Project 1 Incident Response Report: Your Task

Project 1 Incident Response Reportyour Taskyou Have Been Assigned To

You have been assigned to assist with After Action Reporting in support of the Sifers-Grayson Blue Team. Your task is to analyze and report on a Red Team penetration test, identify vulnerabilities exploited by attackers, compile lessons learned, and recommend actions to improve cybersecurity. Use enterprise architecture diagrams provided by the Blue Team and readings from Weeks 1-4 to identify security gaps and incident response capabilities needed by the company.

Paper For Above instruction

Sifers-Grayson, a family-owned manufacturing business in Kentucky, has recently undergone a significant security assessment driven by contractual obligations with federal agencies such as the Department of Defense and Homeland Security. This compliance requires adherence to strict cybersecurity standards, including NIST SP 800-171 on protecting Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI), DFARS regulations on safeguarding defense information, and timely incident reporting. The company's complex operations and diverse hardware and network infrastructure pose challenges and opportunities for cybersecurity enhancements.

The recent engagement of an external Red Team exposed critical vulnerabilities within Sifers-Grayson's legacy systems, especially in its R&D and SCADA labs, which are integral to sensitive research and development activities. The Red Team successfully compromised several areas, including gaining access to enterprise servers, exfiltrating highly confidential design documents, and stealing employee login credentials through phishing campaigns. Notably, the attack facilitated physical consequences when malicious malware installed during the penetration test was able to take control of a test drone, demonstrating the severe implications of cybersecurity gaps in operational security.

The analysis indicates fundamental weaknesses in the company's incident response capabilities and security architecture. The absence of automated intrusion detection systems, centralized monitoring, and forensic tools hampered quick detection and response to the Red Team's activities. The company's practices have historically relied on manual oversight, with each department managing its own systems without a unified security strategy or incident response plan. These deficiencies contributed to the failure to identify breaches during the penetration test, allowing the Red Team to exfiltrate data and manipulate operational equipment undetected.

Key vulnerabilities exploited by the Red Team include unprotected network pathways allowing external access to the enterprise network and Data Center, weak employee security awareness leading to successful phishing attacks, and outdated or unsupported operating systems like Windows 8.1 in the SCADA environment, which remains vulnerable to exploits. The lack of regular backups, particularly in the SCADA lab, exacerbated the impact of ransomware attacks previously experienced, emphasizing the need for robust backup and recovery procedures tailored to legacy systems.

Lessons learned from this exercise underscore the importance of establishing a centralized and automated security monitoring framework. Implementing Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems, intrusion detection/prevention systems (IDS/IPS), and continuous vulnerability assessments are critical steps. Additionally, regular staff training on cybersecurity best practices, including phishing awareness, can reduce the success rate of social engineering exploits. The importance of having a comprehensive and tested incident response plan, including forensic capabilities, cannot be overstated, especially considering the operational and national security implications of vulnerabilities in SCADA and R&D systems.

To address the identified weaknesses, specific recommendations include upgrading or applying compensating controls to legacy systems like Windows 8.1, deploying network segmentation and access controls, and enhancing physical security measures against social engineering. Creation of a dedicated cybersecurity team responsible for enterprise monitoring, incident response, and threat hunting is advisable. Establishing rigorous backup protocols, including offsite and air-gapped backups for critical systems, will improve resilience against ransomware and other destructive attacks.

Furthermore, compliance with federal cybersecurity standards requires implementing your detailed policies, procedures, and technological controls. These measures not only support regulatory adherence but also align with best practices for modern cybersecurity defense in complex operational environments. Future penetration testing, regular security audits, and a proactive security culture are essential for continuous improvement and resilience against evolving cyber threats.

References

  • National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2018). NIST SP 800-171 Revision 2: Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Systems and Organizations. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-171r2
  • Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS). (2017). Subpart 252.204-7008 — Compliance with safeguarding covered defense information controls. https://govregs.com/regulations/dfars/252.204-7008
  • European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA). (2020). Incident Response Guidelines. https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/csirt-in-incident-response
  • Peltier, T. R. (2016). Information Security Policies, Procedures, and Standards: guidelines for effective information security management. Auerbach Publications.
  • Stallings, W., & Brown, L. (2018). Computer Security: Principles and Practice (4th ed.). Pearson.
  • Kissel, R., et al. (2017). Guide to Industrial Control Systems Security (NIST SP 800-82 Revision 2). National Institute of Standards and Technology. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-82r2
  • Alshaikh, M., & El-Hajj, W. (2020). Enhancing incident detection and response capabilities in enterprise networks. Journal of Cyber Security Technology, 4(3), 173–191.
  • Gordon, L. A., Loeb, M. P., & Zhou, L. (2011). The impact of information security breaches: has there been a change in risk? Information Management & Computer Security, 19(4), 282–295.
  • Anderson, R., & Moore, T. (2006). The economics of information security. Science, 314(5799), 610–613.
  • Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). (2020). Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) Program. https://www.cisa.gov/cdm

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