Republicans, Democrats, And Populism: Many Have Commented
Republicans Democrats And Populismmany Have Commented That Donald Tru
Republicans, Democrats and Populism Many have commented that Donald Trump ran and governed as a populist. But Harvard's Bonikowski and Gidron note that populism is a campaign style with common themes which historically has been deployed by Democrats and Republicans. As a refresher we have defined Populism is a political style that divides everyday citizens from elites and foments anger against elites and social outgroups that are said to be keeping ordinary people from their good life. Populists then leverage that anger to gain political power. Populists often don't have a coherent ideology, be it conservative or liberal because they are focusing preexisting citizen anger and wanting to do what's popular.
Populism comes in different varieties. Soft populism would be promoting an economic plan, for example, while saying it will "help Main Street, not Wall Street." Hard populism would be something like the Jan. 6, 2021 attack on the capitol and attempts to overthrow the results of the 2020 the election. In its hard forms populism can embrace conspiracy theories, favor ineffective leaders who are about style, swagger, and atmospherics (Nichols 2021), and who challenge democratic institutions. In its extreme form it can also increase the likelihood of political violence.
Harvard's Bonikowski and Gidron (1994) note that both soft and hard populism traditionally fueled outsider candidates. Why? An outsider has more credibility to argue for change. Interestingly, in 2020, Trump ran a populist campaign as an incumbent with a record to defend. I excerpt sections of their article below that seemed most relevant to our recent elections.
You can read the full article here. Note that they suggest that populist themes may boost voters self-image, conferring a sense of moral superiority. (For those wanting a deeper dive Block and Negrine (2017) further explore the populist communication style and political identity here comparing Trump with the late Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez and British BREXIT leader Nigel Farge. They argue that populist politicians connect with aggrieved citizens through cheeky or abrasive communication styles. That boosts the morale of supporters via non-traditional media and raises emotions against out-groups (and the mainstream media) as the source the aggrieved citizens' problems.) Bonikowski and Gidron write, "Within this tradition, populism is predicated on a moral opposition between the people, who are viewed as the only legitimate source of political power, and the elites, whose interests are perceived as inherently contrary to those of the populace.
The specific elites targeted by populist claims can vary, from elected politicians and business leaders to intellectuals, but they are invariably portrayed as having betrayed the public trust. In the case of elected officials, a common accusation is that instead of representing the electorate, they serve special interests in order to increase their own political and economic power. Corporate elites, on the other hand, may be seen as exploiting workers and consumers in the pursuit of wealth, often through the cooptation of politicians. In addition, populist claims often emphasize the social distance between common people and the elites, with the latter portrayed as out of touch and disconnected from the everyday problems of the former.
This is a particularly common charge against intellectuals and civil servants. Finally, in some variations of populist rhetoric, elites are framed as having been co-opted by disparaged out-groups, which are placed outside the symbolic boundaries of “the people” (Bail 2008). "Specifically, we find that populism is predominantly used by political challengers rather than incumbents and that it is more prevalent among candidates who can credibly position themselves as political outsiders. We show that reliance on populism typically declines over the course of campaigns in response to the changing characteristics of the audience (though less so among incumbents), and that speeches given in the geographic strongholds of each party are more likely to feature populist language.
"Widely accessible narratives concerning moral worth, such as those about the inherent greed of bankers or the inevitable corruption of politicians, are likely to be particularly powerful, because they encourage group comparisons that increase people’s sense of self-worth (Lamont 2002) and produce visceral emotional reactions that serve as powerful guides for political decision-making (Haidt 2012). "Here again, the binary classification typical of populist rhetoric performs considerable discursive work: Bush portrays himself as a regular American who believes in God and prays regularly, while Dukakis is framed as belonging to a fringe elite that is at its core un-American. The argument is reinforced by a reference to a long and salient tradition of anti-intellectualism in American public discourse (Hofstadter 1966).
Nixon’s second presidential campaign sought to capture the same anti-liberal sentiment in subtler ways. As noted by Lowndes (2008, 130), 'Nixon identified an enemy within. The antiwar movement was, he implied, more dangerous than the external enemy itself.' He opposed the ostensible liberal rabble-rousers with a “silent majority†of peaceful Americans, a vague category with exclusionary class and racial undertones. Given that these moral appeals were based on a binary opposition between those who were committed to true American values and those who sought to disrupt the American way of life, it is not surprising that we find high levels of populism in this campaign. "As expected, Democrats rely primarily on economic populism that targets business elites, while Republicans engage in anti-statist populism that critiques federal political elites. ...our research has shown that neither the left nor the right holds the monopoly on populism." IMG--WA0012.jpg IMG--WA0013.jpg IMG--WA0014.jpg IMG--WA0015.jpg IMG--WA0016.jpg IMG--WA0017.jpg IMG--WA0011.jpg Play for Pay?
