Pick One Developing Country. Examine This Country's Politics ✓ Solved

Pick one developing country. Examine this country's political

Pick one developing country. Examine this country's political history and current barriers to developing its democracy. Create a concise argument on the type of democracy the country should institute and why. Use scholarly sources to support your analysis.

Paper For Above Instructions

Developing Democracy in Nigeria: History, Barriers, and a Recommended Model

Thesis: Given Nigeria's history of military rule, ethnic and regional fragmentation, oil dependency, and weak institutions, the country would best advance democratic consolidation by shifting toward a strengthened federal parliamentary system with proportional representation, reinforced anti-corruption institutions, and targeted decentralization to promote inclusion and institutional accountability (Lijphart, 1977; Diamond, 1999).

Political History Overview

Nigeria’s modern political trajectory began with independence in 1960 and has been marked by alternating civilian and military regimes through much of the latter half of the 20th century (Joseph, 1991). The First Republic (1960–1966) collapsed amid ethnic tensions and coups, followed by prolonged periods of military rule that centralized power and weakened civilian institutions. Democratic rule resumed in 1999, inaugurating the Fourth Republic, but persistent legacies—patronage networks, weakened rule of law, and military influence—have constrained consolidation (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997; Diamond, 1999).

Current Barriers to Democratic Development

Several interlocking barriers impede Nigeria’s democratic deepening:

• Ethnic and Religious Fragmentation: Nigeria’s heterogeneity—major divisions between Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, Igbo, and smaller groups—fuels zero-sum politics and makes winner-takes-all presidential contests a flashpoint for competition (Lijphart, 1977).
• Rentier Economy and Oil Dependency: Oil revenues concentrate resources at the center, incentivizing elite capture, prebendal politics, and corruption rather than broad-based taxation and accountability (Ross, 2001; Van de Walle, 2001).
• Weak Institutions and Corruption: Electoral management, judiciary independence, and anti-corruption agencies face capacity and credibility deficits, while Transparency International and Freedom House note persistent governance weaknesses (Transparency International, 2022; Freedom House, 2023).
• Security Challenges: Insurgencies (e.g., Boko Haram), communal conflicts, and banditry undermine state legitimacy, limit civic space, and allow securitized responses that can abridge civil liberties (International Crisis Group, 2020).
• Clientelism and Patronage: Political survival often depends on distributing material benefits through networks rather than programmatic policy platforms, reducing incentives for institutional reforms (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997; Joseph, 1991).

Recommended Democratic Model: Parliamentary Federalism with Proportional Representation

To address these barriers, I recommend Nigeria transition from its current strong presidential model toward a strengthened federal parliamentary system combined with proportional representation (PR) for legislative elections and institutional reforms to promote accountability.

First, a parliamentary system encourages coalition-building and power-sharing across ethnic and regional lines; executives emerge from legislatures and depend on multi-party support rather than winner-take-all presidential mandates, reducing incentives for post-election violence and exclusionary politics (Lijphart, 1977; Diamond, 1999).

Second, proportional representation better reflects Nigeria’s plural society by enabling smaller groups and parties to gain legislative voice, encouraging inter-ethnic bargaining and reducing the zero-sum calculus inherent in majoritarian single-member districts (Lijphart, 1977).

Third, federalism must be reinforced with clearer fiscal decentralization so subnational governments have resources and responsibilities, which can lessen the centralization of oil rents and open space for accountable local governance (Van de Walle, 2001).

Complementary Institutional Reforms

The systemic model shift should be accompanied by targeted reforms:

• Electoral and Party Law Reform: Implement PR for legislatures, strengthen independent electoral commission capacity, and regulate party financing to reduce clientelism (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997).
• Anti-Corruption and Rule-of-Law Strengthening: Empower anti-corruption agencies with autonomy, protect judicial independence, and create transparent procurement systems to diminish rent-seeking (Transparency International, 2022; Diamond, 1999).
• Security Sector Reform: Rebalance security responses toward community policing and judicial accountability to restore public trust while addressing insurgencies via socio-economic and political inclusion (International Crisis Group, 2020).
• Civic Education and Civil Society Support: Invest in civic education and fund independent media and civil society groups to cultivate accountable political culture and voter sophistication (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997).
• Economic Diversification: Reduce oil dependency through economic policy that expands non-oil sectors, creating broader tax bases that link citizens to the state and reinforce accountability (Ross, 2001; World Bank, 2022).

Feasibility and Risks

Constitutional change faces political resistance from incumbent elites who benefit from the current system. Gradual implementation—beginning with electoral reform (PR for legislative seats) and strengthened decentralization—can produce demonstrable benefits, building momentum for deeper institutional shifts (Diamond, 1999). Risks include elite backlash, transitional instability, and co-optation of reforms; robust civil society oversight and international assistance conditionality can help mitigate these risks (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997).

Conclusion

Nigeria’s democratic consolidation requires institutional designs that mitigate ethnic cleavages, undercut rent-seeking dynamics, and incentivize inclusive governance. A move toward parliamentary federalism with proportional representation, coupled with anti-corruption measures, security sector reform, and economic diversification, is the most viable path to a more resilient, inclusive democracy. Such a model aligns incentives for coalition governance, broad representation, and accountability—key conditions for democratic consolidation in plural, resource-rich developing states (Lijphart, 1977; Ross, 2001; Diamond, 1999).

References

• Lijphart, A. (1977). Democracy in Plural Societies. Yale University Press.
• Diamond, L. (1999). Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Johns Hopkins University Press.
• Bratton, M., & van de Walle, N. (1997). Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge University Press.
• Ross, M. L. (2001). Does Oil Hinder Democracy? World Politics, 53(3), 325–361.
• Joseph, R. A. (1991). Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic. Cambridge University Press.
• Transparency International. (2022). Corruption Perceptions Index 2022. Transparency International.
• Freedom House. (2023). Freedom in the World 2023: Nigeria. Freedom House.
• International Crisis Group. (2020). Curbing Violence in Nigeria’s North East. International Crisis Group.
• World Bank. (2022). Nigeria Overview. World Bank.
• Van de Walle, N. (2001). African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–1999. Cambridge University Press.