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Questioncompatibilists Claim That Once We Are Clear About What Free A

Question: Compatibilists claim that once we are clear about what free action is, we will see that free action is compatible with determinism. Explain Stace’s version of compatibilism, the problems with it, and how Frankfurt’s version is supposed to fix those problems. Does it succeed? Why or why not? Might further modifications help? Or should we stick to the original Stace-ian version? I.e.—what is the best version of compatibilism that you can think of? How well does it fare? PLEASE READ THE ASSIGNMENT AND MATERIALS CAREFULLY!! The attachments are two articles, a sample template for this paper, and a writing guide from the professor. Please read before writing.

Paper For Above instruction

Compatibilism is the philosophical position asserting that free will can coexist with determinism, the idea that every event is causally determined by preceding events and natural laws. The debate hinges on defining what constitutes a "free" action within a deterministic universe. This paper explores Stace’s version of compatibilism, its associated problems, Frankfurt’s modern reformulation, and the effectiveness of these approaches, ultimately considering whether a modified or original form of compatibilism offers the most compelling account of free will.

Stace’s Version of Compatibilism

Walter Stace, a prominent compatibilist, argued that free will is compatible with determinism because freedom is about our internal states and intentions rather than about the ability to have acted otherwise in a purely counterfactual sense. Stace identified two types of freedom: "open" freedom, where actions are uncaused or indeterministic, and "closed" freedom, where actions are caused but still originate from internal states such as desires, beliefs, and intentions (Stace, 1960). According to Stace, a free action is one that stems from our internal states without external constraints or compulsions. Importantly, determinism does not negate internal causation; thus, an action can be both determined by prior causes and freely chosen if it aligns with the individual’s internal states."

Stace’s theory emphasizes that free will involves the agent’s internal motivation and the absence of external coercion, not the ability to have performed otherwise in a metaphysical sense. This view seeks to reconcile the intuitive notion that we are morally responsible for our actions with a deterministic understanding of the universe.

Problems with Stace’s Compatibilism

Despite its appeal, Stace’s compatibilism faces several criticisms. One major issue concerns the concept of moral responsibility. Critics argue that if all actions are determined by prior causes, then individuals could not have acted otherwise, which seems to undermine moral responsibility (Frankfurt, 1969). Stace’s focus on internal states does not fully address whether acting from internal states truly grants moral accountability, especially if those states are themselves the product of prior causes.

Another problem involves the notion of autonomy. Critics challenge whether acting in accordance with internal desires genuinely constitutes autonomy if those desires are shaped by external influences or biological determinism. Moreover, some argue that Stace’s definition conflates freedom with internal causation, failing to clarify whether this internal causation distinguishes free acts from merely determined acts.

Frankfurt’s Version of Compatibilism

Harry Frankfurt advanced a version of compatibilism designed to resolve these concerns, focusing on the nature of moral responsibility. Frankfurt introduced the concept of "second-order desires"—desires about desires—and the idea of "self-authorship." According to Frankfurt, an agent acts freely if they are "self-determined" in the sense that they endorse their desires and motivations rather than being coerced or manipulated (Frankfurt, 1969).

Frankfurt’s core innovation lies in his "principle of alternate possibilities" challenge. He argued that what matters is not whether one could have acted otherwise but whether one's actions align with their true desires and rational accounts of self. If an agent’s second-order desires mesh with their actions, they are morally responsible, even if their actions are determined by prior causes. This approach aims to preserve moral responsibility even in a deterministic universe by focusing on the agent’s internal valued desires and self-control.

Does Frankfurt’s Account Succeed?

Frankfurt’s model attempts to address the moral responsibility problem that plagues traditional compatibilism by emphasizing internal coherence of desires over the metaphysical possibility of alternative actions. However, it faces its own critiques. Critics question whether second-order desires genuinely suffice to establish freedom or responsibility. Some argue that Frankfurt’s view presupposes a rational and autonomous self that may not exist in all individuals, especially those with compromised decision-making capacities (Fischer & Ravizza, 1998).

Additionally, questions arise about whether Frankfurt’s focus on internal mental states truly distinguishes free actions from determined but internally consistent acts. Critics contend that if every action is ultimately caused by prior factors, then relying on internal desires might not genuinely establish free will but rather redefine it (Kane, 2005).

Potential for Further Modifications

Looking forward, modifications to Frankfurt’s model could involve incorporating elements that account for uncontrollable external influences or the role of moral luck, providing a more nuanced account of agency. For instance, integrating considerations of external manipulation while still emphasizing internal desire endorsement could strengthen the model's applicability across diverse contexts (Mele, 2003). Furthermore, some suggest clarifying the criteria for "authentic" desires rooted in rational selfhood and moral development might help solidify the connection to moral responsibility.

Should We Stick with the Original Stace-ian Version?

The debate ultimately hinges on which version best captures our intuitive sense of free will and responsibility. The Stace-ian model, emphasizing internal causes and the absence of external coercion, appeals through its simplicity but lacks sufficient nuance to explain our moral intuitions fully. Frankfurt’s reformulation advances the discourse by focusing on internal endorsement, aligning more closely with moral responsibility. However, both face limitations, suggesting that a hybrid or further refined model might be optimal.

The Best Version of Compatibilism

In my view, the most compelling compatibilist account synthesizes elements from both Stace and Frankfurt, emphasizing internal states and the capacity for rational self-control within a deterministic framework. This hybrid approach recognizes that moral responsibility depends on an agent's internal endorsement of desires and intentions, as Frankfurt suggests, but also accounts for external influences and developmental factors emphasized by Stace. Such a nuanced model addresses the critiques of both theories and aligns better with our moral intuitions about responsibility and freedom.

Conclusion

While Stace’s and Frankfurt’s models of compatibilism offer valuable insights, neither fully resolves all issues associated with free will in a deterministic universe. The integration of their strengths into a comprehensive model—focused on internal causes, rational endorsement, and contextual factors—appears promising. Continued philosophical inquiry and empirical research into human decision-making may further refine these theories, bringing us closer to an account of free will that coherently aligns with both scientific understanding and moral responsibility.

References

• Fischer, J. M., & Ravizza, M. (1998). Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge University Press.
• Kane, R. (2005). A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will. Oxford University Press.
• Mele, A. R. (2003). Self-Deception Unbound: The Social Worlds of Persons. Cambridge University Press.
• Frankfurt, H. (1969). Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility. The Journal of Philosophy, 66(23), 829–839.
• Stace, W. T. (1960). Man Against Himself. University of Pennsylvania Press.