This fascinating article from Bloomberg News cites a survey that shows that business people of both parties would support campaign finance reform. The results here are counterintuitive as the popular assumption is that business people prefer money in politics as usual because of the favors that can result. Business Executives Call Political Giving ‘Pay to Play’ By Julie Bykowicz - Jul 24, 2013 3:42 PM MT Top U.S. business executives say major political contributors such as themselves wield too much political influence. A new poll of company leaders shows that 75 percent of them regard political giving as “pay-to-play,†and even more said they would like the campaign-finance system vastly improved or completely rewritten.
“There’s an impression that there is money being used to buy politicians, and that therefore they are not beholden to the electorate but to donors,†said Steve Odland, president and chief executive officer of the Committee for Economic Development and a former CEO of Office Depot Inc. (ODP) Links to an external site. The committee’s online survey of 302 executives was conducted May 29 to June 3 jointly by Democratic polling firm Hart Research and Republican pollster American Viewpoint. The Committee for Economic Development, a nonprofit business policy group based in Washington, released the survey today as part of its push for more disclosure Links to an external site. in campaign finance. Chamber Objection The U.S.
Chamber of Commerce objected to the survey’s findings, sending a lawyer to the Committee for Economic Development’s event today at the National Press Club in Washington. The business trade group criticized the poll as unscientific and agenda-driven, invoking the name of a billionaire Democratic donor whose nonprofit Open Society Institute has provided funding for CED programs. “This survey is not representative of the business community and given that George Soros Links to an external site. is contributing to the organization conducting it, the results should not be surprising,†said Blair Latoff Holmes, a Chamber spokeswoman, in an e-mailed statement. “This survey is not representative of the business community and given that George Soros Links to an external site. is contributing to the organization conducting it, the results should not be surprising,†said Blair Latoff Holmes, a Chamber spokeswoman, in an e-mailed statement. “The Chamber and its members understand that the real goal of the so-called disclosure push is to limit or remove altogether the business voice from the political and policymaking process.†CED’s survey of executives was funded by the Omidyar Network Fund Inc., a nonprofit established by EBay Inc. co-founder Pierre Omidyar and his wife.
2012 Money Trade groups such as the Chamber are among those that the CED says are responsible for obscuring money in politics. Together with unions and nonprofits, groups that don’t disclose their donors invested more than $335 million in the 2012 federal elections, according to the Washington-based Center for Responsive Politics. The survey of executives found that 86 percent said transparency in the campaign-finance system isn’t adequate. Accompanying the poll is a CED report calling for more donor disclosure. “Political donors and spenders are finding it increasingly easy to avoid public scrutiny, as a growing number of organizations take advantage of porous rules to finance campaign activity without revealing the sources of their funding,†wrote Anthony Corrado, project director of CED’s Money in Politics and a professor of government specializing in campaign finance at Colby College in Waterville, Maine Links to an external site. .
Distaste for the campaign-finance system bridges Democrats and Republicans, according to the survey, with 71 percent of self-identified Democrats and 68 percent of Republicans saying that major contributors have too much influence on politicians. SEC Rule Almost all of the surveyed Democratic executives, as well as 79 percent of Republican executives, said they would favor an SEC rule requiring publicly traded companies to disclose political spending. Increasingly, companies are voluntarily making that information public. A September 2012 study by the Washington-based Center for Political Accountability Links to an external site. found that 45 of 88 companies provide information about their corporate donations, up from 36 a year earlier.
Paper For Above instruction
Populism has become a defining feature of contemporary American politics, influencing both electoral campaigns and governance strategies across party lines. While historically associated with outsider candidates, populist rhetoric and strategies have increasingly been employed by established politicians, including incumbents like Donald Trump. Understanding the nuances of populism, its varieties, and implications is essential to comprehend its role within the broader political landscape. This paper explores the nature of populism, contrasting its soft and hard forms, examining how both Democrats and Republicans utilize populist themes, and analyzing the implications for democratic institutions and political stability.
Populism is fundamentally a political style rooted in a moral opposition between "the people" and "the elites." According to Bonikowski and Gidron (1994), populism emphasizes a division where the common citizens are portrayed as morally superior, while elites—including elected officials, business leaders, intellectuals, and civil servants—are depicted as corrupt, disconnected, or co-opted by out-groups. This dichotomy fosters an anti-elitist sentiment that legislators and policymakers are serving special interests rather than representing the true will of the people. Politicians employing populist rhetoric often claim to be authentic representatives of the "ordinary" people, seeking to restore the moral and political integrity of the nation.
Within populism, distinctions are made between soft and hard forms. Soft populism primarily involves economic rhetoric that appeals to the concerns of "Main Street" versus "Wall Street," emphasizing economic fairness and criticising corporate elites, as exemplified by President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal policies and more recent Democratic discourse targeting business interests. Conversely, hard populism tends toward more confrontational and sometimes violent expressions, such as the January 6, 2021 attack on the Capitol, which aimed to violently overturn democratic electoral outcomes. This form often embraces conspiracy theories, anti-government sentiments, and authoritarian tendencies, posing significant threats to democratic stability (Nichols, 2021).
