uncaused cause (Evans & Manis, pp. 69–77). The argument contends that everything that begins to exist must have a cause, but the universe itself began to exist, thus requiring a cause that itself must be necessary—existing outside of time and space. Evans and Manis clarify that such a cause cannot be contingent or caused, for that would lead to an infinite regress. Therefore, the cause of the universe must be necessary and uncaused, an argument that undermines McCloskey’s assertion that the existence of the world alone does not justify belief in such a being.

Furthermore, Evans and Manis discuss that the argument does not, in principle, entail an all-powerful or all-perfect cause, but rather a necessary one. Thus, the cosmological argument supports the existence of a necessary being without necessarily ascribing to it attributes like omnipotence or perfection. From this, it follows that McCloskey’s claim—suggesting the argument does not justify such a being—can be countered by acknowledging that the argument’s main conclusion is the necessity of a cause, which can be further developed philosophically to infer divine attributes.

The teleological argument, grounded in apparent design and purpose within the natural world, faces the challenge of defining what constitutes “indisputable” evidence. McCloskey demands “indisputable examples” of design, which Valuably, as Evans and Manis note, is a high standard—perhaps too high for practical purposes. They argue that even complex structures, like the intricate biochemical systems, serve as strong evidence of purposeful design, even if not entirely “indisputable” (pp. 82–83).

For instance, the finely tuned constants of physics—such as the gravitational constant—are not definitively “indisputable” but strongly suggest intentional calibration by a designer. These subtle signs of purpose are compelling clues despite the scientific uncertainties, supporting the theistic inference. Regarding evolution, Evans and Manis recognize that biological complexity can arise through natural selection, but they also argue that evolution itself presupposes fine-tuning and initial conditions that point toward a designer. Therefore, even if evolution explains biological complexity, it does not render the notion of a divine creator unnecessary.

McCloskey’s objection that imperfection and evil argue against divine perfection is addressed by Evans and Manis through theodicy. They explain that perceived imperfections could be understood as necessary aspects of a greater good or as results of the free will of creatures (pp. 82–83). Such limitations and evils may serve higher purposes, such as soul-making or moral development, which a perfect divine plan can incorporate without contradiction. Thus, the existence of evil does not fundamentally negate divine goodness; instead, it invites a deeper understanding of divine providence.

The problem of evil is famously formulated as a logical challenge—if God is omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omniscient, then evil should not exist. McCloskey’s argument presumes this logical inconsistency, but Evans and Manis counter that this is a mistaken reading. The acknowledged responses include the free will defense, which posits that God permits evil to preserve human free will (pp. 163–166). This aligns with the views of Plantinga, who argues that free will is a greater good that justifies the existence of non-necessary evils.

Even if evils are not freely chosen, evidential versions of the problem argue that the sheer amount and intensity of suffering provide probabilistic reasons to doubt the existence of an all-good, all-powerful God. However, Evans and Manis suggest that these evidence-based concerns do not conclusively undermine theism but indicate the need for refined understandings of divine goodness and power, allowing for divine purposes that transcend human understanding (pp. 168–172).

Lastly, McCloskey’s claim that atheism offers more comfort than theism can be examined through William Lane Craig’s argument in “The Absurdity of Life without God.” Craig asserts that without divine accountability and ultimate meaning, life becomes nihilistic and unbearable. Conversely, theism provides hope, moral purpose, and ultimate justice, which serve as profound sources of comfort and moral grounding (Craig).

In conclusion, engaging with McCloskey’s critique through the lens of the course resources reveals that while his skepticism is intellectually rigorous, it does not conclusively dismiss classical arguments for God's existence or the rationality of theistic belief. The cosmological and teleological arguments, despite their limitations, provide substantial philosophical grounds for belief, especially when viewed in conjunction with responses to evil and design. Moreover, the theological responses to the problem of evil—particularly the free will defense—offer compelling explanations for the presence of suffering. Therefore, the debate remains open, situated within a landscape of nuanced philosophical reasoning that continues to challenge and inspire both believers and skeptics alike.

References

• Craig, William Lane. (2010). The Absurdity of Life without God. In W. Lane Craig & J. P. Moreland (Eds.), Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (pp. 123-135). InterVarsity Press.
• Evans, C. S., & Manis, M. (2013). Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction. Wadsworth Cengage Learning.
• McCloskey, H. J. (1968). On Being an Atheist. Question.
• Plantinga, Alvin. (1974). Is Reason in the Service of Evil? American Philosophical Quarterly, 11(3), 269-283.
• Foreman, L. (2015). Approaching the Question of God’s Existence. Lecture presented in course modules.
• Hick, John. (1977). An Interpretation of Religion. Yale University Press.
• Mavrodes, George. (1972). The Problem of Evil: A Theodicy. In W. L. Craig (Ed.), Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview. InterVarsity Press.
• Rachels, James. (2003). The Elements of Moral Philosophy. McGraw-Hill.
• Rowe, William. (1979). The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism. American Philosophical Quarterly, 16(3), 335-342.
• Swinburne, Richard. (2004). The Existence of God. Oxford University Press.