Read The Selection By David McCullough, Harry Truman: One T ✓ Solved

Read the selection by David McCullough, 'Harry Truman: One T

Read the selection by David McCullough, 'Harry Truman: One Tough Son-of-a-Bitch of a Man.' It is on pages in Portrait of America, 10th Edition. Write a well-reasoned essay addressing the following question: According to McCullough, what did President Truman feel was his most difficult decision while in office and why? Was his view of the decision shaped by his idea of the 'Lesson of Munich'?

The paper must be 3-4 pages in length. You must use Times New Roman 12pt. font and double-space your essay.

Paper For Above Instructions

Thesis: In McCullough’s portrayal, Truman’s most difficult decision as president was the decision to authorize the use of atomic weapons against Japan in 1945, a choice he believed necessary to end the war swiftly, minimize American casualties, and avert a costly invasion. That decision, McCullough implies, was not made in a vacuum; it was filtered through Truman’s insistence on decisive action and his sense that appeasement or delay would invite worse consequences—a mindset he interpreted, at least in part, through a postdating lens that some historians call the Lesson of Munich. The Munich reference, for Truman and his contemporaries, functioned as a warning against complacency in the face of aggressive powers and a justification for firm, sometimes ruthless measures to deter future aggression. This essay argues that Truman’s atomic decision exemplified a hard, calculated choice shaped by a fear of appeasement and a belief that American power must be used decisively to set the terms of postwar order.

First, McCullough presents Truman as a president who confronted an extraordinary moment of decision with high stakes and limited certainty. By mid-1945, with Allied victories imminent but not assured, the question loomed: would the United States invade Japan and incur immense casualties, or would it deploy a new weapon that promised a quicker end? McCullough emphasizes Truman’s sense of responsibility for American lives and for preventing a protracted war that could stretch into 1946 and beyond (McCullough, 1992). The argument that the bomb could shorten the war—saving both American and Japanese lives in aggregate—appealed to Truman's practical sense of duty as commander-in-chief. The decision, in other words, was not a symbolic gesture but a grim calculus about casualties, success, and the legitimacy of wartime policy (McCullough, 1992). This reading aligns with the broader historical record in which Truman’s tenure is framed by a relentless focus on outcomes and a willingness to act when the alternatives appeared worse.

Second, the decision is read in McCullough’s portrait as inseparable from Truman’s distrust of “soft” or delayed responses to existential threats. The so‑called Lesson of Munich—often invoked in Cold War historiography—cautions against appeasement and procrastination in the face of aggressors. Truman’s postwar rhetoric and policy prescriptions repeatedly insisted that yielding space to aggressors would only invite larger, more dangerous conflicts later. While Truman’s exact interpretation of Munich evolved in debate, his underlying logic resembled a preference for resolution by decisive action rather than drift toward negotiated settlements that might embolden opponents. The Munich frame, as interpreted in subsequent scholarship, functions here as a lens through which Truman justified rapid, uncompromising moves when confronted with a dangerous wartime decision (Kennan, 1947; Gaddis, 1982). In McCullough’s depiction, that frame helps explain why Truman would accept the moral and political costs of using a weapon that had no modern precedent: he believed that a strong, timely display of resolve could prevent greater destruction down the line (McCullough, 1992).

Third, the moral, strategic, and geopolitical dimensions of the atomic decision illuminate why it appeared so difficult. The choice carried unimaginable consequences—human suffering, ethical ambiguity, and the risk of unleashing a nuclear age whose long arc would define international relations. McCullough’s narrative foregrounds the need to weigh immediate war termination against the long-term implications of setting a precedent for atomic warfare. Contemporary scholarship supports the view that Truman’s decision was a watershed moment for U.S. foreign policy and military strategy, shaping both the postwar settlement and the U.S. approach to deterrence and diplomacy for decades to come (Alperovitz, 1995; Sherwin, 1975; Hasegawa, 2005). The moral complexity of the decision is acknowledged by historians who emphasize that the act reflected a synthesis of pragmatic wartime reasoning and the president’s own judgments about justice, necessity, and the responsibility of leadership (McCullough, 1992; Rhodes, 1986). In this sense, the decision was not merely about ending a war but about articulating a credible American posture in a fragile, rapidly changing international system (Gaddis, 1982; Gaddis, 2005).

Fourth, the decision to use atomic weapons must be read in the context of civilian control of the military and the political risk of leadership in crisis. Truman’s enforcement of civilian supremacy—reinforcing that strategic choices be made within the bounds of constitutional authority and democratic accountability—was itself a substantial political and personal risk. The act of authorizing such a weapon, while supported by some as a necessary expedient, also exposed the president to charges of moral ambiguity and strategic overreach. McCullough situates Truman’s choice within a broader pattern of his insistence on clarity of purpose and his readiness to shoulder responsibility for consequences, even when the public’s mood was uncertain or divided (McCullough, 1992). In the longer arc of U.S. foreign policy, this moment helped crystallize the dynamic tension between decisive action and the ethical responsibilities of power, a tension that scholars continue to debate in light of the bomb’s human cost and the strategic lessons it produced (Alperovitz, 1995; Fried, 1990; Sherwin, 1975).

Finally, the consequences of Truman’s decision reverberated across American history and global politics. The atomic bomb changed military strategy, diplomacy, and international norms, catalyzing a nuclear era in which great powers sought to deter each other while competing for influence around the world. In McCullough’s account, Truman’s decision is a defining instance of leadership under pressure—one that problematized the costs of rapid, unilateral choice and forced the United States to confront questions of moral accountability, civilian oversight, and global responsibility in the new atomic age (McCullough, 1992). The Lesson of Munich, as a heuristic, remains a touchstone for how policymakers weigh the temptations of appeasement against the imperative of deterrence—an enduring theme in analyses of Truman’s presidency and the broader early Cold War order (Gaddis, 1982; Kennan, 1947).

References

• Alperovitz, Gar. The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth. Vintage, 1995.
• Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of Containment: A Critical History of American Foreign Policy During the Cold War. Oxford University Press, 1982.
• Gaddis, John Lewis. The Cold War: A New History. Penguin, 2005.
• Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. Racing the Enemy: Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the Atomic Bomb. Harvard University Press, 2005.
• Kennan, George F. The Sources of Soviet Conduct. Foreign Affairs, 1947.
• McCullough, David. Truman. Simon & Schuster, 1992.
• McCullough, David. Portrait of America, 10th Edition. (Contains the selection: 'Harry Truman: One Tough Son-of-a-Bitch of a Man.')
• Rhodes, Richard. The Making of the Atomic Bomb. Simon & Schuster, 1986.
• Sherwin, Martin J. A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and Its Aftermath. Knopf, 1975.
• Britannica. "Harry S. Truman." Encyclopedia Britannica Online, 2024.