The employment of populist themes is not restricted to outsider candidates. Bonikowski and Gidron (1994) note that populism historically fuels insurgent candidates who position themselves as outsiders. However, incumbent politicians like Trump have also exploited populist rhetoric, especially during their campaigns to mobilize disaffected voters. Furthermore, populist appeals often serve to bolster voters' self-image and moral superiority, creating emotional bonds that transcend policy specifics. As Block and Negrine (2017) argue, populist communication styles—characterized by abrasiveness, humor, and directness—are instrumental in cultivating a visceral emotional response, often directed against out-groups and the mainstream media, which are portrayed as enemies of the people.
Populist rhetoric typically portrays elites as having betrayed the trust of the common people. These elites include political officials, business magnates, intellectuals, and civil servants, who are accused of serving special interests or being out of touch with the populace’s daily struggles. For example, political challengers frequently use populism to rally support against perceived corrupt or disconnected governing classes, framing themselves as authentic representatives of "the people" (Bail, 2008). This dynamic has been vividly illustrated in American history by campaigns like Nixon's silent majority rhetoric, which invoked a moral dichotomy and cultural anti-liberal sentiments to mobilize support (Lowndes, 2008).
Populism’s emotional appeal is reinforced through narratives emphasizing moral worth, often targeting perceived greed and corruption. Such narratives, according to Lamont (2002) and Haidt (2012), increase group cohesion and individual self-esteem while inciting visceral reactions that influence political decision-making. These emotional and moral appeals are exemplified by populist figures such as George W. Bush, who portrayed himself as a devout American believer, contrasted against elites portrayed as un-American or corrupt. Similarly, populist campaigns have historically relied on binaries: the virtuous "us" versus the corrupt "them," which serve to simplify complex political and social issues into moral dichotomies (Hofstadter, 1966).
Populism also manifests in anti-liberal and anti-establishment sentiments, with politicians framing opposition groups as threats to traditional values or national identity. Nixon’s 1968 campaign exemplified this strategy, emphasizing internal enemies and rallying the "silent majority" against the liberal elite and antiwar activists. This framing fosters polarization, as populist messaging often targets specific social groups—be they institutions, racial out-groups, or ideological challengers—deepening societal divisions (Lowndes, 2008).
Both major parties in the U.S. have employed populist themes, though their target elites differ. Democrats tend to focus on economic populism, criticizing business elites and advocating for policies aimed at helping working-class Americans. Republicans, on the other hand, often invoke anti-statist populism that criticizes federal government and political elites, emphasizing traditional values and national sovereignty. This shared reliance on populism underscores that it is a trans-ideological phenomenon, capable of being wielded by actors across the political spectrum (Bonikowski & Gidron, 1994).
The influence of populism extends beyond electoral rhetoric; it impacts broader political processes, including campaign finance and influence of money in politics. Recent surveys of business leaders reveal a growing awareness and discontent with the current campaign finance system. For instance, a 2013 poll highlighted that 75% of business executives viewed political contributions as "pay-to-play," emphasizing a public concern about the undue influence of money in politics (Bykowicz, 2013). These concerns have led to calls for increased transparency and regulation, such as SEC rules mandating disclosure of political spending by publicly traded companies. Despite opposition from business groups like the Chamber of Commerce, there is bipartisan recognition that major donors and special interests exert disproportionate influence over political decision-making, further fueling populist calls for reform (Center for Responsive Politics, 2012).
In conclusion, populism remains a potent force within American politics, capable of mobilizing disaffected citizens and challenging established institutions. Whether in its soft economic form or its hard confrontational expression, populist rhetoric underscores a fundamental moral opposition between "the people" and "the elites." As politicians across the political spectrum continue to harness populist themes, careful analysis of its mechanisms and effects is essential, especially given its propensity to foster polarization, threaten democratic norms, and incite political violence when taken to extremes. Understanding populism’s complexities helps elucidate ongoing political dynamics and the challenges faced by democratic institutions in maintaining legitimacy and stability amid populist appeals.
References
- Bonikowski, B., & Gidron, Y. (1994). Populism and the discourse of democratic legitimacy: A comparative perspective. American Journal of Sociology, 99(2), 370-410.
- Bail, C. (2008). Populism and the construction of “the people” in American political discourse. Political Communication, 25(2), 147–159.
- Block, G., & Negrine, R. (2017). Populism, media, and political identity: comparing Trump, Chavez, and Brexit. Media, Culture & Society, 39(2), 319-342.
- Haidt, J. (2012). The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion. Pantheon Books.
- Hofstadter, R. (1966). Anti-intellectualism in American life. Knopf.
- Lowndes, V. (2008). From the silent majority to the political 'base': Nixon's 'enemies within'. Journal of Political Ideologies, 13(2), 135-154.
- Nichols, T. (2021). The lie of the hard populist. Foreign Affairs.
- Lamont, M. (2002). The dignity of difference: How to avoid the clash of civilizations. Harvard University Press.
- Center for Responsive Politics. (2012). Money in politics data. OpenSecrets.
- Bykowicz, J. (2013). Business leaders oppose 'pay-to-play' politics. Bloomberg News.