Read The Article: Genetics And Reproductive Risk

Read The Article Genetics And Reproductive Risk Can Having Children

Read the article “Genetics and Reproductive Risk: Can Having Children be Immoral?” by Laura M. Purdy, pp. 564–570. In this article, Purdy argues that it is morally wrong to reproduce when we know there is a high risk of transmitting a serious disease or defect, specifically using Huntington’s disease (HD) as an example. She considers a situation where a couple wants to have biological children, and one of them carries the gene for HD, risking passing it onto their children. Purdy supports the application that it is morally wrong for such a couple to reproduce without trying to avoid passing HD onto their children. You are asked to evaluate this position using a utilitarian perspective based on Mill’s version of hedonistic, act utilitarianism, and to consider the principle of autonomy. Finally, you should state whether you believe (A)—that it is morally wrong for the couple to reproduce under these circumstances—is true or false, providing your reasons beyond the discussed arguments.

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Laura M. Purdy’s argument that it is morally wrong to reproduce when there is a high risk of transmitting a serious disease such as Huntington’s disease (HD) is rooted in a concern for preventing unnecessary suffering. She maintains that since HD is a devastating neurodegenerative disorder that leads to severe cognitive decline and early death, the transmission of this disease would cause immense suffering for affected individuals and their families. Purdy argues that because the risk of passing HD can be known and mitigated through reproductive technologies or alternative methods of conception, deliberately choosing to reproduce without attempting to avoid passing the disease is morally problematic. This stance is based on the premise that knowledge of such a high risk imposes a moral obligation to prevent future harm, given the severity of HD. Furthermore, she considers that there are instances, due to genetic testing advancements, where couples are aware of their genetic risks and can take measures such as preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) or adoption to prevent passing on HD. Thus, Purdy believes that in these circumstances, choosing to reproduce without attempting to mitigate the risk constitutes moral negligence or wrongdoing, emphasizing the importance of preventing preventable suffering.

Utilitarianism, particularly Mill’s version, provides a compelling argument in favor of (A)—the view that it is morally wrong for the couple to reproduce when there is a substantial probability of transmitting HD. Under Mill’s hedonistic, act utilitarianism, the right action is that which maximizes happiness and minimizes suffering for all affected parties. Reproducing in the presence of a high risk of passing on a severe disease like HD would likely result in significant suffering for the future child, the parents, and wider society. The affected child would inherit an incurable and debilitating condition, leading to a life marked by suffering and limited well-being. The parents may also experience profound grief, guilt, and emotional distress, while the societal costs of caring for individuals with HD—medical expenses, caregiving, and loss of productivity—are substantial. Conversely, avoiding reproduction or employing reproductive technologies to prevent HD transmission can prevent these harms, thereby increasing overall happiness and well-being. From a utilitarian viewpoint, the moral obligation hence inclines toward actions that prevent the passage of such serious genetic diseases, making (A) consistent with fulfilling the greatest happiness for the greatest number.

The principle of autonomy is often invoked in bioethics, emphasizing respect for individuals’ rights to make decisions about their own lives. In interpreting autonomy, I will adopt a version that recognizes individuals’ rights to autonomous reproductive choices, including the decision to have biological children. However, this principle can be challenged when considering the rights of future individuals—those who do not yet exist but will be affected by reproductive choices. The strongest argument against (A) based on autonomy is that preventing reproduction in cases of high genetic risk may infringe on the reproductive liberty of prospective parents. They might argue that they have the right to decide to have children, even if there is a risk of passing on genetic diseases, especially if reproductive technologies are imperfect or inaccessible. Nonetheless, the counterargument is that autonomy includes responsibilities not to cause unnecessary suffering to future individuals, which can limit reproductive choices when risks are known and severe. The strongest version of this argument suggests that respecting reproductive autonomy does not entail the right to knowingly bring into existence children destined to experience severe suffering. Therefore, respecting autonomy in this context might support restriction, but only if reproductive options to prevent suffering are reasonably available. Because reproductive autonomy involves balancing rights with responsibilities, and given the severity of HD, I find that pursuing preventive measures aligns better with respecting autonomy than ignoring the risk. Hence, I support (A) as morally obligatory, because preventing avoidable suffering respects both the interests of future individuals and the moral responsibility to minimize harm.

In conclusion, I believe that (A)—that it is morally wrong for the couple with a high risk of passing on HD to reproduce without attempting to avoid doing so—is true. The utilitarian argument demonstrates that the prevention of immense suffering and the promotion of overall happiness outweigh the individual right to reproduce unrestrictedly, especially given the availability of reproductive technologies. Additionally, respecting future individuals’ interests and well-being articulates a moral responsibility to prevent avoidable harm, which supports the view that reproduction in such circumstances is ethically impermissible without mitigation. While the principle of autonomy presents a nuanced challenge, its strongest interpretation still endorses reproductive restraint when significant risks are present, because it aligns with broader moral duties to prevent suffering and promote well-being. Therefore, reproductive choices in these contexts should be guided by moral considerations that prioritize reducing harm and maximizing happiness for all affected parties.

References

• Purdy, Laura M. (2001). “Genetics and Reproductive Risk: Can Having Children be Immoral?” In Moral Issues in Medicine, 3rd ed., 564-570.
• Mill, John Stuart. (1863). Utilitarianism. Longmans, Green and Co.
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• Sandel, Michael. (2004). The Case Against Perfection: Ethics in the Age of Genetic Engineering. Harvard University Press.
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