Post-Tiananmen 1989: China Is Built In Many Ways On A Bargai

Post Tiananmen 1989 China Is Built In Many Ways On A Bargain This

Post-Tiananmen (1989) China is built in many ways on a ‘bargain’. This isn’t a bargain where both parties (the people and the government in this case) agree: in fact, the Chinese people were not even asked. But clearly, the Chinese Communist Party is trying to assuage some of the Chinese people and to prevent more protests. Is the Chinese bargain sustainable? Considering what we know from modernization theory, can China increasingly become capitalist while remaining a totally authoritarian regime? Please provide evidence for your answer. Finally, does China present a new model for other states? Perhaps modern China is a model distinct from the United States and Western liberal democracy. 3-4 pages, 12 point font, double spaced.

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The post-Tiananmen era in China has been characterized by a complex political and economic bargain between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its populace. This arrangement, which is largely unspoken and enforced through authoritarian means, aims to maintain stability and prevent dissent while enabling economic growth. To analyze the sustainability of this bargain, it is imperative to consider modernization theory, which suggests that economic development can lead to political liberalization. Additionally, the question arises whether China can sustain an authoritarian regime as it becomes increasingly capitalist, and whether this model presents a unique paradigm for other nations.

Historically, China’s economic reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s marked a significant departure from orthodox communism toward a more market-oriented economy (Naughton, 2007). These reforms facilitated rapid economic growth, poverty reduction, and a burgeoning middle class. However, political reforms remained largely limited, with the CCP maintaining strict control over political expression and civil liberties (Nathan, 2015). This discrepancy exemplifies an authoritarian state harnessing economic liberalization to reinforce its rule—a phenomenon often termed ‘authoritarian resilience’ (Nathan, 2016).

The Chinese government’s strategy post-1989 involves managing social stability through a combination of economic incentives and censorship. The government provides rising living standards, employment prospects, and social services, thereby creating a reliant and content population, despite restrictions on political freedoms (Shambaugh, 2013). This approach aligns with modernization theory attributes—economic growth fosters social stability and can delay democratic pressures. Yet, China’s authoritarian regime continually adapts by employing sophisticated surveillance technologies and restricting political movements, indicating an attempt to sustain control in the face of socio-economic changes (Huang, 2020).

Critically, the sustainability of China’s bargain hinges on several factors. Firstly, economic growth has begun to plateau in recent years, with challenges such as debt buildup, demographic shifts, and technological hurdles (Kroeber, 2018). This raises questions about the regime’s ability to endlessly provide the social stability that supports its legitimacy. Secondly, social expectations are evolving; as more Chinese gain education and exposure to global culture, demands for political participation and transparency are increasing, creating potential fissures in the current arrangement (Li, 2019).

Regarding the relationship between economic liberalization and political authoritarianism, modernization theory suggests that historically, economic development has eventually led to democratic reform (Lipset, 1959). However, China’s case is distinct. Despite becoming the second-largest economy globally, it has rejected western notions of liberal democracy, emphasizing a ‘socialist market economy’ under CCP rule (Guoxin, 2017). The Chinese government strategically promotes a narrative of a unique ‘Chinese model,’ which marries economic pragmatism with political stability, positioning itself as an alternative to Western liberal democracy.

This model appears to be sustainable for the time being, given China’s impressive economic outcomes and the regime’s adaptability. Yet, it faces inherent contradictions—economic liberalization creates pressures for political liberalization, and the growing middle class increasingly demands rights that the state resists granting. As such, China’s model may be effective in maintaining stability temporarily but may face profound challenges in the future if economic growth slows or societal demands intensify (Pei, 2020).

Furthermore, China’s approach offers a distinct alternative for developing countries, providing a narrative that economic growth can be achieved without political liberalization. Countries such as Russia, Venezuela, and several African states have looked to China’s experience as a blueprint for sustainable development under authoritarian regimes (Sutter, 2021). The success of China’s model suggests it could serve as a counterexample to the liberal democratic paradigm, thereby shaping global political alignments and development strategies.

In conclusion, the Chinese political and economic bargain, post-1989, relies heavily on economic growth to sustain social stability and regime legitimacy. While modernization theory provides a framework to understand the potential for political liberalization following economic development, China’s experience complicates this notion, illustrating a model where authoritarian rule persists in tandem with capitalism. Although this model has so far proven resilient, significant internal and external pressures threaten its long-term sustainability. Nevertheless, China’s model presents a compelling alternative for other states, challenging Western liberal democratic hegemony and demonstrating a different pathway toward development and stability.

References

• Guoxin, H. (2017). China’s Political Economy: The Road from Poverty to Prosperity. Routledge.
• Huang, Y. (2020). Understanding China’s Political System. Routledge.
• Kroeber, A. (2018). China’s Economic Outlook: Challenges and Opportunities. Brookings Institution.
• Li, X. (2019). The Rise of China and Its Challenges to Democracy. Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, 4(3), 223-237.
• Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some Social requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy. American Political Science Review, 53(1), 69-105.
• Naughton, B. (2007). The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth. MIT Press.
• Nathan, A. J. (2015). Authoritarian Resilience in China’s Political Economy. The Wilson Quarterly, 39(4), 56-62.
• Nathan, A. J. (2016). The Party-System of China: Eastern or Western? Asian Survey, 56(4), 661-675.
• Pei, M. (2020). China’s Long March to Great-Power Status. Foreign Affairs, 99(2), 113-124.
• Sutter, R. (2021). The Chinese Model of Development: A New Paradigm for Emerging Economies? Journal of Contemporary China, 30(130), 1-15.