Prompt: Write A 1000-Word Analytical Essay On John Stuart Mi ✓ Solved

Prompt: Write a 1000-word analytical essay on John Stuart Mi

Prompt: Write a 1000-word analytical essay on John Stuart Mill's Utilitarianism (1863). Explain what utilitarianism is, its main arguments, its justification, and its relation to justice, including brief critical evaluations.

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Utilitarianism, as articulated by John Stuart Mill, is a normative theory that defines morality by the consequences of actions for human well-being. At its core, it holds that actions are right to the extent that they promote happiness and wrong insofar as they diminish it, encapsulated in the familiar maxim of the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Mill’s formulation builds on Jeremy Bentham’s foundational idea of utility but adds refinements that deepen its appeal and its depth. He argues that happiness is the ultimate end of human action and that the fairness of moral judgments depends on how effectively they advance that end. Mill also introduces an important qualitative distinction among pleasures, insisting that higher (intellectual and moral) pleasures can outweigh lower (bodily) pleasures when determining what yields greater overall happiness. This elevates utilitarianism beyond crude hedonism and aligns it with human development, culture, and virtue (Mill, 1863).

What utilitarianism is, in Mill’s own words, is a doctrine that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, and wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. Happiness itself is defined as pleasure and the absence of pain, and unhappiness as pain and deprivation of pleasure. This definition does not mean happiness is the only good, but it is the essential end toward which all other desiderata are instrumental. Mill stresses that the concept of happiness must include not only momentary sensations but the longer-term flourishing of persons, which involves education, virtue, and social structures that sustain well-being over time. Importantly, Mill departs from a simplistic view of pleasure by asserting that some pleasures are qualitatively preferable to others; the pursuit of higher pleasures—such as intellectual activity, moral development, and aesthetic enjoyment—should count more in the calculus of welfare when they contribute to the sum total of happiness (Mill, 1863; Bentham, 1789).

A central element of Mill’s account is justification—the grounds upon which the utilitarian standard can be accepted. Mill argues that questions of ultimate ends are not settled by syllogistic deduction alone; rather, the endorsement of utility as a rule mixes rational reflection with the experience of human welfare. The idea of a “proof” here is not mathematical certainty but rational justification grounded in the observable consequences of actions: the things people desire—pleasure and the avoidance of pain—are integral to human nature, and policies or actions that reliably produce more happiness are preferable. Mill acknowledges the limits of proof and reframes justification as an argumentative process: the utility principle corresponds with the sentiments and behaviors that individuals actually value, and its acceptance follows from its practical success in improving collective welfare across contexts (Mill, 1863).

The connection between justice and utility is a topic Mill treats with careful attention. He argues that while justice is often conceived as a set of fixed rules, it is ultimately grounded in social utility. Institutions that protect rights, enforce fair treatment, and distribute resources in a way that sustains the longer-term happiness of the community are, in Mill’s view, just insofar as they promote overall well-being. In this sense, justice is not an abstract aspiration severed from consequences but a social arrangement whose legitimacy rests on its contribution to human flourishing. The broader implication is that moral and political norms should be evaluated by their effects on happiness and stability, while recognizing that some intuitions about fairness may require qualitative judgments—such as the protection of minority liberties—to preserve the trust and cohesion essential to widespread welfare (Mill, 1863; Rawls, 1971).

However, utilitarianism has faced enduring critiques. Critics worry that the framework can, in principle, justify sacrificing minority interests for majority gain, or permit rights to be overridden by aggregate welfare calculations. Mill responds by defending the intrinsic value of higher pleasures and by appealing to human progress: a society that respects education, development, and cultivated capacities tends to generate more stable and enduring happiness than one governed by crude calculations alone. Yet debates persist about how to measure happiness, how to compare qualitatively different pleasures, and how to protect individual rights within utilitarian reasoning. Some thinkers have argued that utilitarianism underestimates the importance of justice and individual rights, while others maintain that long-run social utility can coherently ground rights if rights themselves are understood as instruments for achieving sustainable welfare (Nozick, 1974; Scanlon, 1998; Nagel, 1986). These critiques have sharpened modern debates by testing utilitarian claims against the demands of personal autonomy, fair procedure, and moral constraints beyond mere happiness tallies (Singer, 1993; Kymlicka, 2002).

Despite these tensions, Mill’s utilitarianism offers a robust framework for evaluating actions and policies in light of their consequences for well-being. Its insistence on the qualitative dimension of pleasures provides a plausible answer to the charge that utilitarianism reduces all values to mere pleasure-seeking. By foregrounding education, virtue, and social arrangements, Mill contends that moral life is oriented toward the development of capacities that yield durable happiness. The theory remains influential in contemporary ethics and political philosophy precisely because it seeks a unified standard—social welfare—while acknowledging complexity, pluralism, and the legitimate role of moral reasoning in adjudicating conflicts among goods and rights (Mill, 1863; Parfit, 1984; Singer, 1993).

References

• Mill, J. S. (1863). Utilitarianism. In The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume 10. Edited by J. M. Robson. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. (Primary text)
• Bentham, J. (1789). An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Oxford: Blackwell, 1948 edition. (Foundation of utility)
• Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Impact on consequentialist reasoning)
• Singer, P. (1993). Practical Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Applied ethics and utility)
• Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Justice and distributive fairness)
• Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books. (Rights critique of utilitarianism)
• Scanlon, T. (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Duty, obligations, and social justification)
• Kymlicka, W. (2002). Contemporary Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Contemporary utilitarian discussions)
• Nagel, T. (1986). The View from Nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Objective standpoint in moral theory)
• Hare, R. M. (1981). Moral Thinking. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Utilitarian reasoning and moral philosophy)